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Abstract 
 
This exploration of the Sheffield armaments industry focuses on four in-depth 
case studies of John Brown, Cammell-Laird, Thomas Firth and Hadfields to 
examine the business and technology of the industry. It builds on the work of 
Tweedale and Trebilcock on Sheffield and armaments, and advances the 
argument that during the period of study from 1900 to 1930, the city was one of 
the most important centres for armaments research and production anywhere in 
the world.  
 
The business of the armaments industry is explored through an examination of 
the evolving links the industry had with the Government against the backdrop of 
an uncertain trading environment, and the managerial connections established 
between the state and private industry. Also explored are the collaborative, 
collusive and independent defensive measures enacted by the industry to 
counter uncertainty in the industry, through collaborative business 
arrangements and various approaches to entering international markets for 
armaments. An examination of the business of the armaments industry also 
highlights the value of the technological investment made by the industry.  
 
At the centre of exploring the technology of the armaments industry, a 
reconstruction of its technological history is undertaken using patent and 
archival records, highlighting the nuances and research dead-ends of 
development in the industry. Of central importance is the notion of spin-off and 
the interactions between armaments and metallurgical developments in the 
creation of a pool of knowledge to be utilised for future research into alloy 
steels, and the notion of path-dependent technological research. Also advanced 
is the concept of an innovation system centred on Sheffield, and an exploration 
of the important national and international links advanced by the industry.  
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Candidates Statement 
 
The objectives of this research were as follows. Using four case studies, the 
research set out to examine the technological development of armaments, the 
industrial district in which the Sheffield armaments industry was situated, the 
marketing involved and the connections developed to home and foreign 
governments by members of the industry, and the specialised management 
required for armaments research, production, and marketing, across the period 
1900-1930. To achieve this, the archival business records and patents of the 
case studies were consulted. Published sources have been referenced 
throughout with footnote citations and are included in the bibliography in full.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
This study explores the business and technology of the Sheffield armaments 
industry through the examination of four company case studies in John Brown, 
Thomas Firth, Charles Cammell and Hadfields. Using a thematic approach, the 
research will explore the technological development of armaments, the 
industrial district in which the Sheffield armaments industry was situated, the 
marketing involved and the connections developed to home and foreign 
governments by members of the industry, and the specialised management 
required for armaments research, production, and marketing. Commencing in 
1900, when large numbers of orders were placed with private industry due to 
the Boer War, this study examines the three decades through to 1930, when 
steel rationalisation programmes changed the structure of the industry. The 
research builds principally on the work of Trebilcock on the armaments industry, 
and the work of Tweedale on the Sheffield steel industry.1 By utilising the case 
studies outlined, new source material, and reconstructing the technological 
history of the industry from the use of published patent records, a number of 
refinements and revisions can be made to key aspects of knowledge regarding 
the Sheffield armaments industry. In his seminal work on the Sheffield steel 
industry, Tweedale highlights that:  
The subject of the Sheffield armaments industry – the significance of 
which may be appreciated by the simple fact that all but one (Armstrong-
Whitworth) of the traditional arms firms originated in the town – demands 
                                            
1
 See R.C, Trebilcock, „A „Special Relationship‟ – Government, Rearmament, and the Cordite 
Firms‟, Economic History Review, Vol.19, No.2 (1966); C. Trebilcock, „”Spin-Off” in British 
Economic History: Armaments and Industry, 1760-1914‟, Economic History Review, Vol. 22, No. 
3 (1969), pp.474-90; C. Trebilcock, „Legends of the British Armament Industry 1890-1914: A 
Revision, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.5, No.4 (1970), pp.3-19; C. Trebilcock, „British 
Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914‟, Economic History Review, Vol.26, 
No.2. (1973), p.254-272; C. Trebilcock, „Radicalism and the Armament Trust‟, Edwardian 
Radicalism 1900-1914 (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp.180-201; C. Trebilcock, 
„War and the failure of industrial mobilization: 1899 and 1914‟ in J.M. Winter, War and Economic 
Development, Essays in the memory of David Joslin (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1975); C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914 (London, 
Europa Publications, 1977); C. Trebilcock, „Science, Technology and the Armaments Industry in 
the UK and Europe, with special reference to the Period 1880-1914‟, The Journal of European 
Economic History, Vol.22, No.3 (1993); and G. Tweedale, Steel City: Entrepreneurship, Strategy 
and Technology in Sheffield 1743-1993 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), especially Chapter 5: 
Arsenal of the World.  
2 
a whole book in itself. Certainly it deserves closer attention than it has 
received in most studies about the industry.2 
Tweedale also highlights the work of Trebilcock and Davenport-Hines on the 
Sheffield armaments industry, principally in relation to Vickers, and for taking a 
critical approach to the subject.3 Nevertheless, a work on the Sheffield 
armaments industry is still absent among studies of British business history, a 
historiographical gap which this thesis will readdress.4  
While a number of studies have been conducted on the armaments 
industry in Britain, there are some limitations which can be highlighted. Firstly, 
there has been a trend to examine the period prior to 1914, and from 1918 to 
1939 as two distinct periods in the history of the armaments industry, with 
business actions in the Great War overlooked and discussions of continuity and 
change in the industry across a longer period not fully examined.5 Secondly, 
                                            
2
 Tweedale, Steel City, p.71. 
3
 Tweedale is specifically referring to Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers and R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, 
Dudley Docker: The Life and Times of a Trade Warrior (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), Chapter 8: Armaments, Electricity and Rolling Stock. See also R.P.T. Davenport-
Hines, The British Armaments Industry during Disarmament (Unpublished Thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 1979); R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, „Vickers Balkan Conscience: Aspects of Anglo-
Romanian Armaments 1918-39‟, in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines (Eds.), Business in the Age of 
Depression and War (London, Frank Cass, 1990), pp.253-285; R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, „The 
British Marketing of Armaments 1885-1935‟ in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, Markets and Bagmen: 
Studies in the History of Marketing and British Industrial Performance 1830-1939 (Aldershot, 
Gower Publishing, 1986); R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, „Vickers as a Multinational Before 1945‟, in 
G. Jones, British Multinationals: Origins, Management and Performance (Aldershot, Gower 
Publishing, 1986).  
4
 There is one local history book which has been produced, with little new information or 
analytical value. See S. Dalton, Sheffield: Armourer to the British Empire (Barnsley, Wharncliffe 
Books, 2004).  
5
 The key examples of this are Trebilcock, Spin-Off; Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers; Davenport-
Hines, The British Armaments Industry during Disarmament; Davenport-Hines, Vickers Balkan 
Conscience; G.A.H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars: A 
Reappraisal of Rearmament (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1988); A. Slaven, „A Shipyard in 
Depression: John Browns of Clydebank 1919-1938‟ in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines (Eds.), Business 
in the Age of Depression and War (London, Frank Cass, 1990); J. Singleton, „Full Steam 
Ahead? The British Arms Industry and the Market for Warships, 1850-1914‟ in J. Brown and 
M.B. Rose, Entrepreneurship, Networks and Modern Business (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1993); E.F. Packard, Whitehall, Industrial Mobilisation and the Private 
Manufacture of Armaments: British State-Industry Relations, 1918-1936 (London School of 
Economics, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2009); R. Lloyd-Jones, and M.J. Lewis, „Armaments 
Firms, The State Procurement System, and the Naval Industrial Complex in Edwardian Britain‟, 
Essays in Economic and Business History, Vol.29, No.1 (2011), pp.23-39; G. Marchisio, 
Battleships and Dividends: The Rise of Private Armaments Firms in Great Britain and Italy 
c.1860-1914, (Durham University, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2012). There are also some 
exceptions, including D. Edgerton, „Public Ownership in the British Arms Industry, 1920-1950‟ in 
R. Millward and J. Singleton, The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain 1920-1950 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995); A.J. Arnold, „”In Service of the State”? 
Profitability in the British Armaments Industry 1914-1924, Journal of European Economic 
History, Vol.27, No.2 (1998), pp.285-314; D. Edgerton, Warfare State, Britain 1920-1970 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006); S.C. Sambrook, The Optical Munitions 
Industry in Great Britain, 1888-1923 (London, Pickering and Chatto, 2013).  
3 
there has been limited exploration of the process of technical change in one of 
the first scientifically influenced industries.6 Thirdly, studies of Vickers and 
Armstrong have dominated writing on the industry, given their position as 
principally armaments companies with diversified interests in steel and 
shipbuilding, perpetuated by the longer availability of their business records 
over other companies in the sector.7 Consequently, there has been a focus on 
the armaments industry as an adjunct of the shipbuilding industry, with warship 
production and procurement a prevailing feature.8 With the exception of 
Tweedale‟s work on the wider Sheffield steel industry, prior studies have placed 
less attention on the importance of Sheffield as not just a productive centre, but 
perhaps the most important inventive centre for armaments in the country. 
Previously, attention has been placed on other industrial centres related to 
armaments, Bastable suggesting that „the true symbol of British naval power 
was not the great battleships on the seas but the great armament factories at 
Elswick.‟9 Nevertheless, it is essential to not overlook that in addition to being 
connected to shipbuilding, the armaments industry was also an important 
adjunct of the steel industry. As two of Vickers‟ directors observed in 1931, 
                                            
6
 A basic narrative of the armaments industry which deals with technology in a very broad sense 
was written in 1945, with little attention paid to the business of armaments. See J.F.C. Fuller, 
Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of 
Classical Warfare to the Second World War (New York, Charles Scribner‟s Sons, 1945). In the 
1950s, armour production received some attention; see A.D. Stacey, An Historical Survey of the 
Manufacture of Naval Armour by Vickers Sons & Co., and their Successors (Sheffield, 
Unpublished Typescript, 1956). Some discussion of the interplay between business, innovation 
and the British government has also been provided by McNeill. See W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit 
of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society Since A.D.1000 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1983), Chapter 8: Intensified Military-Industrial Interaction 1884-1914. More recent general 
works have also begun to explore the technology and production of armour. See D. C. Oldham, 
A History of Rolled Heavy Armour Plate Manufacture (Sheffield, South Yorkshire Industrial 
Heritage Society, 2010) and D. Boursnell, Forging the Fleet: Naval Armour and the Armour 
Makers, 1860-1916 (Sheffield, Sheffield Industrial Museums Trust Press, 2016). 
7
 The main works in this area are J.D. Scott, Vickers: A History (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1962); Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers; K. Warren, Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth in 
Engineering and Armaments to the Merger with Vickers (London, Macmillan, 1989); M. J. 
Bastable, Arms and the State: Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 
1854-1914 (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004); K. Warren, Armstrong: The Life and Mind of an 
Armaments Maker (Berwick, Northern Heritage, 2011). Davenport-Hines, Disarmament, and 
Packard, Whitehall also draw their conclusions based on predominantly examining Vickers. 
Elsewhere, when Steven Tolliday‟s work on the British steel industry explores armaments, it too 
only focuses on Vickers and Armstrong. See S. Tolliday, Business, Banking and Politics – The 
Case of British Steel 1918-1939 (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1987).  
8
 For instance, see S. Pollard, and P. Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 1870-1914 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979), Chapter 10: The Influence of the State; C. 
More, „Armaments and Profits: The Case of Fairfield‟, Business History, Vol.24, No.2 (1982), 
pp.175-185; Warren, Armstrongs; Slaven, „A Shipyard in Depression‟; Singleton, „Full Steam 
Ahead‟. 
9
 Bastable, Arms and the State, p.223. 
4 
„Steel is the foundation of the armament business.‟10 Furthermore, writing in the 
1920s, John Brown‟s chairman Baron Aberconway estimated that before the 
Great War Sheffield made about 70% of all the armour made for British 
warships, and 70% of war material made by private companies, including guns, 
gun forgings, shell and projectiles, and steel for small arms.11 
 Of the five companies involved in the Sheffield armaments industry, 
Vickers, Brown, Firth, Cammell and Hadfields, the latter four have received 
limited attention in studies of the British armaments industry, and as already 
outlined form the core of investigation for this study. Vickers, whose River Don 
Works were in Sheffield, is excluded for a number of reasons. As already 
highlighted, much has already been written on the company, and by 1914 
Vickers were a large national company with ten productive facilities in the UK. 
Most importantly, the four companies under investigation were steel companies 
with a significant interest in armaments, while Vickers evolved into an 
armaments company with an interest in steel. Such was the diversification of 
Vickers‟ business in the Edwardian period it would be misleading to suggest 
they were principally a steel company.12 Viewing the armaments industry as an 
adjunct of the steel industry is central to this exploration of the Sheffield 
armaments industry. It is acknowledged that while Brown and Cammell also had 
access to shipbuilding facilities, the core of their business remained in steel.  
Situated in the East End of Sheffield (See Map 1), the companies 
selected for this research have all been the subject of studies which cover their 
history, with armaments receiving varying levels of attention.13 While describing 
Sheffield as „The Arsenal of the World‟, the close proximity of each company‟s 
works and research facilities led a contemporary observer to note in 1918 that:  
                                            
10
 Quoted in Davenport-Hines, Disarmament, p.157. 
11
 Lord Aberconway, The Basic Industries Of Great Britain, Chapter 3, Part 2: Sheffield Steel, 
1927, p.61. 
12
 B. Collier, Arms and the Men: The Arms Trade and Governments (London, Hamish Hamilton, 
1980), p.67. On Vickers, Collier suggests of their expansion plans: „it must become not so much 
a steel firm with a substantial interest in the arms trade as an armament firm with a substantial 
interest in steel.‟  
13
 See A.C. Marshall and H. Newbould, The History Of Firths 1842-1918 (Sheffield, 1925); A. 
Grant, Steel and Ships: The History of John Brown’s (London, Michael Joseph, 1950); A.W. 
McKears, The First 100 Years: Hadfields of Sheffield (Sheffield, Unpublished Duplicate 
Typescript, 1973); E. Mensforth, Family Engineers (London, Ward Lock Ltd, 1981); K. Warren, 
Steel, Ships and Men: Cammell Laird and Company 1824-1993 (Liverpool, Liverpool University 
Press 1998). Maltby‟s work on Hadfields‟ AGMs also explores armaments issues. See J. 
Maltby, „Hadfields Ltd: Its Annual General Meetings 1903-1939 and their Relevance for 
Contemporary Social Reporting‟, The British Accounting Review, Vol.36, No.4 (2004), pp.415-
439. 
5 
It is said of the great East End Armaments Works in Sheffield that whilst 
on one side of the road a firm is inventing an armour-plate that will resist 
the most formidable piercing shell made, an establishment on the other 
side of the way is producing a shell against which nothing can possibly 
stand. It is almost as if the irresistible were meeting the immovable.14  
This had been true for the previous 20 years. Overall before the Great War, 
Sheffield was perhaps the world centre of armaments production and research, 
with licensing agreements and sales across the globe. The two armour plate 
producers, Brown and Cammell, commenced manufacture in the early 1860s 
and for more than two decades had a virtual monopoly of supply to the 
Admiralty. Firth commenced shell and projectile manufacture around the time of 
the Crimean War, their counterparts in Hadfields experimenting with ordnance 
production from 1878. The growth of the industry from the late 1880s stemmed 
from a decision by Jackie Fisher, the Admiralty Director of Naval Ordnance in 
1886. Fisher:  
demanded and was accorded the legal right to purchase from private 
firms any article that the arsenal could not supply quickly or more 
cheaply. Though no one realised it at the time, this decision soon gave 
private arms makers an effective monopoly on the manufacture of naval 
heavy weapons.15  
This decision saw an expansion in the number of private companies in the 
armaments industry, with Vickers commencing gun and armour production in 
Sheffield from 1888 with the passing of the Naval Defence Act the same year. 
The growth of the industry thereafter was based on the need to expand the 
facilities for armaments production in Britain. As Ashworth has suggested:  
For warships and armaments the gradually increasing reliance on private 
enterprise seems to have come more from a need to call on greater 
productive capacity than from any comprehensive assessment of 
economic advantages.16 
 
                                            
14
 Sheffield City Library (SCL), Sheffield, The World’s Arsenal, 1918.  
15
 McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p.271.  
16
 W. Ashworth, „Economic Aspects of Late Victorian Naval Administration‟, Economic History 
Review, Vol.22, No.3. (1969), pp.491-505.  
6 
 
Map 1: Sheffield East End, 1920. Adapted from Ordnance Survey Map 1924. 
 
The growth and consolidation of the industry in the late Victorian and Edwardian 
period saw the development of a number of national and international 
connections in the industry. However, the industry received some criticism 
during this time of expansion. There were attacks on what was termed the 
„International Armaments Trust‟ by Radicals in the Edwardian period, but much 
of their evidence was based on speculation and hearsay rather than solid 
facts.17 In discussing armaments in the years prior to the Great War, Stevenson 
has highlighted that:  
There seems little basis for a primarily technological explanation of the 
intensified competition between about 1910 and the outbreak of 
war…armaments were viewed more generally as a defensive insurance 
                                            
17
 Trebilcock, Radicalism. 
7 
premium, a deterrent, and an instrument of diplomatic leverage than as 
the means of military aggression.18 
The companies involved in armaments manufacture saw what they produced as 
a symbol of the power of the British Empire and a means of preventing rather 
than inciting wars.19 
One of the main reasons the Sheffield armaments industry has not been 
examined in detail is due to the limited availability of archival sources. Only 
relatively recently have the records of Sheffield steel companies become 
obtainable following donations and company closures, and very few have been 
fully catalogued. During the course of this study the records of Firth were 
catalogued and made available from Sheffield Archives, along with a limited 
number of records from Brown covering 1903-24 deposited with the Firth 
collection in 1993. The records of Hadfields, donated to Sheffield Archives in 
the early 1980s, and the English Steel Corporation records deposited in 1988 
are so extensive they are still being processed by archive staff. Despite 
covering the late 1920s to the 1960s, the English Steel Corporation collection 
contains some important records regarding armaments production after the 
Great War. Finally the records of Cammell, long thought lost following Second 
World War bombing of their factories, were discovered when their Birkenhead 
Shipyard was closed in 1993 and consequently deposited at the Wirral Archives 
Service where a simple box list is available.20 Without the opening up of these 
records, this study would not have been possible. However, these records are 
relatively limited regarding the technology of the industry, and few contemporary 
records discuss the development of armaments technology in any detail.21 
 In light of this scarcity, patents are used as the only source available 
which documents the evolution of armaments technology between 1900 and 
1930.22 Much like in the electrical and aviation industries, the filing of patents 
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was routine in the armaments industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.23 The use of patents can have its pitfalls, the main critique that they 
are not „synonymous with inventive activity or invention‟ and that few inventors 
ever left records detailing why they invented and in the areas they chose.24 
Patents also only „capture the most formalised part of technological knowledge,‟ 
that which has been codified into explicit knowledge to allow its transmission.25 
Nevertheless, with no alternatives patents are the best available means of 
reconstructing the technological history of the industry. The collection of these 
records commenced with the identification in company archives of relevant and 
important patents, which allowed for the correct filings to be found. The 
development of databases such as EspaceNet has aided the research, as 
patents can be searched for by inventor and company names where they 
appear, and also facilitates the discovery of other inventors involved in the 
development of armaments technology.26 All of the patents emanating from 
each company and named inventor during the period of the study were 
examined to fully explore the relationships between civilian and armaments 
technology in the industry. After identifying all of the relevant patent records, 
these were examined chronologically to identify the evolution of technological 
development and experimentation, and in turn highlight the nuances in designs, 
knowledge development and areas where civilian knowledge influenced 
armaments developments, and armaments knowledge was passed back to 
civilian researchers for further utilisation. This level of analysis facilitated the 
exploration of technological paths at each company, and added to an overall 
understanding of the successes and dead-ends discovered in research and 
development activities. 
 While this combination of primary sources has only recently been made 
available to researchers, there are also many secondary works on the industry 
which can be accessed. Since the inter-war period, much has been written on 
the armaments industry from a number of perspectives. Following the failure to 
induce unilateral disarmament in the 1920s a negative literature grew up in the 
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following decade which predominantly looked upon the armaments industry as 
a war-mongering, profiteering conglomerate.27 Much of this criticism was 
focused on the belief that the armaments industry caused wars, operated in 
rings to drive up profits, exercised extreme political influence to secure orders, 
and bribed foreign governments to buy their products.28 The German arms giant 
Krupp also received criticism, though a more balanced literature on the 
company grew from the 1950s despite discussions of their role in the 
rearmament of Germany and links to the Nazi party being included.29 In need of 
a figure to direct their vitriol against, many writers focused their critique of the 
industry on Sir Basil Zaharoff, a salesman from Vickers who became the 
proverbial „merchant of death‟.30 Zaharoff did himself no favours when he 
declared in 1933 that „I make wars so that I can sell arms to both sides.‟31 
However, more recent work on Zaharoff has emphasised his prominent role in 
communicating with the Ottoman Empire during the Great War on behalf of the 
British Government.32 Much of the evidence behind this negative press was 
proved questionable following the 1935-6 Royal Commission on the Private 
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Manufacture of and Trading in Arms.33 During the presentation of their evidence 
at the commission, unsurprisingly most companies emphasised the technical 
contributions private manufactures had made to the industry since the 1890s, a 
detail overlooked in the negative accounts of the industry.  
The work of Clive Trebilcock from the late 1960s began to counter the 
negative stereotypes of the industry.34 Trebilcock has, correctly, asserted that 
the companies and directors involved with armaments were not „merchants of 
death‟, but good businessmen, suggesting a general need to „assess the 
armament manufactury as a business and not as a moral problem.‟35 However, 
Trebilcock‟s conclusions are predominantly based on examining Vickers, and 
on other aspects of armaments production such as cordite. Consequently, there 
is scope to explore and provide revisions to some of the core elements and 
arguments advanced by Trebilcock through the case studies utilised in this 
research. 
 
Overview of Themes 
By examining the technology of the industry, the connections between 
armaments and metallurgy in the use, creation and transmission of knowledge 
derived from research and development activities at the companies involved will 
be explored. Furthermore, consideration will be given to the process of 
innovation in the industry, the approaches taken to developing refinements in 
the products manufactured, and the importance of connections between people 
and institutions in the process of research. In this regard, it advances the 
existence of an innovation system centred on Sheffield.  
The technological development of armaments was unlike any other 
research and development undertaken at the time. As Warren highlights:  
In no field of technology is „progress‟ so rapid as in the elaboration of 
means of mass destruction. The continuing flow of new processes or 
products requires incorporation into the manufacturing programme; 
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innovation must be slotted into place in the making of complex 
instruments of war.36 
Nevertheless, there is scope to expand our understanding with regards how and 
why armaments companies innovated the way they did. Research into the 
convergence of armaments and metallurgical technology is an area where more 
investigation is required to understand the connections between civilian and 
military research and development activities in private industry. Tweedale has 
highlighted that:  
almost everything else written about Sheffield steel tends to underrate 
the impact of armaments. Historians of metallurgy, in particular, have 
neglected this area, perhaps because they have been reluctant to stress 
the destructive uses of steel, or because the technology itself is often so 
inscrutable.37 
The history of metallurgy owes much to Tweedale‟s work on Sheffield and the 
key individuals involved in research and development.38 As Tweedale has 
stated, „By 1900 the science of metallurgy was definitely emerging, though the 
diffusion of ideas was slow.‟39 In discussing the use of chromium by armaments 
companies before the Great War, for example, Tweedale has suggested that 
„Much of the development work on these steels was highly secret and will 
probably never be known, but the importance of such research for the 
development of a superior understanding of the science of steel must have 
been immense.‟40 Trebilcock has also highlighted that the metallurgical research 
of armaments companies was decades ahead of their civilian counterparts.41 
Limbaugh‟s work on the mining of tungsten by the Nevada-Massachusetts 
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Company equally stresses that „as steel metallurgy advanced, so did 
experiments to improve arms and armour by using special alloys of nickel, 
manganese, chrome, tungsten and other materials.‟42 The influence of 
armaments research and development on metallurgy has been acknowledged 
elsewhere, Pollard stating that „metallurgical improvements emerged out of the 
rivalry of the armaments producers, with Vickers and Armstrongs in the lead.‟ 43 
However, there has been limited discussion or detail provided to what these 
metallurgical improvements are, and how they influenced future special steel 
developments. A more systematic review of research and development in 
armaments, steel and metallurgy is required, and forms a major element of this 
study.  
 The terms alloy steels and special steels are used in this study and 
require an introduction. Robert Abbott Hadfield, arguably the father of the 
modern age of alloy steels, offers the following definition:  
It is usual…to reserve the term “alloy steel” or “special steel” for steels 
which owe their properties to the presence of elements other than 
carbon, even though carbon still plays a vitally important part in 
determining the characteristics of the alloy… From the practical 
standpoint the importance of alloy steels lies in the fact that they yield a 
greater range of mechanical properties than can be obtained in simple 
carbon steels, whilst they also yield either new physical properties or new 
combinations of properties.44 
While armaments were central to the evolution of knowledge related to 
metallurgy and alloy steels in the early 1900s, they drew on the developments 
in this area since the 1860s. In experiments to advance tool steels, Robert 
Mushet discovered in 1868 that the addition of 7% tungsten to the composition 
of steel created a „self-hardening‟ tool steel, later marketed as „R. Mushet‟s 
Special Steel‟.45 This was certainly one of the major early breakthroughs in the 
development of metallurgy. Writing in 1925, Hadfield stressed that „In relation to 
our present-day knowledge, the armourer working with carbon steels and the 
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Mushets working with self-hardening alloy steel occupied the same plane of 
successful empiricism.‟46 Hadfield‟s research was particularly important to the 
early development of alloy steels. In 1882, his novel addition of 12% 
manganese to steel led to the first major alloy steel to go into production, its 
hard wearing properties useful in the production of tramway rails and crushing 
machinery.47 Hadfield also invented silicon steel in 1884, the material finding 
widespread use in the electrical industry and in the manufacture of electrical 
transformers.48  
A key feature of the armaments industry from 1888 was that „weapons 
technology evolved mostly from the research and development efforts of private 
entrepreneurs.‟ 49 Innovation was central to the continued vitality of the 
business, with research and development encouraged by the British 
Government. Consequently, companies in the industry committed themselves to 
a perpetual cycle of experimentation and investigation to maintain their status 
as armaments producers. As Trebilcock has suggested in his study of Vickers:  
Failure to innovate would be ruinous, failure to keep abreast with 
technological advance would be „destructively unprofitable‟, failure to 
maintain quality would mean a customer lost – and when a customer 
could be a whole country, quality was at a premium.50 
Given this supportive market environment, innovation became routine, requiring 
a „dependable capability in research and development‟ towards consistent 
scientific renewal rather than perfection.51 However, there is limited discussion 
regarding the complexity of the connections between armaments and 
metallurgical developments in previous studies. Gale has placed some 
acknowledgement on the link between armaments and metallurgy, stating that:  
In the last twenty years or so of the nineteenth century numerous 
experiments were also made on armour plate steels and on armour-
piercing alloys, which added considerable information to the store which 
was building up on the effect of alloying various elements with iron. 
Those were the days of the heavy capital ship in the world‟s navies, and 
it was for the arming and armouring of such ships that much of the 
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experimental work was done. Its main significance historically, however, 
is in the information it made available on nickel-steel alloys.52 
Elsewhere, there have been discussions regarding the emergence of metallurgy 
as being unguided by systematic research. Rosenberg has suggested that: 
the modern science of metallurgy had its origins in the need to solve 
practical problems that were associated with the emergence of the 
modern steel industry…metallurgy can be characterised as a sector in 
which the technologist typically “got there first,” that is, developed 
powerful technologies, or alloys, in advance of systematised guidance by 
scientists.53  
Nelson too highlights this form of metallurgical emergence.54 More generally, 
Edgerton has called for more firm and sector based explorations of research 
and development as a part of business history. Furthermore:  
Many innovations are based on combinations of different sciences and 
technologies, combinations which might be more easily identified where 
they were already part of the same firm or research laboratory… It might 
well be that firms produce firm-specific scientific and technological theory 
which can then be used to develop new products in a particular way, 
while another firm might have different theory and innovate in a different 
way – it is not therefore a question of being first with a theory.55 
This combination of different sciences was a key element of innovation with 
steel, metallurgy and armaments. More recently, Edgerton has highlighted how 
the history of technology has become a sector of study in its own right, and that 
„unfashionable‟ history disciplines such as business, economic and military 
history need to be further engaged with as part of technological investigations.56 
In this regard, elements of this study may be considered interdisciplinary; 
exploring the connections between business and technology in what was one of 
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the first examples of a systematic, scientifically informed approach to research 
and development. 
Central to exploring the technology of armaments is Trebilcock‟s concept 
of technological spin-off, which suggests that the development of armaments 
had a strong influence on the development of complementary civilian 
technologies in Britain and Europe.57 However, Trebilcock‟s ideas require 
qualification. While extensive in the examples provided which demonstrate spin-
off between industrial sectors, there are areas where Trebilcock offers 
observations regarding spin-off and armaments technological development 
where further research can provide key refinements to the paradigm, principally 
at the level of the company. Firstly, highlighted in the opening definition of spin-
off is that technological innovations may „merely travel the short distance 
between the weapons department of the munitions firm and the commercial 
engineering department often maintained by such organizations‟, though limited 
examples of such interactions are provided.58 Secondly, only briefly mentioned 
is the possibility of civilian industries influencing the development of armaments 
technology, with metallurgical, machine tool and chemical engineering 
industries highlighted. Trebilcock advances that „a two-way process was 
involved: arms technique had to draw upon these disciplines before, in its turn, 
it could hand down useful instructions to industry at large.‟59 This potential use 
of civilian knowledge to assist the research and development mechanisms at 
armaments companies is not explored further. The cases examined in this study 
will consider the extent to which refinements to Trebilcock‟s definition of spin-off 
can be made. Furthermore, to move beyond this definition of spin-off, this 
phenomenon may function as a two-way interaction between civilian and 
armaments research and development at a company. The evolution of 
armaments and commercially based metallurgy was part of a continuum, 
whereby the two fields could continually draw on each other for knowledge to 
drive forward the next product-based technological advance from either side of 
the industry. Principally, this is related to the utilisation of knowledge, and the 
individuals involved in its creation, transmission and usage. The spin-off of 
knowledge from research dead-ends also requires consideration, the examples 
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found from reconstructing the technological history of the industry which 
highlight where ideas failed to go into production, but useful lessons were 
learned. Nonaka and Takeuchi have suggested that „to create new knowledge 
means quite literally to re-create the company and everyone in it in an ongoing 
process of personal and organisational self-renewal.‟60 There is also a literature 
related to a knowledge based view of the firm, which reduces what a company 
does to simply the utilisation of knowledge and its exchange, though this is 
somewhat limited on how companies create knowledge.61 
As part of Trebilcock‟s analysis of spin-off, he suggests that an „interest 
in the scientific basis of manufacture set the armourers apart from the 
conservative mass of British industrialists and qualified them to act as 
technological leaders.‟62 One critique levelled against the spin-off paradigm 
drew attention to the monopolisation of nickel supplies by the armaments 
industry from their membership of the Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate. In 
response, Trebilcock referred to the commercial activities of the armaments 
companies and how their access to civilian markets promoted the use of nickel 
in the manufacture of alloy steels.63 One, more complex version of the spin-off 
paradigm has been suggested by Samuels, who examined the concept in 
relation to the development of the Japanese military.64 The benefits of spin-off 
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from the international business ventures of the armaments industry have also 
been explored by Trebilcock.65 
The process of armaments technological evolution is further explored 
through Rosenberg‟s notion of path dependency, which provides a framework 
for examining the development of armaments technologies, and the integration 
of civilian technology into armaments production. Rosenberg‟s approach 
highlights that „technological knowledge grows in distinctly path-dependent 
ways‟ and that a technological path begins with the development of a major 
innovation. A major innovation has the potential to trigger the development of a 
number of sub-innovations which serve to refine and advance the performance 
of the initial major innovation. As Rosenberg states, such developments „involve 
endless minor modifications and improvements in existing products, each of 
which is of small significance but which, cumulatively, are of major 
significance‟.66 Given the process of development in the armaments industry, 
we will be able to apply this notion of technological path dependence in order to 
fully understand the research and development history of the industry. 
The individuals involved in the process of technical development also 
require consideration. As Gospel has suggested, we should not overlook that 
„engineers and technical staff [have a] key role in the process of developing and 
implementing technological change.‟67 The predominant force for technological 
change in the armaments industry was the individual inventor-cum-technocrat, 
dedicated to the perfection of a design to fulfil a narrowly defined issue and 
predisposed to explore and satisfy every element of its design and function to 
absolution. In the pursuit of such an end, inventors frequently built on their prior 
experimentation and knowledge to create new sub-innovations which in 
isolation had limited function but when combined with other sub-innovations 
created a finished product. Consequently it is possible to view the path-
dependent development of armaments technology as inseparable from the 
research and development activities of its principal inventor. Consequently, the 
continued technological vitality of an armaments company may be dependent 
upon the continuity of its research team. Commercially, to be able to profit from 
their initial invention and designs, the inventor-cum-technocrat had two options; 
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they could employ some entrepreneurial skill and commence manufacture 
themselves or licence the patent rights to a company, which often led to a 
directorship at the firm. However:  
„…we should not too easily equate technological innovation with 
business entrepreneurship. A new technology, however brilliantly and 
elegantly designed, however efficiently it performs, does not necessarily 
guarantee being acknowledged as superior, nor does it necessarily bring 
business success.‟68 
Lipartito has suggested that technology was „one of the key determinants of 
business strategy‟ and that business historians have to ask what choices 
companies had in making the technological decisions which guided their 
strategy.69 He also highlights that „Innovative firms do not merely select from 
available technologies, they participate in the process of innovation, including 
setting the basic parameters that determine success and bringing artefacts and 
knowledge together with ambience.‟70 The model Lipartito advances places the 
company „at the crucial juncture points of all the interests that converge on 
technology.‟71 In this regard, exploring the nature of inter-firm links is central to 
any examination of armaments technology.  
The connections between armaments companies were an important 
element of their technological development, inter-firm competition also a proven 
driver of technological innovation in the industry.72 As Nelson suggests, „even 
among private for-profit entities, there is some sharing and openness about 
technology and other matters as well as proprietary rivalry.73 To explore this 
further the research utilises the concept of innovation systems.74 Building on the 
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work of Nelson and Rosenberg, innovation is viewed as „the processes by 
which firms master and get into practice product designs and manufacturing 
processes that are new to them, if not the universe or even to the nation,‟ while 
the system element emphasises „a set of institutional actors that, together, plays 
the major role in influencing innovative performance.‟75 Central to the concept is 
the value of connections between people, companies, universities and 
governments as a part of the innovation process. As Archibugi and Michie 
highlight, „crucial to the definition of a national system is how the different parts, 
such as universities, research centres, business firms and so on, interact with 
each other.‟76 However, Nelson and Rosenberg‟s work is chiefly concerned with 
national innovation systems, a concept they also stress as potentially too 
broad.77 To examine an innovation system in the Sheffield armaments industry, 
viewing the system as national does not accurately reflect the connections 
developed by actors in the industry, which had a local core in Sheffield and links 
across the globe. In this regard, more recent work on regional or local 
innovation systems does not reflect their experience either. Howells highlights 
that the concepts „can arguably be equally applied at a regional or local level‟ 
and provides an additional layer to the national systems of innovation approach 
rather than supplanting them.78 Sub-national innovation systems also „represent 
crucial arenas for localised learning and tacit know-how sharing.‟79 Furthermore, 
Nelson has highlighted that „innovation systems are not neatly divided by 
national borders.‟80 A trans-national innovation system with a concentrated local 
core in Sheffield is more appropriate, though a geographically bounded 
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description of the links between actors does not truly reflect the international 
nature of the industry. Armaments represent an example of the transmission of 
technology across national borders, counter to the suggestion that „technology 
is not easily transferable across countries‟81 To dispense with a spatially 
bounded definition, the simpler notion of a „technological innovation system‟ is 
most appropriate, with the addition of a description of the technologies 
involved.82 For this study the label „armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation 
system‟ is used to describe the important connections between actors in the 
industry. When exploring an innovation system, it is imperative to understand 
that „systems are made up of the interactions between the actors…in a system. 
Without any interaction between actors…it is difficult to accept that a system 
exists.‟83 Two additional points also require attention; firstly that systems can 
evolve over time, and „personal capitalism was a component part of the British 
NIS during the second industrial revolution.‟84 Both of these aspects are 
incorporated into this study. 
In production, the armaments industry involved „large-scale batch, rather 
than continuous assembly line production‟.85 Scranton highlights that „batch 
versatility was crucial to the introduction of crucible and tool steels and an array 
of specialty alloys.‟86 It is no coincidence that all of these examples were 
introduced in the Sheffield industries, where batch production became a core 
element of the area‟s commitment to the manufacture of specialised products. 
As companies diversified into armaments production, batch production 
techniques were transferred and became central to the specialised nature of 
armour plate and projectile manufacture. Where armaments differed from other 
uses of batch production was in the specialisation of their machinery, which 
resembled a producer utilising facilities to accelerate standardised products 
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rather than the general machinery favoured for batch flexibility.87 This was the 
curse of the armourer; so specialised was their plant that adaptation, central to 
batch production approaches, was only rarely possible and with extensive 
modifications required. The goal for the armaments companies was the 
utilisation of their productive facilities for commercial and armaments 
production, though this was increasingly difficult due to the omnipresent need 
for accuracy and uniformity during a production run. Much like a blacksmiths in 
the Middle Ages, who could use their furnaces and equipment to produce fire 
grates or shoe horses, and quickly use the same facilities to make swords and 
suits of armour, flexible adaptability and specialisation were at the core of the 
industry. This level of adaptability required each company to understand the 
resources at their disposal.88 Internally, the resources of a company were 
central to their successful utilisation of new technology, new techniques and 
new knowledge. A company‟s use of resources for another purpose may involve 
the existence of dynamic capabilities, which reflect the ability of a company to 
„integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments.‟89 The maintenance of dynamic capabilities also 
requires entrepreneurial management.90 
 Building on the technological development of the industry, the notion of 
Sheffield as an armaments focused industrial district is advanced. With the 
small number of companies in the Sheffield armaments industry, this group can 
be described as a „capsule‟ network, one which is „relatively small in 
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membership, self-contained and impermeable.‟91 The small number of members 
in the group may also promote trust among the actors, though Popp and Wilson 
have suggested that such high-trust networking „could shade into collusive 
behaviours and attitudes, reducing the responsiveness of firms and districts.‟92 
Finally, from the technological development of the members of the industry the 
notion of Sheffield as a knowledge cluster can be explored. In a knowledge 
cluster, technological information central to the development of an industry 
becomes commonly known among all actors in the grouping.93  
 The limited market for armaments, only purchased by national 
governments for their military services, made marketing the quality of a product 
and service paramount. Faced with a monopsonist British government, the 
armaments companies developed what Trebilcock describes as special 
relationships.94 This terminology is used for this research for continuity, with the 
caveat that „special‟ is used only to signify an unusual and distinctive 
relationship rather than something exceptional for the companies involved. The 
establishment and maintenance of these relationships required a close 
association of personnel, with ex-government and military appointments as 
company directors a common feature of the industry. The research considers 
the power relationship between the state and private industry in the building and 
development of these connections, and if any companies were viewed more 
favourably by the government. The evolving nature of this relationship is also 
considered beyond the Great War, with the decline of the industry requiring the 
protection of armaments capacity by the British Government. The international 
market, where the Sheffield armaments industry was highly active, also 
presented a number of challenges for the companies involved. The strategies 
employed for finding, exploiting and maintaining new foreign customers and the 
impact on the armaments companies business is explored in the study. The 
marketing of technology and the licensing agreements entered into by the 
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industry is also explored, with the use of printed marketing materials and brand 
names a usual method by which companies differentiated their products from 
competitors.  
Management of the industry is an omnipresent feature which has links to 
the other themes of this study. Of importance is management‟s role in exploring 
strategies to defend against the uncertain market for armaments with the British 
government. In addition to developing technological and marketing capabilities, 
this theme will also consider management‟s role in the development of the inter-
company relationships and wider collaboration in the industry, the development 
of director networks and the use of joint business ventures. Any discussion of 
management in British business history stems from the work of Alfred Chandler, 
who has explored the relative decline of British industry in relation to the 
persistence of personal capitalism. The general view presented suggests that 
Britain remained tied to personal forms of management, and failed to invest in 
new production techniques, salaried managers and appropriate marketing 
mechanisms.95 Chandler has also used the decline of the armaments industry 
after the Great War to demonstrate „continued failure in the older industries.‟96 
As Tweedale has stressed, using mass production as the yardstick against 
which industrial efficiency is measured certainly did not apply to the Sheffield 
steel industry.97 Chandler‟s approach to business history, focusing on the 
emergence of big business and viewing the multidivisional form of American 
enterprises as the ideal organisational form has come under criticism since its 
publication.98 Despite this disdain for the personally managed and family firm, 
further research has highlighted the persistence of family firms in the US, Japan 
and Germany at the same time as Britain and its perceived decline.99 Family 
firms are now recognised as representing the majority of businesses worldwide 
and the scholarship on family businesses is increasing across a number of 
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disciplines.100 Development based on adapting the Chandlerian paradigm to the 
study of British business by Toms and Wilson has drawn attention to the 
significance of external relationships and industrial districts to the British 
experience.101 The Harvard school of business history has perpetuated notions 
of British industrial and entrepreneurial decline in the wake of the Chandlerian 
paradigm, including the work of Dintenfass, and Elbaum and Lazonick.102 This 
view has been challenged in a technological context by Edgerton, who stresses 
that once we acknowledge that relative decline is not the same as doing badly, 
a new view of Britain emerges.103 The frequency of personally managed 
companies in Sheffield has also been explored by Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, who 
highlight that: 
Sheffield firms in the specialty-steel sector did invest in manufacturing 
and marketing, but their reluctance to invest in managerial hierarchies 
that would undermine their personal control did not inhibit their business 
success.104 
Into this specialty-steel bracket may appropriately be placed Brown, Cammell, 
Firth and Hadfields, their armament output the pinnacle of special steels 
technology before the Great War. However, the need to recruit specialists and 
the industry‟s evolving links with the state through the use of ex-government 
and military personnel may lead to a further revision of the notion of British 
industrial decline and personal capitalism. The technology involved and the 
markets available to armaments manufacturers were both exceptionally 
specialised and required appropriate investments in people and knowledge to 
exploit the limited commercial scope for their products. Overall, armaments 
companies do not fit the general „failure‟ model of family business. In exploring 
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Vickers, Trebilcock notes they did not „display the familiar symptoms of capital 
shortage, or technological lag, or entrepreneurial deficiency, or small size, or 
failure to escape from [their] family origins.‟105 This study will explore the extent 
to which Trebilcock‟s conclusions can also be applied across the Sheffield 
armaments industry. 
 
The Sheffield Armaments Industry in 1900 
In 1900 the Sheffield Armaments industry had begun to build the international 
and inter-company connections from which their position as the centre of world 
armaments technology and production would grow (See Figure 0.1). 
Acquisitions enabled Vickers and Brown to extend into shipbuilding, and Firth to 
commence manufacture of projectiles in the United States. The three armour 
plate manufacturers also had connections to the Harvey United Steel Company, 
the first group of its kind to co-ordinate the use of armaments technology and 
the collection and payment of royalties. Within Sheffield, the first connections 
between technocrats and companies related to projectile technology had begun 
to form, with Hadfields at the centre. These connections will be explained and 
elaborated on in more detail in the chapters which follow. The first two chapters 
in this study will explore the advancement of armaments technology between 
1900 and 1914. Chapter one focuses on the evolution of the armour piercing 
projectile, the connections between companies developed and the marketing of 
the technology. Chapter two examines armour plate technology, the emergence 
of metallurgical knowledge from armaments research, and the development of 
an armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation system with Sheffield at its centre. 
The second two chapters explore the business and management of armaments 
during the same period. Chapter three explores the links between the Sheffield 
armaments industry and the British Government, examining the business and 
directorships of each company and the nature of special relationships between 
the state and private industry. Chapter four studies the defensive measures 
implemented by the Sheffield armaments industry to counter the general 
uncertainty of the industry, though the development of the Coventry Ordnance 
works, and both individual and collaborative explorations of foreign markets.  
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Figure 0.1: The Sheffield Armaments Industry in 1900 
 
Finally, the last two chapters examine at the armaments business from 1914 to 
1930. Chapter five considers the utilisation and evolution of armaments 
technology during the Great War and the decade after, exploring productive 
27 
developments, the research required for updating armour piercing projectiles 
after the Battle of Jutland, and the use of knowledge developed from 
armaments in alloy steels after the conflict. Chapter six investigates the decline 
of the industry following the Great War, the death of special relationships, the 
uncertain business environment, and the managerial stagnation of the industry 
in the 1920s. 
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Chapter 1: Armaments Technology 1900-1914 – The Evolution of the 
Armour Piercing Projectile 
 
Commenting on the market-cum-technological environment in which the British 
armaments industry operated in 1900, Bastable has suggested that:  
The production of naval armaments acquired a strategic, political, 
economic and cultural momentum on a global scale by the turn of the 
century. Management of the huge industrial armaments companies 
occupied an important place in the vast military-industrial complexes that 
arose as the momentum of the naval armaments industry replaced 
technological innovation as the driving force of the business.1 
This viewpoint requires some revision and qualification; as the following two 
chapters will demonstrate, the evolution of armaments technology remained an 
important feature of the industry after 1900. Bastable nevertheless highlights a 
number of important aspects of the industry, but to suggest that technology was 
no longer one of the main driving forces behind the business takes attention 
away from the extensive experimental work undertaken by armaments 
companies in the Edwardian period. As Trebilcock has asserted, „in 1900 the 
armaments industry was, possibly, the most scientific of all industries,‟ and the 
largest armaments companies, Armstrong and Vickers, could spend up to 
£100,000 a year on experiments.2 This was not an industry with a declining 
interest in developing the most advanced armaments possible. Nowhere was 
this more apparent than in the improvement of armour piercing projectiles, a 
product which demonstrates the fusion of armaments and metallurgical 
knowledge. Examining the period from 1900 to the Great War, this chapter will 
explore the development of the Heclon armour piercing (AP) projectile at 
Hadfields, followed by a discussion of Firth‟s development of their Rendable AP 
projectile. These case studies will demonstrate the path dependent nature of 
armaments technologies, the interactions between civilian and armaments 
research at the two companies, and the opportunities for technological spin-off. 
The chapter will then investigate the collaborative arrangements of the two 
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companies to further advance AP projectiles, and examines the patent 
arrangements and the marketing and licensing of projectile technology by 
Hadfields and Firth.  
 
Hadfields and the Development of the Heclon Armour Piercing Projectile 
Robert Hadfield Senior commenced the manufacture of steel castings at 
Hadfields in 1872, and soon after utilised the production method to make 
projectiles for the first time in 1877.3 It was later said that „patriotically he fretted 
over the fact that French pre-eminence in this field posed the threat to Britain of 
dependence on a foreign source for a military essential.‟4 While Hadfield Senior 
manufactured projectiles out of patriotism, his son Robert Abbott Hadfield had 
an outright obsession with achieving and then maintaining the company‟s lead 
in the field of AP projectiles. It was later claimed that nothing excited him more 
than watching a shell penetrate an armour plate.5 The elder Hadfield had 
encouraged his son to learn metallurgy and sent him on a tour of America from 
June to August 1882 „to introduce the young Sheffielder to the metallurgical and 
business world in preparation for his role as director of the family firm.‟6 Hadfield 
Senior even had a furnace installed at the family home, where after his return 
from America in 1882 Hadfield invented what would be known commercially as 
manganese steel. This material, known for its hard-wearing properties and 
toughness, demonstrated the positive contribution scientific methods could have 
to the development of metallurgy, and was the first major innovation in the 
emerging field of alloy steel production.7 Hadfield later invented silicon steel, a 
material used in the development of electrical transformers, and by 1900 was 
recognised as one of the foremost metallurgists in the world.8 His knowledge of 
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how various elements altered the properties of alloy steels certainly assisted the 
development of AP projectiles at Hadfields.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Portrait of Sir Robert Abbott Hadfield 
 
After the death of his father in 1888, Hadfield took over the company and 
imprinted his interests in both metallurgical development and armaments 
production on the company‟s strategy. In addition to being Hadfields‟ chairman 
and managing director, Hadfield was also head metallurgist and de facto head 
of armaments developments. From 1888 Hadfield placed a renewed emphasis 
on projectile development, and had received three small orders from the British 
Government by 1890.9 Work on early types of AP projectiles facilitated an 
expansion of productive facilities for armaments, and by 1897 Hadfields had 
outgrown their original Hecla Works. Construction of the East Hecla Works 
began the same year, and once completed the Hecla Works were dedicated 
solely to the production of war material. The increased scale of projectile 
development had been facilitated by the expanding research facilities at the 
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company, and such was the investment in research by Hadfield, in 1900 the 
company‟s laboratory was perhaps the most advanced in the world. As 
Tweedale has highlighted, Hadfield regarded the laboratory as not simply a 
place to analyse steel, but „as the driving force behind the whole company.‟10 In 
no other line of production was this seen more than the development of AP 
projectiles.  
Robert Hadfield Senior‟s decision to use his company‟s steel casting 
capabilities to manufacture AP projectiles for the first time in 1877 marked not 
only the start of Hadfields‟ long association with armaments production, but also 
gave the projectile superiority over contemporary armour plate designs. 
Introduced in the early 1870s, iron armour faced with steel had superseded iron 
armour, thanks to the revolution in bulk steel production following the 
introduction of the Bessemer converter. Known as „compound‟ armour, the 
design could not withstand attack from cast steel projectiles. The use of cast 
steel was the major innovation which commenced a new path of technological 
development with AP projectiles at Hadfields. However, their superiority over 
armour plate would be short lived. By the 1890s, armour plate technology had 
advanced more rapidly than projectiles and resulted in two new methods of 
hardening, both of which could withstand attack from Hadfields‟ cast steel 
projectiles.11 The first of these was the Harvey method, developed in the US 
and licensed from 1891, which used water sprays to harden the armour plates 
after forging. Soon thereafter, the method was superseded by the development 
of Krupp Cemented (KC) plates, developed by the German manufacturer of the 
same name, which used a nickel-chromium alloy steel to provide more 
resistance than Harvey plates. Krupp licensed the method to other producers, 
with Vickers, Cammell and Brown all producing them in the Sheffield area.12  
By 1900 the resistance of KC plates was well known, and their 
superiority over contemporary AP projectiles. The Engineer commented that:  
The great toughness of the Krupp armour, which appears to be 
maintained in a remarkable degree in thick plates, is no doubt partly due 
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to the presence of nickel, and partly due to the method of treatment, so 
that Hadfield may be pardoned when his projectiles are defeated by such 
plates.13 
Such was the shell resistance of a KC plate, when a traditional pointed 
projectile was fired against the armour the projectile would either ricochet off or 
break up on the surface of the armour plate. The most widely researched and 
adopted solution to this issue was to place a soft steel cap over the pointed 
nose of the projectile to aid in the successful perforation of the armour. The 
action of the cap was outlined by The Engineer in 1902:  
When the projectile first strikes the plate the whole energy is delivered to 
the extreme point, and in most cases the latter is completely crushed out 
of recognition…In order to preserve the extreme point from damage so 
as to assist it in delivering the full energy of the projectile at the point of 
impact, the idea occurred of attaching to it a cap of soft, but tough, 
steel.14 
By utilising a capped projectile, greater penetrative power could be achieved. 
The cap would absorb the initial impact upon the face of the armour, before 
folding away around the projectile to allow the point to successfully perforate the 
armour plate unimpeded.15  
For the development of an AP projectile, there were a set of 
technological challenges to considered and resolved before a finished product 
could be presented to potential customers. What would be the ideal composition 
of the alloy which would make up the body of the projectile; would it be immune 
to the problem of spontaneous fracture, when a projectile would split and jam in 
the gun barrel during firing, which had plagued other projectiles; after casting 
how would the body of the projectile be treated to ensure the optimum 
performance when fired; what would be the composition of the cap and how 
would it be fitted to the projectile; and perhaps most paramount, how would 
quality control be implemented to ensure consistency among projectiles? These 
were important technical questions because when delivered to the British 
Government, one projectile out of a batch would be selected at random and test 
                                            
13
 The Engineer, 5 January 1900, p.21. My emphasis.  
14
 The Engineer, 27 June 1902, p.624.  
15
 Hadfield discusses the use and action of projectile caps in the Minutes of Proceedings of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (London, 1903), p.20. For another contemporary account, see 
„Modern Armour And Armour-Piercing Projectiles,‟ The Engineer, 12 April, 19 April, 26 April, and 
3 May 1907. 
 33 
fired as a proof. If it failed, the entire batch would be rejected. With the amount 
of research, development, and testing needed to comply with this list of 
requirements, before even being considered as an approved supplier for the 
British Government, it is understandable why barriers to entry into the industry 
were so high, and the number of suppliers so few. To understand how these 
technological challenges were overcome, and how they contributed to the 
development of capped projectiles at Hadfields, it is necessary to view a 
finished projectile as utilising a series of sub-innovations each designed to build 
on and refine the initial major innovation in advanced projectile technologies, 
the use of cast steel from 1877. On the development of sub-innovations, 
Rosenberg has suggested that „such activities involve endless minor 
modifications and improvements in existing products, each of which is of small 
significance but which, cumulatively, are of major significance.16 For projectiles, 
the „major significance‟ resulting from the introduction of a number of sub-
innovations was the ability to perforate KC armour.  
Building on the use of cast steel, experiments with using alloy steels for 
AP projectiles began in the 1890s. Hadfield‟s knowledge of metallurgy certainly 
assisted his research. His experiments gave him an intimate knowledge of the 
properties of manganese, and knew its content had to be accurately controlled 
in alloy steels for projectiles. In 1897, Hadfield patented a nickel-chromium steel 
alloy for use with projectiles17 which highlighted that „this invention has 
reference to the manufacture, at a comparatively low cost, of cast projectiles 
possessing great strength and penetrative powers and specially suitable for 
armour piercing and like purposes.‟18 The alloy, later marketed as Hadfields‟ 
special 2/2 nickel-chromium steel, contained between 0.75% and 1% carbon, 
2% nickel and 2% chromium with special importance given to keeping the 
manganese content below 0.3%. Hadfield‟s knowledge of the properties of 
manganese clearly assisted in the alloy‟s development, and he stated that „I 
have found that the common accepted idea that manganese is necessary in 
steel is to a large extent erroneous, and in fact its presence is in many ways 
deleterious.‟19 Hadfield discovered that issues encountered from not monitoring 
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the amount of manganese were related to the formation of manganese carbides 
in high carbon alloy steels with over 0.35% carbon. He recorded that:  
Manganese is in itself a very hard and brittle metal and while this in itself 
may not be an objection, yet I consider that in its action as a carbide of 
manganese when carbon is present, it is most harmful where the special 
qualities of hardness and toughness are requisite, as in the production of 
projectiles, believing that these qualities cannot be developed if 
manganese is present in quantity say over 0.25% to 0.3%.20 
Furthermore, controlling the levels of manganese in the alloy helped to reduce 
the cost of producing AP projectiles:  
whilst it has heretofore been necessary in the production of armour 
piercing projectiles of hard steel to employ the very highest quality of raw 
material, such as Swedish pig or melting iron, I find that by making the 
steel free from or low in manganese as set forth, the steel may be 
allowed to contain a larger proportion of sulphur and phosphorous than 
otherwise be admissible, consequently I am able to use in the production 
of my projectiles cheap raw stock such as ordinary hematite pig iron, or 
even mixtures of ordinary pig iron and scrap steel…thus rendering 
available a much wider range of raw material of comparatively small cost 
for the production of armour piercing shell.21  
In developing nickel-chromium alloys, Hadfield was able to apply his knowledge 
of metallurgical developments to the advancement of AP projectile 
technologies, while simultaneously reducing the cost of their production. 
Furthermore, Hadfield‟s stringent specifications regarding the composition of his 
alloy steels helped to provide a uniform quality and performance from the 
projectiles. Accuracy was paramount in the production and development of 
projectiles and alloy steels, two fields in which Hadfield was at the forefront in 
pioneering. The advance of scientific analysis and theories to steelmaking was 
also a clear indicator that Sheffield‟s rule of thumb methods had passed their 
heyday, though the traditional approaches and methods did not disappear 
overnight.22 
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By experimenting with hardening techniques to advance the performance 
of AP projectiles, in 1901 Hadfield further refined the alloy to benefit from the 
hardening effect of manganese in nickel-chromium steel. It had been found that 
by producing a 2/2 nickel-chromium steel with 0.8% carbon and 0.12% 
manganese, the manganese had a „powerful effect in promoting the hardening 
of nickel-chromium steel‟ when heated to 900ºC and then cooled by a blast of 
air.23 Despite being developed for use with projectiles, this refined alloy and 
hardening technique had a wide range of applications away from armaments: 
Besides being beneficial in the manufacture of projectiles, my [Hadfield‟s] 
invention can be advantageously adopted in the production of other 
hardened steel articles of various kinds (especially castings), including 
inter alia, shoes and discs for use in ore crushing, the wearing parts of 
crushing machinery, rolls of various kinds, car wheels, railway wheels, 
cutting tools of various kinds.24  
While this version of 2/2 nickel-chromium steel would never be widely used in 
the manufacture of projectiles, the technological spin-off provided the basis for 
further developments with established commercial lines at Hadfields. By 1905 
the rock and ore crushing machinery produced by the company since the 
1890s, utilising Hadfields manganese steel for the main crushing mechanisms, 
was using this alloy in their support frames and construction, with South Africa 
being a major export market before 1914.25 From the early 1900s, a mix of 
commercially-focused and armaments-focused research were driving product 
developments at the company.  
In addition to the development of Hadfields‟ original 2/2 nickel-chromium 
steel for projectiles, Hadfield also developed a series of sub-innovations which, 
when utilised in combination, had the potential to produce an improved AP 
projectile. Multiple patents relating to advances in casting and hardening were 
issued from the 1890s, which show advancement from casting a projectile point 
up to point down, and developments in hardening different aspects of a shell 
body in different ways.26 Also developed were air deflectors27 which could be 
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placed over a projectile‟s cap to provide a smoother flight and more 
aerodynamic stability, and two methods of attaching caps to shells, due to 
Hadfield having doubts about other methods when used in practice.28 The latter 
of these patents were adopted by Hadfields for the majority of its capped 
projectiles prior to the Great War and gave them their distinctive „thumb marks.‟ 
Producing projectiles necessitated „forming indentations or concavities in the 
projectile and pressing or forcing portions of the metal of the cap into the said 
indentations or concavities.‟29  
The result of this series of sub-innovations and advances over the course 
of a decade were two patents in 1904 in which Hadfield combined multiple 
developments in projectile technologies.30 The resultant product was branded 
Hadfields‟ „Heclon‟ AP projectile, and became the company‟s standard AP 
projectile design for the next 15 years. Prior to these patents there had been 
successful, yet inconclusive trials with capped AP projectiles. As Hadfield 
highlighted in the patent specifications, when used against KC plates „armour 
piercing projectiles of the ordinary type, even if capped, do not give uniformly 
good results.‟31 The first Heclon patent of 1904 referred to a new type of heat 
treatment „in a different manner to that heretofore usually practiced.‟32 The 
patent utilised a further refined projectile which had been developed since 1898, 
still a 2/2 nickel-chromium steel but with a controlled 0.6% carbon content and 
manganese content as low as possible, treated in such a way to provide both 
toughness and hardness in the body of the projectile.33 Due to the effectiveness 
of this treatment, Hadfield made a bold statement in his patent application that, 
„by the improved treatment it is possible to produce projectiles which, when 
capped, will perforate KC armour unbroken.‟34 Three months after the first 
Heclon patent, a further refinement was made to the hardening process which 
improved the performance of the projectile. After being annealed and formed to 
shape, the projectile was slowly heated to between 820ºC and 890ºC for a 6 
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inch projectile, after which the point was cooled in oil. Furthermore, „by the 
treatment described, the head or point of the projectile is rendered extremely 
hard, whilst the walls of the projectile and rendered remarkably tough and stiff to 
withstand compressive strains.‟35 When capped and tested, a 6 inch projectile 
was able to perforate a 6 inch KC plate.36 The projectile cap was also 
redesigned for the Heclon. These were produced in mild steel and heat treated 
to between 950ºC and 1100ºC. To ensure uniform results Hadfield had found it 
advantageous to stamp the caps between shaped dies. The problem of 
spontaneous fracture which had been an issue with older projectiles was also 
solved by the low percentage of manganese used in the 2/2 nickel-chromium 
steel. In 1918 it was remarked that Hadfields‟ Heclon projectiles were immune 
to spontaneous fracture, and that none had ever been reported in practice.37 
After a series of initial trials in 1902 both in the UK and abroad,38 followed by 
successful British Government trials starting in 1904,39 the first large order for 
Heclon AP projectiles was placed in June 1904 for 6,000 6 inch projectiles.40 
The Heclon patents and methods could be applied to projectiles from 6 to 15 
inch calibre, allowing the production method to fulfil the British Government‟s 
entire AP projectile requirements. Following the first order, by the end of 1905 
the company had received orders for in excess of 14,000 Heclon AP shells.41  
In creating the Heclon, Hadfield was able to produce an advanced AP 
projectile with its origins in the major innovation of utilising cast steel for the 
projectile body. This was supplemented by a series of sub-innovations designed 
to solve a string of issues which had plagued AP projectiles in use against KC 
plates. The resultant Heclon patents utilised a series of these innovations in 
combination, highlighting the path dependent nature of projectile development 
at the company. Furthermore, the Heclon‟s development was strongly 
influenced by Hadfield‟s commercial metallurgical knowledge, assisted by the 
trial and error approach of rule of thumb methods to experimentation. Through 
the research undertaken into the effects of various elements on the composition 
of alloy steels, armaments development provided the basis for a series of new 
                                            
35
 British Patent 15,219/1904, p.3. 
36
 British Patent 15,219/1904, p.5.  
37
 SA, Hadfields Box 59, Patents and Royalties, January 1918, p.22. 
38
 The Engineer, 27 June 1902, p.624.  
39
 Sheffield City Library (SCL), Hadfields Steel Foundry Co. Ltd. Book, 1905, pp.25-33; The 
Engineer, January 5th 1906, p.20. 
40
 SA, Hadfields Volume 151, Projectile Orders Number 1, p.152, 21 June 1904. 
41
 SA, Hadfields Volume 151, Projectile Orders Number 1.  
 38 
commercial production lines at Hadfields, influenced by the spin-off of new 
metallurgical knowledge from armaments research. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Interior of Hadfields‟ Hecla Works, 1905 
 
However, the development of the Heclon was not without significant cost 
to the company. In 1905, Hadfields acknowledged that they were spending 
large amounts on their armaments research and development:  
The money that is sometimes spent – first in laboratory research, and 
afterwards in experiments on full scale – represents very large sums 
indeed, many thousands of pounds often being devoted to the working 
out of a single detail, or perhaps simply to arrive at a negative result, and 
the directors of manufacturing establishments, having spent large sums 
of money upon gathering knowledge, look on data thus acquired as one 
of the assets of the business.42 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this statement. Firstly, in the process of 
developing sub-innovations and refinements dead-ends would inevitably be 
reached that are not recorded in the patent records. Secondly, all of the 
research and development undertaken at Hadfields created knowledge which 
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was retained and valued by the company, regardless of a positive or negative 
outcome. This information could be tacit knowledge related to metallurgy, 
retained by Hadfield and the staff employed at the company‟s research 
laboratory and potentially important for future armaments or commercial 
developments.43 Nevertheless, Hadfields represents only one technological 
path related to projectiles in Sheffield, with Firth involved in the development of 
a competing, but equally successful outcome.  
 
Firth and the Rendable Armour Piercing Projectile 
As Metcalfe suggests, „no two firms are expected to innovate in identical 
fashion,‟ and the development of projectiles was no exception.44 Firth had 
begun producing armaments during the Crimean War, with the manufacture of 
solid round shot. Thereafter, the company had „taken a leading part in all the 
succeeding stages‟ of projectile manufacture.45 Firth were also one of the 
pioneers of high speed steels in the 1890s with their „Speedicut‟ type, essential 
in the machining of hardened material such as armour and projectiles.46 In 
contrast to Hadfields, Firth‟s projectile developments were based on the major 
innovation of utilising forged steel from the 1860s, rather than cast steel. By the 
1880s, their projectile capacity was concentrated in part of the Norfolk Works 
known as the Gun Works, a highly specialised forging plant containing 
interchangeable technology, the same equipment being used for both 
commercial and armaments production.47 This ability to utilise their works for 
two different types of product suggests that Firth had a flexible specialisation 
with forging technology, and were attuned to the dynamic capabilities of their 
works.48 Flexible specialisation facilitated the Gun Works production of gun 
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forgings, air vessels and marine shafting in addition to projectiles, as shown in 
Figure 1.3.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: The entrance to the offices of Firth‟s Norfolk Works, about 1906. The display is of all 
the products the Gun Works had produced since the Crimean War. 
 
 At the centre of Firth‟s projectile research and development was 
James Rossiter Hoyle, who joined the company in 1881 and became the first 
member of their board of directors not from the Firth family in 1893. Hoyle was 
unique in pre-1914 armaments technological development, having never served 
in the military or undertaken any metallurgical training his contemporaries all 
having one or both of these experiences prior to commencing research and 
development work with armaments. His background was as a practical 
engineer, and he had developed a keen interest in gun and projectile 
manufacture before joining Firth. Hoyle‟s experience had been gained working 
in both England and France as an engineer and salesman. His knowledge of 
the French language and armaments production gained the attention of Charles 
Henry Firth, who offered him a position in 1881 when Firth had secured a large 
contract for gun forgings with the French Government. Soon thereafter he was 
made manager of the Gun Works, beginning a 45 year association with the 
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company.49 Hoyle, as we shall see, was to be a key figure in projectile 
innovation at Firth for three decades.  
After the introduction of KC Armour in the 1890s Firth, like Hadfields, 
began exploring ways to refine their AP projectile designs. One design explored 
by the company was a type of AP projectile designed to carry a bursting charge, 
which was introduced in 1900.50 In trials, however, the uncapped projectile was 
unable to give consistent results and frequently exploded before perforating the 
armour plate. Firth thereafter opted to continue development of capped AP 
projectiles, a product that they had been producing since 1894. A key element 
of developments at Firth was a mix of utilising in-house innovation and the use 
of outside licenses to supplement their research and development activities. For 
instance, in 1886 Firth researched the production of chrome-steel shot, and also 
bought the rights to making similar shells from the Firminy Company of St. 
Etienne in France.51 From May 1900, Firth were granted a licence from 
Hadfields to use their patents and processes to manufacture 2/2 nickel-
chromium steel for use with projectiles. The royalties involved were small; an 
order Firth obtained for 6,000 6 inch AP projectiles required a payment of 
£1,200 to Hadfields, or 4 shillings per shell.52 The main difference between the 
two companies was that Hadfields commenced the production process by 
casting the steel, while Firth produced steel ingots and then forged the shells to 
the required shape.53  
By utilising Hadfields‟ patents for projectile steels, Firth reduced the 
number of technological challenges faced to refine the performance of their AP 
projectiles. As previously outlined with Hadfields, the remaining challenges Firth 
had to overcome were related to how the cap would be fitted to the body of the 
projectile, and the design of the cap and head of the projectile. A unique feature 
of forged projectiles was related to the distribution of steel throughout the body 
of the shell. Once again, to understand a finished projectile at Firth, the 
solutions to these technological challenges should be viewed as sub-
innovations utilised in conjunction with the major innovation of using forged 
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steel at the company. While these were common problems faced by the 
projectile manufacturers, each company explored different solutions and built on 
different major innovations to overcome them. What can be observed are two 
different instances of path-dependent research, originating from the differing 
core competences of Firth and Hadfields. The evolution of armaments 
technology was also unique to each company and research team involved.  
Hoyle‟s work began in 1902 with an updated projectile head and cap 
shape which became the standard design for Firth‟s shells for the next six 
years. Intended to prevent damage to the projectile head at the moment of 
impact with an armour plate, the design flattened the point of the projectile and 
covered it with a cap to aid with perforation. The patent emphasised that:  
The truncated cone of the head gives better results against hard faced 
plates than the pointed head generally used, whilst the cap provided has 
the double object of reducing the shock on impact of the projectile 
against the plate and also retains the present form of head for accurate 
shooting.54  
This design change was followed in 1903 by a revised shape for the base of the 
projectile. Previously projectiles made by Firth had a flat bottom which in the 
new design was replaced by a grooved bottom, allowing for the steel saved to 
be distributed to the head of the projectile. Hoyle had discovered that by 
increasing the steel content in the head of the projectile its armour piercing 
properties were improved when fired against KC armour.55 The final aspect of 
Hoyle‟s research was an updated method of attaching caps to the projectiles. 
This involved the cutting of three grooves in the head of the projectile and cap, 
the grooves being filled with white metal to secure the cap in place.56 These 
sub-innovations, used in combination with Hadfields‟ shell treatment process, 
and building on the use of forged steel at the company, created an AP projectile 
which could defeat KC armour. This again demonstrates the path-dependent 
evolution of projectile technology, and a different process of innovation 
compared to Hadfields.57 Known as the Firth Rendable AP projectile, these 
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were ordered in 6, 7.5 and 9.2 inch calibres soon after their introduction in 1904, 
and were sent for testing at the Royal Laboratories in early 1906.58  
 The solutions devised by Hoyle to refine the performance of AP 
projectiles were based on the practical manipulation of steel rather than the 
application of science and metallurgical knowledge to their advancement, 
utilising rule of thumb methods in contrast to the integration of alloy steel 
experimentation by Hadfield. This was undoubtedly a result of Hoyle‟s 
background as a practical engineer, utilising his knowledge of forging steel from 
his tenure as manager at Firth‟s Gun Works. While devoid of any metallurgical 
developments related to alloy steel, the result of the Rendable‟s development 
was an AP projectile whose performance could rival Hadfields‟ Heclon AP 
projectile. Hoyle may have been less prolific than Hadfield with patenting and 
advancing the science of alloy steels, but the result was a second AP projectile 
design which could defeat KC armour, developed in close proximity in the same 
industrial district.   
The company‟s approach to AP projectile research, using a mix of in-
house developments and outside technology, gave Firth access to a second AP 
projectile designed by their American subsidiary, confusingly also known as the 
Rendable. In 1896 Firth had obtained the controlling interest in the Wheeler 
Sterling Steel Company, based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to manufacture 
projectiles and tool steel in the United States, renaming it the Firth-Sterling 
Steel Company. When company manager Charles Yandes Wheeler died in 
1899, Lewis Firth was appointed President of the company and Firth increased 
their investment to £250,000, two-thirds of the overall capital of Firth-Sterling.59 
In early 1900 the transfer of all the assets, contracts and patents from the 
former company was complete, which included a type of AP projectile invented 
by Charles Van Cise Wheeler, son of the former company manager.60 This 
design had been licensed to Armstrong in the 1890s.61 Wheeler was works 
manager at Firth-Sterling in Pittsburgh, and along with works metallurgist 
Alexander George McKenna continued research into AP projectiles. The result 
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was their „Rendable Shell‟ in 1902, a design developed at the same time and 
with a number of similarities to the Firth Rendable AP projectile.   
The Firth-Sterling Rendable Shell was covered by three American 
patents. The first outlined a new blunted nose for the projectile, thinner walls 
compared to contemporary designs to allow for more explosive to be utilised, 
and a proposal for the replacement of both common and AP projectiles with a 
single design.62 While AP projectiles were specialised for the attack of armour, 
common shells were used against a much wider range of targets, and generally 
contained more explosives than AP projectiles. This standardisation would have 
made production simpler and could have brought more orders for the projectile. 
The second incorporated a revised design to prevent the breaking of the base 
and subsequent cracking of the walls of the projectile upon impact with an 
armour plate, which could prevent successful detonation.63 The final aspect of 
the Firth-Sterling Rendable shell was the cap; a square steel version similar in 
design to the one developed at Firth, with the same grooved and soldered 
method of attachment.64 Overall, the Firth-Sterling Rendable patents were 
comparable to those developed for Firth‟s Rendable AP projectiles and show a 
similarity in design. In some cases, such as the profile of the cap, Firth were 
ahead with a similar design by at least a year, Hoyle later stating that „a form of 
head similar to the one which [Firth-Sterling] claim as their own was designed 
here as far back as June 1901.‟65 Nevertheless, Firth-Sterling remained 
adamant that their design was superior to that of Firth and in late 1903 
suggested to their parent company they purchase the sole rights to the process 
in the UK.66 Firth were reluctant; the Firth-Sterling design was unproven with 
large calibre projectiles, and their own comparable design could be used free of 
royalties. In March 1904, Firth-Sterling‟s offer for the sale of their Rendable shell 
licence was $60,000 (£12,320). Firth‟s board declined, proposing a royalty on 
each shell sold under the process for a limited time instead.67 Four weeks later 
the Firth-Sterling offer had fallen to $10,000 (£2,053) and a 7½% commission 
on the sale of Rendable shells, which Firth also rejected. Their counter offer 
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was a maximum of 2½% commission.68 A letter received from Firth-Sterling‟s 
American counsel, Harold Binney, as part of the negotiation attempted to 
aggrandise the American Patent system over the British, and aspects of the 
projectile‟s design and performance:  
The ingenuity displayed by the inventors in their hypothetical deduction 
and experiments leading up to their discovery of the surprising fact that 
elongating the nose of the projectile and at the same time blunting its tip 
facilitates, instead of impeding, penetration and also increases the 
strength of the point, might be most naturally lost sight of in reading the 
simple terms of the patent.69 
Firth were not swayed and stuck with their offer. When a reply was not received 
by March 1905 from Firth-Sterling, the offer was withdrawn.70 To circumvent 
this, Firth-Sterling entered into negotiations with other British projectile 
manufacturers to licence their patents, but encountered obstacles. At a trial in 
Washington during November 1905, two Firth-Sterling Rendable projectiles 
broke up on the face of the test armour, while two Firth Rendable AP projectiles 
passed through without any issues. Following this development, the President 
of Firth-Sterling Lewis Firth suggested that „the time had come for an absolute 
interchange of processes and experiences between the two Companies.‟ As the 
directors of Firth observed in 1906, „hitherto all discussions I had had with them 
in reference to projectiles had been carried on by them on the assumption that 
the process of [Firth-Sterling] was better than [Firth], but the above mentioned 
trials had altered that position‟.71 A draft agreement between the two companies 
was produced in February 1906, signed for commencement at the beginning of 
1907. The agreement stated that the two companies would engage in „the 
unconditional exchange of information regarding the manufacture of hardened 
projectiles.‟ Firth also gave Firth-Sterling information on how to produce gun 
forgings, and would draw a royalty of 2½ percent on all projectile sales at Firth-
Sterling for 10½ years thereafter. Essentially, Firth gained access to all of Firth-
Sterling‟s patents without having to pay any royalties.72 These negotiations 
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demonstrate how Firth-Sterling, a subsidiary of Firth nonetheless, perhaps 
believed they had more power over their parent company than in reality. It also 
raises questions regarding the managerial cohesion of the two companies, and 
the effectiveness of control exercised from Sheffield via Lewis Firth. With the 
outcome in Firth‟s favour, no further disputes between the two arose. Later the 
same year, the Firth-Sterling business split in half, the projectile business 
moving to Washington under the name of the Washington Steel and Ordnance 
Company and the Firth-Sterling company remaining in Pittsburgh. Firth retained 
their majority ownership of each, and Lewis Firth remained President of both 
companies.73 Overall, by 1907 Firth had undoubtedly established themselves as 
a technological leader in the manufacture of AP projectiles. Their next 
development would cement this position, and bring them into direct conflict with 
Hadfields over patent rights.  
 
Dispute and Collaboration: Competition in Projectile Designs 
Following the introduction of the Heclon and the Rendable AP projectiles, 
research continued unabated at both companies in a quest to further refine and 
advance their projectile designs. A patent from Hadfield in 1907 outlined an 
advanced long-range cap which claimed that „not only is the efficiency of the 
caps improved but also the flight of the shells or projectiles with which they are 
employed.‟74 The cap was designed to fit closely over the pointed portion of a 
projectile and be low in weight. In the case of a 12 inch projectile the cap would 
be 25 pounds, compared with over 85 pounds for other 12 inch projectiles fitted 
with a much larger cap with a longer protrusion away from the point of the 
projectile. This advance allowed the projectile to be more aerodynamic during 
flight, have longer range, and carry a bursting charge. The design was fitted to a 
common pointed shell with a bursting charge, and became known as Hadfields‟ 
„Eron‟ shell. Introduced in 1908 by the British Government, the Eron was a 
common pointed capped (CPC) projectile with armour-piercing capabilities. At 
trials it had been found that a 12 inch Eron shell could fully perforate a 9 inch 
KC plate.75 This was a capability far beyond what was expected of 
contemporary CPC projectiles. An updated version of the Eron was introduced 
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in 1914 in response to an updated Admiralty specification which requested a 
CPC projectile which could perforate an armour plate of equal thickness to its 
calibre. Hadfields initially had difficulty with the request, and ultimately used a 
„set-back‟ cap design which they had patented in 1912.76 The set-back cap 
design, positioned closer to the point of the projectile, reduced the time between 
the impact of the cap and the impact of the projectile against an armour plate. 
With previous designs, it was found that when: 
a projectile fitted with such a cap strikes an armour plate, either normally 
or obliquely, the cap is liable to be shifted in position relatively to the 
projectile before the critical moment when the point of the projectile 
comes into contact with the plate with the result that the projectile is 
liable to be ineffective.77  
The set-back cap design was one of several which Hadfield had designed and 
patented as part of his projectile research, many of which were put aside for 
future use, though the majority were never used commercially.  
Nevertheless, Hadfield was very protective of his patents, striving to 
retain an exclusive command over the commercial rights to his projectile 
designs in the UK. As other manufacturers and inventors across the world 
began to produce cap designs, such as Krupp, Vickers, and Armstrong, there 
remained the possibility that disputes could arise regarding similarities in 
patents and designs. Hadfield‟s strategy was to avoid patent disputes entering 
legal proceedings, and therefore limit the risk of loosing control of what could 
potentially be a useful design for future specifications, as the set-back cap 
design proved. Purchasing the rights to designs for use in the UK, and licensing 
agreements were used for this purpose. During one of his trips to the US, 
Hadfield discovered a potential patent dispute with Cleland Davis, an inventor 
and US Navy officer who had patented a contour cap in the UK in 1908 which 
pre-dated one of Hadfield‟s own patents of a similar design. Hadfield quickly 
entered into an agreement with Davis, who assigned the patent rights to 
Hadfields for $250, along with all of the preliminary data and information he had 
generated. Hadfield wrote to Alexander Jack, one of Hadfields‟ directors, the 
day the agreement was signed, expressing his reasons for avoiding a legal 
dispute. „I thought it was worth while,‟ Hadfield concluded, to risk „a small sum‟ 
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to ensure that „we shall be in a stronger position by having both patents under 
our control.‟78 Closer to home, however, developments at Firth would bring the 
two companies into dispute over the similarity of their designs and patents.  
At Firth from 1908 Hoyle began working with Major Harry Bland Strange 
to form a research team which could draw on knowledge of projectile 
manufacture, and their practical use in the Army. Strange was born in 1864 into 
a military family of Scottish descent. It was said that every male member of his 
family had been part of the military under the British crown for some 150 years, 
and his father had been a General with the Royal Canadian Artillery. Strange 
had been trained at the Royal Military College at Kingston in Canada, after 
which he surveyed Western Canada for two years. In 1885 he accepted a 
commission with the Royal Artillery, where he remained until his retirement in 
February of 1907. During his time with the Royal Artillery, Strange completed 
the Fire-Masters course in 1889 and served in the Royal Ordnance Corps, 
where his interest in ballistics and projectiles developed 79 After retirement from 
the military, Strange became a manager at Firth in the Gun Works, and was 
given a directorship in 1909. The Hoyle-Strange team made an important 
development in 1908 with the introduction of their „hollow cap‟ design. Writing in 
the 1920s, Brassey‟s Naval Annual summarised the design:  
It was Colonel Strang [sic], of Messrs Firths, who, in 1908, first altered 
the distribution of the mass of the cap to improve its efficiency. This he 
did by moving the material downwards towards the shell, leaving but little 
thickness in front of the point. In order to maintain the original external 
contour of the head for the purpose of flight, he found it necessary to fit a 
thin-plate deflector to complete the point, and what is now commonly 
known as the „Hollow Cap‟ resulted.80  
This design altered the form of the cap to reduce its weight and facilitate a 
better flight after firing.81 After successful British trials between July and October 
1908, the hollow cap was tested in Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, France 
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and Austria before the end of 1911.82 Following the initial hollow cap patent, 
Hoyle and Strange continued to refine the design, resulting in a further five 
patents, one in collaboration with Tolmie John Tresidder of Brown, which 
incrementally improved their performance.83  
  
 
Figure 1.4: Firth‟s and Hadfields‟ Hollow Cap designs, c.1910. Taken from SCL, The Evolution 
of the Modern AP Projectile, 1924, p.7. Note the difference in Hadfields single piece and Firth‟s 
two piece designs. 
 
 However, the initial design drew the company into a patent dispute with 
Hadfields. While the two had produced AP projectiles for the British 
Government for years before, their research and designs had remained 
mutually exclusive. In 1908, Hadfield had also been experimenting with what he 
called „false‟ and „chambered‟ cap designs, similar to the hollow cap design 
from Firth.84 The main difference between the two was that Firth‟s design was 
made from two pieces of steel, while Hadfields was made of a single piece (See 
Figure 1.4)., though their similarity in appearance and the close application of 
                                            
82
 SA, X306/2/3/2/3, Firth Agreements with Harry Bland Strange, 1913-1918. 
83
 See British Patents 17,453/1908, 10,937/1909, 28,032/1911, 10,991/1913 and 10,990/1913.  
84
 See British Patents 2,817/1908 and 8,105/1908 for Hadfields‟ designs, 6,942/1908 and 
17,453/1908 for Firth‟s designs. 
 50 
their patents drew the two companies into commencing legal proceedings.85 
The first patent from Hadfields and the first from Firth were just 50 days apart, 
undoubtedly showing that the two companies were working on the same design 
at approximately the same time. The significance of this cannot be overstated. 
The Gun Works and Hecla Works were barely a mile apart in the same 
industrial district and home to two research teams who, working behind closed 
doors in the strictest secrecy, had devised two near identical projectile cap 
designs and sought to patent their inventions within weeks of each other. 
While their legal dispute began, due to the high cost and time involved in 
undertaking the proceedings it was soon realised that collaboration rather than 
conflict was the most sensible option.86 The two companies came to an 
arrangement in 1910 to revoke their patent claims and entered into a licensing 
agreement whereby each company would share their patents and research with 
the other to allow them both to produce the most advanced capped AP 
projectiles possible. Small royalties were paid on items manufactured under the 
terms of the agreement, a rate of one shilling per inch in diameter of every 
projectile or cap produced. To ensure that their agreement did not quickly 
become redundant due to rapid technological developments in the industry, the 
two also agreed to share any new patents related to capped projectiles after 
1910. In essence, any technological advances either company developed or 
acquired would be shared with the other in a form of automatic cross-
licensing.87 The agreement was set to last for twelve years.88 There are 
certainly overriding collusive elements to this agreement, as both companies 
could now potentially produce AP projectiles with equal performance. As a 
result, neither company had a technological advantage over the other in this line 
of work, ensuring that both retained their position at the forefront of capped 
projectile development. A key part of the agreement was the sole rights 
provided to Firth to licence the hollow cap design to other projectile 
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manufacturers, and in turn pay Strange a commission on any profits gained. By 
the end of 1913, £2,321 had been paid to him in addition to his directors fees, 
one third of the profits made on licensing the hollow cap. The same year, 
Strange signed an agreement with Firth in which the company agreed to use 
any projectile patents Strange would develop or come into possession of, and 
pay him 25% of any profits made from future licences agreements89 This was a 
lucrative proposition to the inventor, and an incentive to continue his research 
into projectile improvements. 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Firth‟s Shell Shop 1912. 
 
One of the key issues for AP projectiles before the Great War was their 
inability to consistently perforate armour at oblique angles. This was known to 
the two producers, Firth even acknowledging in 1912 the deficiency in their 
marketing materials, stating that their projectiles „are guaranteed to penetrate a 
full calibre of Krupp Cemented armour, provided they strike it normal [at a right 
angle] to the surface.‟90 This deficiency was also known to the Admiralty. After 
extensive experiments in 1910, John Jellicoe, then Controller of Naval 
Armaments, had asked the Ordnance Board to „produce an armour-piercing 
shell that would perforate armour at oblique impact and go on in a fit state for 
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bursting.‟91 When Jellicoe went to sea two months later no one pressed the 
matter, and when he returned as Second Sea Lord he was no longer associated 
with their procurement.92 Nevertheless, with full knowledge of the issue 
Hadfields and Firth began to develop caps in Sheffield for oblique attack from 
1912. 
 Firth had previously experimented with oblique attack from their works at 
Riga, where the Russian Government had ordered projectiles in 1909 capable 
of a 20° attack to the normal against thin armour. Firth had fulfilled this 
requirement, „a considerable time before such a feature was introduced into the 
specifications for supplies to our own country.‟93 Reflecting on their pre-war 
projectile development in the 1930s, it was said that „On many occasions the 
experience gained in the execution of contracts for foreign Governments has 
led to the introduction of improvements in the shell supplies for our own 
Government.‟94 This was certainly the case for oblique attack. Developing their 
hollow cap design further, Hoyle and Strange patented a new design which 
incorporated a second, supplementary cap ahead of the main cap, which aided 
oblique attack. Upon impact in „an oblique direction‟ the supplementary cap was 
forced „backwards but is also displaced so that it gives most support to that side 
of the projectile which is remote from the armour plate.‟95The design was further 
refined in two patents issued in 1914.96 Hadfield‟s first design for oblique attack 
was the Nick Cap in 1912, and featured an annular groove around the entire 
cap, to prevent the projectile from sliding off the armour plate during attack, and 
allow the projectile to completely perforate the armour plate unimpeded.97 The 
Nick Cap was superseded in 1913 by the Angelera Cap which introduced a 
flattened nose for more effective perforation during oblique attack. Importantly, 
the Angelera patent replaced the use of soft steel caps with hardened caps 
made of nickel-chromium steel which was heat treated. This development drew 
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upon the metallurgical research undertaken to produce the Heclon in 1904. In 
experiments a cap with 0.34% carbon, 3.86% nickel and 1.78% chromium 
produced good results.98 A Heclon AP projectile fitted with an Angelera cap was 
successfully tested at Shoeburyness in late 1913 at an angle of 15º, followed by 
tests of Firth‟s oblique caps in 1913-14 with equally positive results.99 Backed 
by these outcomes, Hadfields and Firth promoted the oblique projectile to the 
Admiralty with little success, the Navy choosing not to use the updated design 
before the War.100 The two companies had attempted to dictate to the British 
Government what their future requirement was and each commenced a 
research program for oblique projectiles without an obvious home market or 
immediate financial reward.101  
The development of the Eron CPC projectile and the hollow and oblique 
cap designs further demonstrate the use of sub-innovations to refine the 
performance of projectiles at each company. These incremental improvements 
were made in an environment of open-ended experimentation. After the 
introduction of the Heclon and Rendable, instead of working to a design 
specification outlined by the Government, the two companies researched 
improvements they believed would refine their projectiles ahead of 
specifications from their home buyers. This method of technological innovation 
was risky. Without knowing what future demands would be from the 
Government, each company knew their investment in new versions of their 
projectiles might never be rewarded. Nevertheless, the companies viewed these 
designs as in „reserve‟ if they were ever needed, as Hadfields found with their 
second version of the Eron. By having designs in reserve, they could potentially 
reduce the amount of time between an initial request for a new technology and 
its successful delivery, provided the companies had accurately predicted what 
future demand was. The examples of Hadfields and Firth also demonstrate how 
path-dependent projectile research was facilitated by continuity in the 
constitution of the research teams. Hadfield and the team of Hoyle and Strange 
could build on the knowledge they developed and experimental data collected 
to work towards success, and continue to work with a core design based on a 
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major innovation. This continuity led to dozens of improvements and patents, 
and the origin of two of the most used AP projectiles designs of their day in 
Sheffield. To further illustrate the importance of continuity in the success of 
innovation, we can contrast Hadfields and Firth to Cammell, whose research on 
projectiles was led by three different teams before the Great War and performed 
less successfully.  
The first team at Cammell, Frederick Fairholme and Joseph Fletcher, 
from 1902 worked on a process of rolling heated projectiles to improve their 
toughness and provide more resistance when striking an armour plate.102 This 
was followed in 1903 by a new method of casting projectiles, and a new design 
in which the nose and cap of the projectile were screwed onto the body, which 
had a solid base.103 In addition to the designs perfected by Firth and Hadfields, 
the Cammell design had the potential to be a third method of producing AP 
projectiles to defeat KC armour in the Sheffield area. However, for unknown 
reasons the research team undertook no further development and the design 
remained a concept only. The next patent from Cammell related to projectiles 
came in 1909 from Edward Kay, a manager at the company. His patent outlined 
the use of a coil of steel to protect the point of a projectile when perforating 
armour.104 While demonstrating some ingenuity, Kay‟s design had been 
rendered obsolete by the introduction of the Hollow Cap a year prior. The final 
designs came in 1914 from Cammell‟s Sheffield managing director, James 
McNeill Allan. His „Allen Cap‟ design was a solid cap for an AP projectile with a 
recess ahead of the point of the projectile to provide support during 
perforation.105 The design was tested during the Great War, but never entered 
full scale production. Allen‟s work had failed to keep up with the work of his 
contemporaries at Hadfields and Firth, who were advancing designs for oblique 
attack at the time of his invention. None of the research teams involved with 
projectiles at Cammell built on what their predecessors had developed, and this 
discontinuity hampered their technological development. As the cases of 
Hadfields and Firth have demonstrated, by having a stable research team they 
could continually produce sub-innovations based on their previous experiences, 
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tacit knowledge, and observed problems during the testing of an innovation.106 
The stability of a research team also allowed for the more rapid realisation and 
utilisation of knowledge spun-off from armaments research.  
 The nature of spin-off varied between companies and in part depended 
on their approach to research and development, and what the key major 
innovation utilised was. At Firth this was related to the practical use of forging 
technology and aided the production of commercial products at the Gun Works. 
The research undertaken at Hadfields, in addition to providing an impetus to 
refine the construction materials used in the manufacture of their pre-
established line of rock and ore crushing machinery, generated information 
related to the use of nickel-chromium steels, and the effect of various 
compositions and treatments on the performance of alloy steels. Additionally, 
building on Hadfield‟s own knowledge of manganese, further research was 
conducted regarding controlling the use of this element in nickel-chromium 
steels and its affect on hardening. These aspects helped to provide a spin-off of 
metallurgical knowledge at Hadfields, contributing to a pool of information which 
could be drawn upon by the company‟s research staff for future armaments and 
commercial research. Furthermore, part of this pool of information was 
generated from research dead ends, ideas which failed to go into production or 
were ultimately not used. 
Overall, Hadfield „never tired of applying his metallurgical brain to the 
problems involved in the struggle for supremacy between projectiles and 
armour plate.‟107 By applying metallurgical skill and knowledge Hadfield 
pioneered the Heclon AP projectile, but importantly his understanding of the 
commercial potential of the technology enabled him, to generate a spin-off both 
into and out of armaments production within the boundaries of a single 
company. Furthermore, Hadfield‟s process of innovation with AP projectiles, 
beginning with his father‟s method of utilising cast steel, demonstrates one 
version of path-dependent research with projectiles. As Tweedale has rightly 
stated, as a result of such extensive technological development and testing 
„…by 1914 Hadfield had made his firm probably the world leader in the highly 
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specialised art of armour-piercing shell manufacture.‟108 Conversely, the 
research undertaken at Firth into projectiles built on the major innovation of 
using forged steel, and was based on practical advances rather than 
metallurgical considerations. The team of Hoyle and Strange clearly 
demonstrated this, though they were not lacking in inspiration or innovation. 
This is reflected in their successes, and the credit given to Strange for the 
invention of the hollow cap. Essentially, Firth provides an intriguing contrast to 
Hadfields‟ technological developments with projectiles. Starting with two 
different major innovations, cast and forged steel, the metallurgist and the 
practical minded innovators, working in two different research facilities in the 
same industrial district, demonstrate two different approaches to projectile 
developments, and two examples of technological path dependence. While 
individually each company was a world leader in projectile technology, their 
connections and use of patents were central to their ability to innovate, and 
further profit from investment in research and development.  
 
The Marketing of Projectile Technology: Patents, Licences and Systems 
The use of patents was an important part of the armaments industry. They were 
a means of protecting the expensive research conducted, assisting the sharing 
of knowledge between companies, and providing an opportunity to generate 
profits outside of those earned from the companies own commercial application 
of the technology. In essence, they facilitated the transfer of technological 
knowledge through licensing agreements both at home and abroad. This use of 
inter-company and overseas arrangements is counter to what is known about 
patent licensing. Nelson highlights that „the limited evidence is that much of 
patent licensing is between a firm and its affiliates and subsidiaries,‟ not 
between potential commercial rivals in the international market as the 
armaments industry will demonstrate109 Furthermore, the marketing materials 
produced by projectile companies emphasised the capabilities of their 
technology to potential foreign customers. These are important aspects of 
armaments marketing that have been overlooked by previous studies, which 
have explored technology to some extent but not the scope of their overseas 
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connections and the patents and knowledge which underpin the products 
offered.110 Patents and licensing were also a way of controlling how much 
technical information left the company, leading to decisions based on what new 
knowledge would be codified in a patent specification and what remained tacit 
and owned by the research team of the company. A patent or licence explained 
how to manufacture a product, not why it was produced in a certain way. This 
limited the scope a licensee had to modify the design, as details of technical 
experimentation and failed prior designs are rarely recorded in sufficient detail 
to facilitate further development from examining patent records alone. For 
instance, if a licensee adjusted the composition of an alloy steel by even a small 
margin, or modifying its treatment process, they had no means of knowing if the 
resultant alterations in the performance of the steel would be advantageous or 
not. By retaining the knowledge of why a material was produced a certain way 
research teams could refine a product and develop further sub-innovations 
based on their prior successes and failures. Overall, this information related to 
armaments and metallurgy was developed and maintained by independent 
research teams operating primarily in secret, and provided the core knowledge 
that facilitated the path-dependent development of armaments technology.  
At Firth their means of profiting from patents was with licensing the 
hollow cap design, granted as part of their agreement with Hadfields in 1910. 
For royalties on the manufacture of hollow caps included in the arrangement, at 
the end of each year Hadfields and Firth would compare their production figures 
and calculated the payments required. From 1911 to 1913, Hadfields produced 
more hollow caps, leading to £5,970 paid from them to Firth, who never paid 
Hadfields for using the patents before the Great War. Elsewhere, one of the first 
licensees of the hollow cap was Krupp of Germany, who began paying royalties 
from the start of 1912. One third of the royalties from Krupp was paid to 
Hadfields, Firth retaining the other two thirds. In the first two years of the 
agreement, Krupp paid Firth £7,328 for the use of the hollow cap, £2,442 of 
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which was passed to Hadfields.111 In contrast to British armaments companies, 
Krupp preferred to export finished weapons rather than techniques in the early 
1900s.112 Firth also licensed the hollow cap to the Bofors Company in Sweden, 
the Breda Company in Italy, and in the UK to Armstrong, Cammell and Vickers 
by the end of 1914. With each licence Firth incorporated a clause to facilitate a 
reciprocal technological exchange, meaning that if any of their licensees 
developed improvements in the hollow cap design, the details would be given to 
Firth without cost.113 While the patents did not detail why hollow caps were 
made the way they were, practical adjustments could be made by the licensees 
to the design. However, no evidence of technical information from licensing 
agreements being returned can be found in the Firth records. The company also 
received royalties outside of formal agreements with four further Italian shell 
manufactures, and provided Hungarian company Manfred Weiss with full details 
of how to produce AP projectiles, along with rights to the Hoyle-Strange 
patents.114 These licences allowed Firth to exploit and profit from their 
technological knowledge in addition to using the Gun Works to manufacture 
projectiles. By 1914 Firth had become one of the major licensors of projectile 
caps in the world, principally due to the addition of Strange to the company and 
his hollow cap design.   
Hoyle and Strange were also involved in the development of a range of 
fuzes for projectiles.115 These were generally improvements over contemporary 
designs and allowed Firth to market „Projectiles Charged and Ready for Firing‟ 
to foreign customers.116 A key part of their marketing was to claim that they 
could offer a projectile immediately ready for service, by combining their ability 
to produce shells and fuzes with an agreement made with the Cotton Powder 
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Company in 1910 to supply cordite for foreign orders.117 The Firth „exploder‟ 
fuze was the main design used, and its performance was outlined in marketing 
materials:  
The delay in this fuze is of such a nature that the shell will be 
successfully detonated even when broken by impact with the armour (as 
on active service the majority of projectiles will be), owing to striking the 
armour at various angles, instead of normally as in the case on the proof 
ground.118 
The fuze designs were also licensed to other armaments manufacturers, with 
Vickers, the Coventry Ordnance Works and the Bethlehem Steel Company in 
the US all signing agreements before the Great War with the stipulation that all 
fuzes had to be stamped „Firths Patent.‟119  
 
 
Fig 1.6: Left, Cover of Firth‟s „Projectiles Charged and Ready for Firing‟. Right, Front page of the 
„Hadfield System as applied to War Material‟ 
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At Hadfields, the use of patents allowed for a combined means of 
marketing finished products and their method of manufacture to foreign 
customers. All of the metallurgical and armaments developments produced by 
Hadfield were placed under patent protection. While covering a range of 
advances and issues, the patents had two common features. They all were 
related to producing a superior product, and sought to reduce the cost of 
producing AP projectiles. These patents would form the basis of the licensing 
agreements which Hadfields marketed under the banner of the „Hadfield 
System as Applied to War Materials.‟ The relationship between the inventor and 
the company was an interesting one. In January 1918, Hadfields‟ acknowledged 
that the company‟s business and development was founded upon patent 
inventions and improvements, and that 219 patents had been taken out by the 
company in the UK and overseas, 172 by Hadfield and a further 40 jointly by 
Hadfield and company director Alexander Jack.120 In addition to the patents 
which he had personally filed, Hadfield had also gained control of a number of 
his father‟s patents upon the foundation of Hadfields as a limited company, and 
he continued to receive royalties under the company‟s articles of association.121 
His control over patents was extended in 1897 when the board of directors 
passed a special resolution granting Hadfield full rights to licence his patents in 
Europe and the US.122 As a result, through using the research facilities at his 
company, Hadfield was able to patent his inventions, improvements and 
discoveries, after which he could licence them back to Hadfields and anyone 
else in order to secure royalty payments. This was in addition to the sizeable 
dividend payments paid to him as the company‟s largest shareholder in the 
years prior to the Great War. Being able to keep Hadfields at the forefront of 
technological progress in both metallurgical development and armaments 
technologies was clearly of paramount interest to Hadfield, and his own bank 
balance.  
One example of this agreement in practice comes from the licensing of 
the Hadfield System to Krupp. Brokered by Hadfield directly with the German 
company in 1898 for a period of 12 years, and renewed in 1912 for a further six 
years, the licence covered projectile manufacture and manganese steel 
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production, including all associated patents, technological knowledge and 
information.123 After signing, the royalties from the arrangement were paid to 
Hadfield, not the company. A minimum payment for the first 12 years was set at 
£925 per year, rising to £1,500 per year in 1912, without the payment of any 
additional royalties which included £5 per ton of AP projectiles sold. 
Additionally, if any products made under the agreement were exported, Krupp 
would pay double the royalties on the product.124 The agreement with Krupp 
returned Hadfield a minimum of £15,000 from its signing in 1898 to the end of 
1914, without a single product being sold by the German manufacturer. Krupp 
also agreed to consider the use of all future inventions Hadfield would patent in 
Germany, which thereafter would be jointly patented by the two.125 Essentially, 
this gave Krupp access to the AP projectile technology designed to defeat their 
KC armour, in widespread use by all British armour manufacturers and several 
others around the world at the time.  
The Hadfield System as Applied to War Materials offered potential 
customers a service, not simply a technological product, and was used as a 
marketing tool to gain new orders for the Heclon and Eron. It also emphasised 
Hadfields‟ ability to produce common lyddite, shrapnel and practice shells, and 
the ERA steel products Hadfields could produce at their plant.126 The Hadfield 
System also offered licensing agreements for all of their products and patents, 
giving other companies and nations the opportunity to produce Heclon and Eron 
projectiles themselves, in return for royalty payments. This licensing system had 
multiple benefits for Hadfields. While marketing the means of producing 
advanced weapons to potential customers, the Hadfield System was not an 
arrangement which revealed the decades of research into armaments 
development at Hadfields, nor the full details of how a projectile and its cap 
worked in practice. While the methods of production were licensed, the 
knowledge remained private. As discussed above, the details in a patent 
specification only revealed what to include in an alloy steel composition, not the 
reasons why such elements were required. By licensing their production 
methods, Hadfields were able to further profit from their research, and with the 
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perpetual cycle of new developments in the armaments industry, licensing 
agreements had the potential to be rapidly rendered obsolete, at which time 
Hadfields could licence a new development in the field. In essence, by utilising 
licensing agreements Hadfields could control the flow of their technological 
research and production methods leaving the company, while also making a 
return on their research investment in projectile technologies.  
As a result of the Hadfield System, Heclon projectiles were produced 
under licence in America prior to the Great War as part of an agreement with 
the US Army. Signed in 1914 for 12 years, the agreement encompassed 17 
patents for projectiles and ERA steel registered in the US between 1899 and 
1911.127 The agreement demonstrates the progressive growth of the Hadfield 
System over time, and highlights the constant development of sub-innovations 
patented to refine the performance of their armaments products. As part of an 
agreement with the Japanese Government to supply the Imperial Japanese 
Navy in 1910, Hadfields also provided training to a small number of Japanese 
students at the Hecla Works.128 Overall, Hadfield‟s extensive patent and 
licensing arrangements served a multitude of purposes. The Hadfield System 
provided commercial opportunities to exploit their patents and make a return on 
research while protecting the knowledge and experience behind them. On the 
other hand, the arrangements made with Cleland Davis and Firth served to both 
protect and extend Hadfields‟ patents and knowledge in projectile cap 
technology and manufacture in order to remain at the forefront of developments. 
Essentially, the control and development of armaments knowledge and 
technology were central to the strategy of the company.129  
By examining all of the technological connections related to projectiles 
made by Firth and Hadfields at the outbreak of the Great War (Figure 1.7), it is 
possible to demonstrate the extent to which licences and agreements were a 
core feature of the industry. While reciprocal licences were commonly utilised to 
ensure the sharing of technological advances, the connection between 
Hadfields and Firth from 1910 is the most important. This agreement formalised 
the relationship between the two and covered any future technological 
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developments in addition to the hollow cap. These connections, and those with 
key inventors in Robert Abbott Hadfield and Harry Bland Strange, were an 
important element of projectile developments in Sheffield. Nelson and 
Rosenberg outline how the connections between people and institutions are a 
key part of technological developments.130 The relationships outlined can be 
viewed as part of an armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation system which 
developed prior to the Great War with Sheffield at its centre. This system 
emerged from the fusion of metallurgical knowledge and armaments production 
and, in this instance, facilitated the development of projectiles and a pool of 
metallurgical information which could be built upon for both commercial and 
armaments developments. These connections highlighted are solely for 
projectiles, and will be developed in the following chapter‟s discussion of other 
aspects of armaments technology 
 
Conclusion 
From exploring the evolution of AP projectiles in Sheffield, a number of core 
aspects of armaments development have been highlighted. Hadfields and Firth 
both innovated in different ways, related to the productive specialty of each 
company and the research background of the research team involved. 
Hadfields built on the major innovation of using cast steel for projectiles, and 
utilised the metallurgical knowledge of Robert Abbott Hadfield to develop a 
number of sub-innovations which demonstrate the path dependent nature of 
projectile research at the company. Conversely, Firth‟s major innovation was in 
the use of forged steel for projectiles, using practical knowledge of both steel 
manufacture and military use of shells from their research team of James 
Rossiter Hoyle and Harry Bland Strange. The sub-innovations developed at 
Firth also highlight another example of path-dependent technological 
development of projectiles, different to the research undertaken at Hadfields. 
One of the key factors in facilitating this type of innovation was a consistent 
research team, the example of Cammell with their inconsistent research teams 
demonstrating the issues of a changeable leadership for armaments research 
and development. Projectile developments also demonstrate the spin-off of 
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metallurgical knowledge from armaments research, contributing to a pool of 
information available for future use. This was part of a complex and long-
established continuum between armaments and commercial metallurgical 
developments in Sheffield. The value of patents for armaments companies has 
also been demonstrated, facilitating inter-company collaboration and knowledge 
exchange, and providing a means of marketing technology and further profiting 
from investment in research and development. The connections developed 
between Sheffield companies can be seen as an essential element of an 
innovation system centred on the city. However, projectiles are only one aspect 
of armaments technological development in Sheffield. Armour was equally 
important for the advancement of metallurgical knowledge, as the following 
chapter will explore.  
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Figure 1.7: Technological arrangements for projectiles, 1914. 
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Chapter 2: Armaments Technology 1900-1914 – Armour, Metallurgy and 
Innovation Systems 
 
Projectiles were not the only area of armaments experimentation which took 
place in Sheffield, and this chapter will investigate three further elements of 
armaments research and development in the area. Firstly, there will be an 
exploration of armour research and production methods by Brown and 
Cammell, considering the technological environment in which they operated and 
the metallurgical knowledge their experimentation created. Secondly, the use of 
metallurgical knowledge to support new areas of armaments research will be 
investigated, examining Hadfields‟ ERA steel and Harry Brearley‟s work in 
developing stainless steel. Finally the chapter will advance a model of how 
innovation occurred in the Sheffield armaments industry, and evaluates the 
technological connections between armaments companies and the wider 
Sheffield steel industry as part of an innovation system centred on the city.  
 
Sheffield and the Technology of Armour 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the major innovations which initiated the 
development of armour piercing (AP) projectiles in Sheffield were casting and 
forging technology, both central to the manufacture of steel. While armour 
production also drew on these important techniques, the major innovation 
central to armour production was the introduction of bulk steel manufacturing 
techniques from the 1860s, first the Bessemer process and in the 1870s the 
Siemens-Martin open-hearth furnace. The introduction of these process 
innovations facilitated a move to producing steel by the ton rather than by the 
pound with older methods like the crucible. Brown and Cammell were the first 
two companies to introduce the Bessemer converter and quickly used the 
process to capture the market for steel rails.1 As the demand for railway 
materials declined in the early 1870s, to utilise their steel making capacity the 
companies turned to armour plate and armaments, which were „high-value 
products and in that respect they reaffirmed Sheffield‟s quality emphasis.‟2 This 
was not a new product for either company; Brown pioneering the use of iron 
                                            
1
 On the Sheffield rail trade, see K. Warren „The Sheffield Rail Trade, 1861-1930‟, Transactions 
and Papers (Institute of Geographers), Vol.34 (1964), pp.131-157. 
2
 K. Warren, The Geography of British Heavy Industry Since 1800 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1976), p.44. 
 67 
armour for ships in 1859, and Cammell commencing manufacture soon after. 
By 1867 three quarters of the British Navy‟s ironclads were protected with 
Brown‟s armour. By that date „Browns were said to be rolling some of the 
largest armour plates in the world – 21 tons – by a process that was clearly 
pushing the limits of available technology.‟3 The company had captured first 
mover advantages with their armour production and were part of a duopoly with 
Cammell of armour supply to the Admiralty. Nevertheless, commencing armour 
production meant committing to a potentially unending path of technological 
development in order to maintain a position in the industry. Warren has 
summarised the market-cum-technological environment in which armour 
producers operated:  
If any producer failed to respond to the demands of naval architects it 
would loose business and be left with underused plant representing 
immense capital outlay. In short there had to be a ceaseless pursuit of an 
„improved‟ product and therefore modifications of processes that required 
large-scale, apparently unending, capital investment. These conditions 
forced producers to make every effort to get sufficient orders to keep 
their plants in condition to meet ever more exacting specifications.4 
Commencing armour production was a long-term strategy for both companies. 
Once initiated, they continuously sought to keep their plant up to date and 
maintain their position as the leading armour manufacturers in Britain. The 
introduction of bulk steel to the manufacturing process also saw each company 
innovate in different ways, Brown led by the Ellis family, and Cammell by the 
Wilson family.  
At Brown, whose company history is indelibly linked to the history and 
technological development of armour plate in Britain, in 1871 company 
chairman John Devonshire Ellis patented a means of cementing an iron armour 
plate. The cementation process increased the carbon content of the face of the 
armour to improve its resistance. After test plates proved unsatisfactory, the 
method did not go into production.5 As we shall see, armour innovations were 
difficult to develop and introduce, this case demonstrating one of the first 
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examples of this in the industry. Research dead-ends were a common feature 
of developments with armour, but this did not deter inventors‟ efforts. Ellis later 
had success with a method of producing compound armour consisting of an iron 
armour plate with an outer steel skin. Patented in 1877 and used widely for the 
next 15 years, the process included a perfect weld between the iron plate and 
the hardened steel skin.6  
At Cammell, central to their armour developments from the 1870s was 
Alexander Wilson, an engineer who joined the company after leaving University 
in the 1850s. Wilson worked as assistant managing director from 1864 under 
his brother George and in 1900 it was said of Wilson that „with the development 
of the armour plate industry his name is indissolubly associated.‟7 In 1876, 
Wilson developed and patented a method of producing compound armour of 
steel backed with iron, a year ahead of Ellis at Brown. The Wilson method was 
an important competitive alternative. The process involved heating a wrought 
iron plate to the required temperature and placing it „in an iron mould on 
trannions.‟ Thereafter, „the mould was turned upright and Bessemer steel was 
poured in front. After solidifying, the plate was then rolled to thickness, bent, 
planed and fitted.‟8 The proportions of the plate were one third steel, the 
remaining two thirds iron. Cammell were able to produce plates up to 19 inch in 
thickness with the method, and licensed the process to three French armour 
manufacturers.9 Wilson, in his role as managing director from 1885, remained 
active in developing armaments technologies into the 1890s. One invention was 
a method for carburising armour, using electricity to heat two plates connected 
via a diode with a layer of carbide between them to increase the carbon content 
of the face of the armour, and offered an alternative to gas or coal heated 
carburisation furnaces.10 Wilson was a prodigious innovator, and presided over 
the introduction of the next two changes in armour production at their Cyclops 
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and Grimesthorpe works, the Harvey and Krupp Cemented (KC) methods.11 
The introduction of these methods at Brown and Cammell marked two key 
changes in how armour was produced in the industry. Firstly, it introduced the 
standardisation of armour production techniques by the Admiralty, and 
thereafter each armour manufacturer in the country had to utilise the same 
method to ensure consistent performance with each ship constructed. In 
Sheffield this now included Vickers, who had commenced armour production in 
1888 to compete with Brown and Cammell.12 Essentially, the Admiralty had 
seized control over the universal adoption of new methods of armour 
production. Consequently it meant that Brown and Cammell, consistent 
innovators since commencing armour manufacture, would be increasingly 
reliant on outside licences and designs for the first time. However, Brown were 
able to avoid paying royalties for the Harvey method due to a coincidence over 
patent filings in Britain and America.  
At the heart of Brown‟s research and development of armour plates from 
the 1890s was Captain Tolmie John Tresidder, a „retired Royal Engineer, a 
great mathematician and an authority on ballistics.‟13 Tresidder had trained at 
the Royal Military Academy before joining the Royal Engineers, where he 
became a Lieutenant in 1870 and a Captain in 1882. He retired from the Army 
in 1887 and joined Brown as manager of the armour department the same year, 
before gaining a directorship in 1894. It was said that his „mathematical 
attainments and aptitude for ballistics found use with his work with John Brown 
where he devoted himself chiefly to the development of armour and armour 
piercing projectiles.‟14 Brown had been able to hire an ex-military expert whose 
knowledge and expertise helped to maintain the company at the forefront of 
armour developments. Tresidder invented in 1891 a means of chilling armour 
during its production with a high pressure water spray in order to harden the 
outer face of all-steel plates. This treatment had been developed 
contemporaneously with the American engineer Hayward Augustus Harvey, 
whose name was given this method of production. Tresidder patented the 
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method in Britain one day ahead of Harvey in the US, resulting in the patents 
being interchangeable and licensed together to armour manufacturers. This 
resulted in Brown paying no royalties, having a legitimate claim to have 
invented the method.15 Despite providing improved resistance to attack by 
projectiles over compound armour, the main technical flaw with Harvey armour 
was its liability to crack after being hit due to the structure of the steel after 
treatment.16 This issue was solved with the introduction of Krupp Cemented 
(KC) armour by Krupp just three years later.  
Krupp‟s KC armour was first produced in 1894 and established the use of 
nickel-chromium steel for armour production, containing 4% nickel and 2% 
chromium.17 The treatment of KC armour was similar to the Harvey method, 
using carburisation and water cooling, with a new heat treatment applied to alter 
the structure of the steel for the new method of manufacture. This use of similar 
techniques meant that the KC and Harvey patents were packaged together for 
licensing purposes. The updated treatment prevented the plate from cracking 
after a projectile attack as it dissipated the blow more effectively.18 The process 
of production was complex, time consuming, yet at the vanguard of 
metallurgical developments:  
To make a single plate of armour, by the methods of 1896, required 
doing extraordinary violence to metal. To begin with, an ingot of nickel 
steel, weighing 52 tons and about one yard in thickness was compressed 
in a rolling mill, at a single heat, within thirty minutes, to a new thickness 
of just six inches. This so altered the molecular structure as to 
enormously increase hardness. Then charcoal was forced into the 
surface of the metal, under heavy heating, for 10-12 days. This 
introduced a larger carbon molecule into the already modified molecular 
structure of the steel. The plate was then bent to the desired shape in an 
8,000-ton hydraulic press; then planed, edged and faced to its finished 
contours. It was these operations which required machine tools and 
cutting materials of a size, speed and force rarely needed in civilian 
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industry. Once treated to their ministrations, the plate was further 
hardened by plunging into cotton-seed oil. Then it was alternately heated 
and water cooled to harden the carbonized belt on the face of the plate, 
by now some three inches deep. By this stage, the armour was too hard 
to cut at all, and any final adjustments had to be made with massive 
grinding machines. The result was the most advanced metallurgical 
product of its day.19 
The Sheffield armour manufacturers had no issues obtaining licences or 
technical advice from Krupp to produce KC armour.20 A clause in the Krupp 
licence required any licensees to communicate any improvements they made in 
the manufacture of the armour back to the inventor.21 Any competitive 
advantages from the advance of armour would be short-lived in this 
international free exchange of knowledge, with each producer thereafter able to 
produce an advanced product. Krupp had chosen to be open with the licensing 
of the method due to profit considerations, due to the potentially limited markets 
for the German manufacturer. The British Admiralty would never order from a 
German company, yet they were open to the British armour manufacturers 
using a German design and paying royalties back to Krupp. This increased the 
return the German company made on their technological investment, much like 
their counterparts with projectiles explored in the previous chapter. By 1898 it 
was reported that „our three great Sheffield armour-plate factories have 
achieved success in the manufacture of Krupp process plates nearly 12 inch 
thick.‟22 Despite the rapid adoption of the approach by Sheffield companies, its 
introduction had caused some severe issues at the armour plants. The 
Admiralty initially deliberated over the best type of armour which led to the 
stoppage of orders, and at Brown the management had trouble keeping the 
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works in operation.23 Once KC armour was universally adopted, it required 
significant new capital investment for each armour plant. Grant concludes, the 
introduction of KC armour by Brown „had forced the company to reorganise the 
armour plant, spending a good deal more capital.‟24 In 1895 Brown commenced 
expanding the armour plant by adding Krupp furnaces (for carburisation), 
Harvey furnaces (for chilling armour), a new armour rolling mill, 10,000 ton 
armour forging press and an 8,000 ton armour bending press, with the 
extensions completed by mid-1901.25 In 1903 the capacity of Brown‟s armour 
plant had increased to 10,000 tons a year.26 Cammell‟s first KC plate was 
produced in 1896, preceded by a large capital outlay and the removal of the 
Bessemer plant at the Cyclops Works to clear the space required.27 By 1900 
Cammell had produced armour for over 200 ships, and claimed to be one of the 
largest armour producers in the world.28 Overall, their new plant required for 
maintaining armour production was advanced and expensive, and had limited 
use for commercial work.  
 
Figure 2.1: 12,000 ton armour bending press at Cammell 
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Figure 2.2: Armour relationships in 1908 before dissolution of the Harvey United Steel Company 
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The introduction of KC armour also required the coordination of patents, 
licences and royalty payments. Despite the armour‟s German origin, it 
introduction was not part of an international conspiracy, but simply a reflection 
of the British Admiralty‟s preference for Krupp armour after extensive 
deliberations regarding the best armour for the Royal Navy.29 Nevertheless, for 
the duration of the patents the British armour manufacturers were required to 
provide Krupp with a royalty of £4 or £5 per ton produced.30 From 1900 both the 
Harvey and Krupp patents and licensing rights belonged to the British-based 
Harvey United Steel Company, with shareholding members in four countries 
and Albert Vickers as its chairman.31 The members of the group from Britain 
were Brown, Cammell, Vickers, Armstrong, and from 1902 Beardmore; from 
Germany, Dillinger Hütten, and Krupp; from France, Acieries de la Marine, 
Schneider, and Chatillon; and from America, Bethlehem and Carnegie. In 
addition to dealing with royalties, the group also divided orders for armour from 
countries outside of their members between them. The American companies 
voluntarily left in 1908, seeing the group as no longer to their advantage, and 
once the Harvey and Krupp patents expired in 1905 and 1909 respectfully, the 
group voluntarily wound up, finally coming to a close in 1912.32 Thereafter, the 
former members were able to continue producing KC armour free of royalties. 
The production of KC armour also required its manufacturers to secure supplies 
of nickel, and in 1901 the Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate was established 
by Vickers, Armstrong, Brown, Cammell and Beardmore to use their combined 
purchasing power to arrange a preferential supply agreement with La Société 
de Nickel, at the time the world‟s leading producer of Nickel.33 By 1908 its 
membership had grown to include all the European members of the Harvey 
United Steel Company, Hadfields in Britain, Wilkowitzer-Bergbau in German, 
and Societa di Terni in Italy.34 The relationships between the armour producers 
and these international groupings before the dissolution of the Harvey United 
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Steel Company in 1908 are shown in Figure 2.2. The use of syndicates was 
seen as an efficient means of sharing knowledge related to KC armour, and 
assisting in reducing the cost its production. In particular, the positive 
experience of Brown within the syndicate led its management to consider the 
adoption of the model for a new armour design in 1911.  
Brown had provided access to their Krupp and Harvey furnaces for 
experiments with a new method of armour production to General Feodosieff, an 
inventor and armaments expert.35 The proposed treatment was provisionally 
protected by patents, and created a plate of „especial quality.‟36 Before applying 
for a patent, undertaking any testing or the design being accepted by the 
Admiralty, Brown‟s Works Committee „suggested that, if patented, Messrs 
Krupps‟ Patent might be taken as example‟ to utilise the design with 
international manufacturers through the establishment of a new syndicate.37 
The suggestion of a licensing syndicate so early in the process development 
also highlights the insatiable desire to control the commercial utilisation of 
armaments technology by Brown‟s management. Company managing direction 
William Ellis began to formulate an agreement with Feodosieff for his designs in 
late 1911, but encountered issues with the Government and their reluctance to 
accept armour made by the process. A test plate was suggested to be 
submitted to prove its resistance, though no further record of the process can 
be found in Brown‟s records and the process never entered production.38 Dead 
ends were a common feature of armour research and development, as 
experimentation utilising metallurgical knowledge and refining new alloy steels 
for armour from 1900 time and again demonstrated.  
One of the key contributions of KC armour to the Sheffield armaments 
industry was in its pioneering use of nickel and chromium for the production of 
armour, in conjunction with an innovative treatment. Essentially, after the 
introduction of KC armour and the development of new AP projectiles 
metallurgical knowledge was used to defeat metallurgical knowledge in a 
perpetual technological war waged between members of the Sheffield 
armaments industry, using research facilities in walking distance from each 
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other. Each side also consistently believed they would again either keep or 
retain the upper hand, Charles Ellis remarking in 1908 that: 
„the old fight which has been going on between projectiles and armour, I 
think now for forty-four years, still goes merrily on. It may be that the 
capped projectile is, at the present moment, the winner, but I daresay 
that is a position of honour which it will not hold, at any rate 
unchallenged, very much longer.‟39 
Brown and Cammell, like their counterparts in Firth and Hadfields discussed in 
the previous chapter, were involved with commercial metallurgical research 
alongside their armaments developments. Cammell were committed to alloy 
steel research from the 1890s, when the company appointed Thomas Middleton 
as head metallurgist. Middleton suggested that the company install a 
metallographic laboratory to examine the structure of steel in 1902, and the 
following year he is believed to have produced a stainless steel knife, though 
the air of secrecy around Cammell‟s research laboratories and his own reserved 
character prevented the further publicity of his achievements.40 Nevertheless, 
the company possessed modern research facilities for metallurgical 
developments and by 1919 they had also recruited 9 graduates in engineering 
and metallurgy from the University of Sheffield.41 Brown also had a long history 
of metallurgical developments, in 1871 chromium steel had been made for the 
first time in England at the Atlas Works, and experiments with tungsten for tool 
steels had also been undertaken before 1900.42 In 1903 the works were 
described as possessing an extensive chemical laboratory with a staff of 
fourteen chemists, and by 1919 Brown had employed eight of Sheffield 
University‟s graduates in engineering and metallurgy.43 One of their main roles 
was the testing of armour. Every plate was subjected to three or four chemical 
analyses and five or six mechanical tests. Armaments manufacture clearly 
encouraged the development of metallurgical analysis.44 Ensuring accuracy in 
the composition of the steel, and the uniform treatment of armour were essential 
to guarantee a consistent performance. Armour production and development 
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also demonstrate that the „rule of thumb‟ methods of Sheffield‟s steel industry 
were declining with the development of more precise approaches to steel 
making though these older technologies to production and research did not 
disappear overnight.45 Nevertheless, the use of alloy steels for armour made 
accuracy a paramount consideration at both companies.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Research Laboratory at Cammell-Laird 
 
Research into new alloy steel compositions for armour continued at 
Brown and Cammell after the introduction of KC armour, and the installation of 
new Harvey and Krupp treatment furnaces in the 1890s. Three examples 
demonstrate this continued research at the two companies; the research teams 
involved combining metallurgical and armaments knowledge for the 
advancement of the product. While ultimately research dead-ends, each 
demonstrates an important spin-off of new metallurgical knowledge.46 At Brown, 
Tresidder had begun experimenting with the use of tungsten in armour from the 
1890s, an element used in small quantities for tool steels at the company. While 
not directly commenting on Brown, Trebilcock has highlighted that „one 
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Sheffield armourer was so far ahead of his time – by decades – that he was 
experimenting as early as 1895 with a tungsten alloy for naval protection.‟47 The 
emphasis is clear; using tungsten for alloy steels was developing knowledge at 
the forefront of metallurgical progress in the Sheffield area, and the fusion of 
armaments and metallurgical research had benefits for both fields. Tresidder 
continued developing the armour and in 1903 patented a version of tungsten 
armour which incorporated 0.3% carbon, 0.3% manganese, 0.3% tungsten, and 
2.5% of nickel, treated using the same production facilities at the Atlas Works 
for KC armour.48 Furthermore, Tresidder suggested the material could be used 
in the manufacture of safes.49 The potential commercial spin-offs from research 
were clearly considered by armaments experts during their experiments, in 
addition to developing their understanding of metallurgy. 
At Cammell, their managing director Frederick Charles Fairholme 
developed a new armour steel and treatment in 1903 which they suggested 
could also be used for projectiles.50 The most innovative aspects of the design 
were in the alloy steel composition, and the method of cementation. The armour 
contained 1% molybdenum or tungsten, 3½% chromium and 0.6% carbon, 
eliminating the use of nickel with the material. The cementation process moved 
beyond using solely carbon, typically in the form of charcoal, to increase the 
hardness of the exterior face of the plates as had been the case in the 
production of KC armour. For this method, the face to be hardened was heated 
in contact with boron, tungsten, molybdenum or vanadium. The use of these 
elements increased the resistance of the armour.51 This was certainly 
developing knowledge at the forefront of metallurgical progress, utilising a 
number of elements rarely used in alloy steel production at the time, and added 
to the retained knowledge of metallurgy at Cammell‟s research laboratories. In 
1907, a second research team at Cammell, William Archbold Hartley and 
metallurgist Bedford Henry Deby patented a new method of producing armour 
remarkably similar to Wilson‟s compound armour from the 1870s.52 Their 
compound steel armour was produced by first casting the back of the plate, and 
once solidified the front of the plate was cast directly onto it. This method of 
                                            
47
 Trebilcock, Science, p.573. 
48
 British Patent 8299/1903, pp.3-5. 
49
 British Patent 8299/1903, p.5. 
50
 British Patent 1,850/1903. 
51
 British Patent 1,850/1903. 
52
 British Patent 15,976/1907, p.2. 
 79 
compound casting meant the two layers could possess different metallurgical 
compositions. The front of the plate contained 0.5-1% carbon, 1-3% of 
chromium, tungsten and molybdenum, and 2-6% nickel, while the back of the 
plate contained 0.1-0.3% carbon, 2-6% nickel, 0.75-3% chromium, and 0.25-1% 
vanadium.53 The use of five different elements in the composition of the armour 
was unique among the Sheffield armourers. Incidentally, this would have 
increased the cost of producing armour using this method, and certainly played 
a part in preventing its introduction. While innovation was promoted by all 
armament companies, the cost implications involved with the introduction of any 
new product were carefully considered in relation to the potential of profits being 
made. Producing KC armour may have been difficult, but over time and with 
experience their production was progressively more efficient and cheaper, 
allowing greater profitability for the company.  
None of the three designs highlighted went into production and 
developed beyond the patent stage yet all were utilising the most advanced 
techniques and experimental information related to metallurgy, creating new 
knowledge for future use by the research teams involved. Armour research at 
Brown and Cammell explored the use of a range of elements for the 
composition and treatment of alloy steels for armour, including tungsten, 
manganese, nickel, molybdenum, chromium, boron and vanadium. Tantalum 
can also be added to the list, used by Vickers for an experimental armour 
design in 1909.54 Overall, the nature of spin-off at the two companies from 
armaments research was in the form of knowledge relating to the effect of these 
elements on the performance of steel, retained by the research teams involved 
for future utilisation for either commercial or armaments developments. 
Principally, this knowledge was derived from research dead-ends, 
demonstrating that the spin-off of new information from armaments research did 
not have to be from a finished product. Given the lack of success with the 
development of new alloy steels, future armour research would look to more 
practical solutions to counter the superiority of attack over defence.  
By 1908 AP projectiles were able to successfully perforate and defeat KC 
armour when attacked at right angles to the plate due to the action of the soft 
steel cap placed over the point of the projectile. To counter this development, at 
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Brown Tresidder experimented with the use of two armour plates instead of 
one. His design would use the same thickness of armour as normal, but split 
into an outer decapping plate one quarter the thickness of the inner plate, with a 
controlled gap between the two. The use of two plates was not new, but 
maintaining an approximate relative thickness and separation between the inner 
plate and the outer decapping plate was novel.55 The action of the outer plate 
would remove the projectile cap, reducing its ability to successfully perforate the 
inner plate. The design, however, did not go into production, possibly due to the 
need to produce and treat twice as many plates as usual, either doubling 
production times or requiring the expansion of facilities to produce KC armour. 
Nevertheless, this example shows that practical solutions rather than altering 
the composition of the material were beginning to be the basis of armour 
research and development.  
 The armour research at Brown again demonstrates how the continued 
refinement and development of armaments technology was tied to the work of a 
consistent research team, in this case Tresidder. The incremental 
improvements and advances made at the company predominantly built on his 
research, utilising path dependent sub-innovations.56 Furthermore, Tresidder 
continuously speculated on future developmental needs for armour plate, with 
limited success.57 The main outcome of armour developments beyond 1900 
was in the production of metallurgical knowledge at the forefront of the industry, 
and of increasing benefit to civilian developments.  
Overall, projectiles and armour were products which inherited the use of 
science and metallurgical knowledge, their productive origins based on major 
innovations in bulk steel, casting and forging. The desire to refine their 
performance saw the merging of armaments and metallurgical technique, the 
former providing the latter with ample opportunity for experimentation with alloy 
steel compositions and treatment processes. In return, armaments provided 
metallurgy with a broad information base, built on experiments and testing to 
understand the effect of a range of elements on the performance of steel, in 
many cases at the forefront of metallurgical knowledge and decades ahead of 
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commercial utilisation of such materials in alloy steels. This mutual development 
involved companies utilising established production methods at their works, 
combined with a growing application of scientific approaches to steel 
manufacture. However, from the early 1900s metallurgical knowledge began to 
be used to develop new armaments and commercial products based not on 
established techniques of steel production, like forging, casting and bulk steel 
processes were, but in the manipulation of the elemental content of alloy steels 
to improve their properties and performance. 
 
Armaments and Metallurgical Developments 
The potential utilisation of metallurgical knowledge to create a new armament 
product was realised by Robert Abbott Hadfield who, away from the 
development of projectiles, sought to exploit his knowledge and research into 
alloy steels for use in armour and armour plating. Introduced in 1904, ERA steel 
armour utilised a nickel-chromium alloy consisting of between 0.25% and 5% 
chromium, 0.25% to 7% nickel, and a low content of manganese up to 0.45%.58 
While previously armour had been forged, meaning little could be done to 
modify it after production, ERA steel armour could be cast, allowing complex 
shapes to be produced in a single piece.59 This was a major step forward in 
armour plate manufacture, and allowed ERA steel to be utilised in gun 
housings, conning towers and other structures which had previously been 
defended by light armour. The Navy incorporated ERA steel into ship designs 
for this purpose, though Hadfield envisioned wider uses for the material. 
Believing the product provided greater resistance than KC armour, he foresaw 
that ERA steel could be used for capital ships and devised a means of 
producing „joint-less armour‟ for naval vessels.60 However, Hadfields did not 
possess the substantial production facilities to produce such armour in large 
quantities, nor was the company forward integrated into shipbuilding as an 
outlet for the product. Hadfield would have to look for a potential collaboration in 
the wider armaments industry.  
In 1904, Hadfield sought an amalgamation with Armstrong as a 
commercial outlet for ERA steel. His proposal to Armstrong is summed up in a 
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letter from Stuart Rendel, vice chairman of Armstrong, to Sir Andrew Noble, 
chairman of the company61:  
It puts me flat on my back and is a bolt from blue! Hadfield is to become 
our largest share-holder, to have a seat on our board at a big salary, to 
draw £5,000 a year for twenty years, and we are to value his shares one-
and-a-half times the value of his own… all this for a licence in England 
for a patent that may be worthless tomorrow! What a gamble!62 
This was an ambitious move by Hadfield. While Armstrong would gain a 
potentially lucrative, yet commercially untested patent, it was Hadfield who 
would gain the most from the arrangement. A seat on Armstrong‟s board would 
have placed him in the upper echelon of the country‟s armourers, a prospect 
which certainly appealed to his ego. However, he risked loosing the managerial 
influence his chairmanship of Hadfields gave him in a newly merged 
organisation. It is only possible to speculate on what advantages Hadfield saw 
for the amalgamation beyond a patent arrangement. As Armstrong‟s largest 
shareholder his wealth would have continued to grow and it is possible he 
anticipated ultimately becoming chairman of the company. Armstrong 
suggested a revised agreement in November 1907, in response Hadfield 
dispatched his directors Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, who had previous links 
with Armstrong, and Colonel Sir Howard Vincent to correspond and meet with 
Noble.63 By March 1908, negotiations had broken down, with Vincent and 
Douglas reporting back to the Hadfields‟ board:  
we entered into negotiations with Messers Armstrong Whitworth Ltd with 
a view to the amalgamation suggested by them. After several meetings 
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we were informed that the Elswick board was not unanimous on the 
subject and that the matter must be dropped.64 
With the failure of negotiations with Armstrong, Hadfield opted to find a 
somewhat less ambitious commercial arrangement for the licence of ERA steel 
patents with the Scottish shipbuilder Beardmore in May 1908. While not the 
type of amalgamation originally planned, the arrangement placed Hadfields in 
closer contact with the Vickers‟ group, and provided further benefits to the 
company.65 This second attempt to gain a substantial return on ERA steel 
patents would be a much simple licensing agreement, which had benefits for 
both companies. Beardmore would gain an exclusive licence to six of Hadfield‟s 
ERA steel patents, covering the armour, its treatment, and a range of 
products.66 Furthermore, Beardmore were restricted to manufacturing ERA steel 
items over 10 tons and beyond Hadfields‟ productive capabilities, and would 
pay half of their profits on these products back to Hadfields. In return, Hadfields 
would produce items under 10 tons, and pay Beardmore one quarter of their 
profits made from ERA steel products as an incentive to market the products.67 
The connection of Beardmore to Vickers also provided Hadfield with a path into 
negotiations to join the Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate for the first time.68 
Their ultimate entry to the syndicate allowed Hadfields to purchase nickel at 
around £30 per ton less than market prices, which could reach £160 per ton. By 
the end of 1914 the company had saved £41,700 in the cost of nickel, a key 
material in the production of Heclon and Eron shells and ERA steel.  
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Elsewhere in Sheffield Brown and Firth, as an extension of their 1902 
share arrangement, looked to establish a joint research facility to use their 
combined metallurgical knowledge for commercial usage, established the 
Brown-Firth Research Laboratory in 1908 and appointed Harry Brearley as its 
first director.69 Brearley had previously been manager of Firth‟s Riga Works, 
where he was involved in the production of projectiles for the Russian 
Government. The rationale behind establishing the facility was the unifying of 
both company‟s research staff and experience. In this regard, the Brown-Firth 
Research Laboratory became the repository of both companies‟ metallurgical 
knowledge, inherited from armaments experimentation and consisted of 
information regarding the metallurgical principles of armour and projectile 
developments, and the effect of various elements and treatments on the 
material performance of steel. From its opening, the Laboratory worked on the 
development of alloy steels and treatments, predominantly for commercial 
purposes and to support their customers‟ needs.70  
 
 
Figure 2.4: The Brown-Firth Research Laboratory 
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Despite the commercial focus of the Brown-Firth Research Laboratory, 
Brearley was also involved with armaments. As part of Firth‟s commitment to 
support their customers with the Brown-Firth Research Laboratory, Brearley 
was invited to a small arms factory in May 1912 to study the erosion of rifle 
barrels. Away from the technological advances in projectiles at their Gun Works, 
Firth were the only Sheffield armourer to produce steel barrels for small arms, 
supplied to the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield.71 By 1913, Brearley was 
also engaged in research work regarding the erosion of the inner-tubes of large 
calibre guns and made a breakthrough with experiments related to steel with a 
high proportion of chromium. The material, which contained 12.8% chromium 
and 0.24% carbon, was initially referred to as rustless steel, and after further 
developments and refinements the material gained its more commonly used 
name, stainless steel. Brearley, somewhat dryly, commented in his 
autobiography that „the people in authority…saw nothing of commercial value, 
and still less of scientific interest, in it.‟72 Despite this viewpoint, with hindsight 
we can see that the development of stainless steel was one of the most 
important spin-offs from armaments research, and one which provided a 
tangible product with a vast range of commercial uses. Ultimately, stainless 
steel failed to be utilised for gun barrels, with Brearley reporting that „the use of 
the material for ordnance purposes, as originally intended, appeared to excite 
no interest.‟ While never used for gun barrels, the commercial exploitation of the 
material was exceptionally rapid, with the Portland Works in Sheffield producing 
stainless steel cutlery, under the guidance of Brearley, in 1914.   
While stainless steel was initially seen as a novelty, information about the 
material quickly spread and by 1915 several companies in Sheffield, including 
Vickers and Hadfields, were producing the material, making patenting the 
innovation impossible in the United Kingdom. As Tweedale has suggested, 
such metallurgical knowledge spread quickly in the City.73 While difficult to 
explore business networks, we can nevertheless from the case studies offered 
make some generalisations. It is probable that some knowledge developed by 
armament companies into alloy steels spread through informal networks in 
Sheffield as well as through formal patents and licences. To understand this 
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process, the general means by which companies innovate in the armaments 
industry requires further exploration, through the advancement of a model of 
innovation. The connections between companies are also a key element of the 
industry, and from this the existence of an armaments-metallurgy-steel 
innovation system centred on Sheffield can be explored. 74  
 
Technological Development and Innovation Systems 
By examining the common features of armaments development and 
experimentation from the previous case studies, it is possible to advance a 
model of how innovation occurred in the armaments industry, and how the 
outputs from this research were connected to the wider Sheffield industry 
through the concept of an innovation system. This model is demonstrated in 
Figure 2.5, and requires some further explanation. While each armament 
company innovated in their own way, related to the research team involved, 
they all worked with a comparable group of inputs and outputs to their research 
and development activities. With inputs, it is possible to group these into four 
areas. Firstly, the productive facilities of the company set the boundaries of 
what their team would research. No armament company supported research 
into an innovation they could not manufacture. These boundaries also forced 
research teams to experiment in a restricted manner. With armour, the high cost 
of both Harvey and Krupp furnaces meant that only innovations which utilised 
these facilities were explored, building on what the company could already 
manufacture. 
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Figure 2.5: A model of armaments development in Sheffield 
 
 Secondly, company-specific metallurgical knowledge was a key aspect of 
the innovative process, either from a director-cum-technocrat such as Robert 
Abbott Hadfield, or brought into the company from outside sources such as 
University graduates, including those from the University of Sheffield‟s 
metallurgical programs. Trained university metallurgists also had a choice of 
which other steel companies they could work with in the Sheffield district, 
contributing to a wider armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation system. Broadly, 
knowledge of steel production and metallurgy affected how companies 
approached armaments developments. For projectiles, Firth stuck to what the 
company knew best in forging steel, Hadfields alternatively worked with cast 
steel. Military-scientific knowledge in the form of ex-military directors, was also 
influential in the innovative process, providing practical knowledge and 
experience from the use of armaments technology away from the testing ground 
and research laboratory, such as Captain Tolmie John Tresidder or Harry Bland 
Strange. Finally, the use of outside licences brought new armaments and 
metallurgical knowledge to the company, but how to utilise the knowledge to 
make further developments varied from team to team. New methods of 
production brought to a company in this way, such as KC armour, had to be 
integrated and understood by the research team involved so further 
developments could be attempted. However, when any refinements were made 
to an outside patent, the licences typically included a reciprocal arrangement 
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whereby the new knowledge had to be communicated back to the original 
licensee free of royalties. 
 This combination of inputs influenced armaments research and 
development at each company. From the case studies presented, the use of 
sub-innovations to assist in the path-dependent development of armaments 
typically achieved the greatest results.75 However, the nature of technological 
path dependence varied between companies and was perpetuated by the 
research teams involved. By building on prior research to develop new sub-
innovations, solutions could be found quicker than a new research team being 
brought together for each issue. This way, tacit knowledge developed by the 
team from prior armaments research could be more rapidly utilised.76 The 
research teams established by Hadfields, built around Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Firth with James Rossitter Hoyle and later Harry Bland Strange, and Brown with 
Tolmie John Tresidder are examples of this. Their success in the development 
of projectiles and armour are testament to the value of path dependent 
technological research and their investigations into an ever increasing number 
of sub-innovations. Conversely, the changing teams at Cammell had less 
success and in some instances lagged behind the progress of their 
contemporaries.  
The outputs from armaments research and development can be split 
between the successful output of a new design, and the by-products of 
armaments research grouped as spin-offs. For every armament company, the 
principal aim of any research was a product output, which could be sold to 
either a home or an overseas buyer. Typically this was very soon after the 
patent was granted and testing and approval were complete, though in some 
cases companies speculated on what future technological demands and 
requirements would be to varying levels of success. In these cases, some 
designs retained for future use did eventually go into production, though 
examples of this are rare. Dead-ends, where a product failed to go into 
production, were a common part of the innovative process for armaments. A 
second and equally common output of successful armaments research were 
licensing agreements with other manufacturers at home and overseas. As 
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demonstrated with projectile technology, this was a secondary means of 
profiting from armaments research, controlling the flow of technological 
knowledge from the company and maintaining a common technological level of 
the industry in a collusive fashion. These connections between companies also 
contributed to an armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation system.  
Spin-off outputs from armaments research can be split into two parts, 
tangible commercial products and metallurgical knowledge. In some cases, the 
spin-off from armaments technological development resulted in refinements 
made to established civilian product lines at the same company, such as with 
the construction of rock and ore crushing machinery at Hadfields, or through the 
commercial exploitation of a new material such as stainless steel from the 
Brown-Firth Research Laboratory. Armaments-based and commercial-based 
metallurgical developments were part of a continuum, the two fields constantly 
able to draw on and influence each other in their experimental developments. 
The second element of spin-off was in the form of new metallurgical knowledge, 
armaments technological developments contributing to a broad information 
base related to the alloying of steels, treatments and productive methods from 
their extensive research and development activities. The effects of manganese, 
nickel, chromium, tungsten, molybdenum, boron, vanadium, and tantalum were 
all explored in relation to alloy steels and armaments in Sheffield in the two 
decades before the Great War. Some of these developments, such as 
Tresidder with tungsten alloys for armour, were decades ahead of equivalent 
developments in civilian metallurgy. The technological war between armour and 
projectiles, and consequently the rivalries created between armaments 
companies were the key factor in promoting the application of metallurgical 
knowledge to the advancement of armaments, and to the pool of metallurgical 
knowledge available to the members of an armaments-metallurgy-steel 
innovation system. This pool of metallurgical knowledge is what the inter-war 
special steel industry was built on in Sheffield.77 With stainless steel, Brearley 
demonstrated how quickly a new product could be discovered and brought into 
commercial production in the city. Part of the pool of metallurgical information 
was derived from research dead-ends, the investigations which did not result in 
a viable sub-innovation or a design, product or patent that, while having positive 
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attributes, failed to go into production and remained at the experimental stage. 
Nevertheless, dead-ends were a key part of generating new metallurgical 
knowledge in the industry. As Nelson highlights, knowledge is „won as a by-
product of searching for new technologies‟ and that „what succeeded and failed 
last time gives clues as to what to try next.‟78 The technological spin-off from 
research dead-ends which can be identified are uncovered from analysis of 
patent records, which is certainly assisted by the persistent culture of patenting 
in the industry before the Great War. However, it is highly likely that many more 
dead-ends were reached and more knowledge developed and documented in 
records which have not survived, if the information was recorded at all. While 
the armourers were secretive in their research and development, they all 
recorded explicit knowledge in their patent filings, which formed the basis of 
their licensing agreements. There may have been significantly more tacit 
knowledge retained by the research teams and their wider metallurgical staff 
which is impossible to uncover, and far more research and development took 
place with armaments than was ever recorded. Consequently, it is possible to 
view Hadfields, Cammell, Vickers and the Brown-Firth research laboratories, 
along with the university graduates, metallurgical chemists and staff working in 
them as repositories of the metallurgical knowledge created by each company 
as a spin-off from armaments research. A key part of this process of 
metallurgical spin-off was the recognition by the research teams and companies 
involved that the knowledge being created was important to their future 
research into both armaments and commercial alloy steels. Without this, it is 
possible much valuable information could be by-passed, while other 
metallurgists searched along similar lines for the next breakthrough in alloy 
steels.79 It is also probable that as with stainless steel and Brearley‟s research, 
knowledge spread quickly in the Sheffield steel industry, rapidly known to other 
companies, research facilities, staff and the university through informal 
connections between people rather than formal business links.  
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Figure 2.6: Technological linkages related to armaments 1914 
 
The connections between people and companies were key aspects of 
innovation in Sheffield. The existence of an armaments-metallurgy-steel 
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innovation system centred on Sheffield can be demonstrated by examining the 
intensity of technological linkages related to armaments and metallurgical 
research in the city in addition to the wider world as shown in Figure 2.6. While 
this principally shows the extent of licensing agreements for projectiles, in 
addition to the supply arrangements made with the SMNS, generally outside of 
Sheffield and Britain, the formal connections between technocrats, companies, 
and training provision in the city helped to build an important innovation system 
to support armaments and metallurgical technical development. These 
connections also aided in the spread of metallurgical knowledge between 
members of the industry. The group of companies which clustered in Sheffield 
were able to outperform companies in other locations, while continuing to allow 
individual companies to „demonstrate sustained superior levels of 
performance.‟80 The network of Sheffield armaments companies can be 
described as a „capsule‟ network, one which is „relatively small in membership, 
self-contained and impermeable.‟81 In this regard, the network served a 
defensive mechanism, one in which technological innovation was maintained 
among those involved, yet prevented new entrants which could disrupt the 
structure of the industry. This compact network created links across the country 
and the rest of the world in order to flourish and fully exploit the technological 
innovations developed. The sharing of armaments technological knowledge 
among the Sheffield companies created a high-trust network from the reciprocal 
licences employed. Popp and Wilson have suggested that such high-trust 
networking „could shade into collusive behaviours and attitudes, reducing the 
responsiveness of firms and districts.‟82 This was certainly the case with the 
armaments industry, and as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 their 
responsiveness to the flood of orders placed with them in the early months of 
the Great War shows they were unprepared for the demands of wartime 
production.  
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Conclusion 
In Sheffield the production of armaments built on older productive methods and 
techniques in casting, forging and bulk steel production. All of these were based 
on rule of thumb methods with origins external to armaments production, but 
when utilised by the industry they can be seen as major innovations, 
commencing the path dependent nature of research. Thereafter, sub-
innovations were utilised to refine the performance of a product, increasingly 
influenced by alloy steels and metallurgical developments, creating new 
metallurgical knowledge from the fusion of the two industries. The technological 
driving force in the industry was the continuous, unrestricted development of 
armour and projectiles which pushed the limits of alloy steel technology. As the 
knowledge available to research teams increased, new innovations based on 
the use of metallurgy, such as ERA armour and stainless steel began to be 
discovered and utilised. By the Great War, the major spin-off from armaments 
research was in the form of metallurgical knowledge, detailing the effect of 
various elements on the alloying of steels and new treatments and 
manufacturing techniques, in addition to each company possessing extensive 
research laboratories. The technological connections between companies in the 
Sheffield armaments industry can be seen as part of an armaments-metallurgy-
steel innovation system, facilitating the sharing of knowledge and providing a 
defence against any new entrants to the industry.  Overall, by 1914 the 
armaments companies in Sheffield were at the forefront of developments with 
armour and projectiles, making the city perhaps the most important centre for 
armaments technology and production in the world. Nevertheless, it was the 
commercial trading environment, not the research laboratory or testing ground, 
where such extensive research investments would be rewarded. As will be 
explored in the following chapter, dealing with a monopsonist home buyer 
presented unique challenges, and required the fostering of a number of special 
relationships with the British Government. 
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Chapter 3: Business, Marketing and Special Relationships - Armourers 
and the British Government 1900-1914 
 
Before the Great War, Sheffield was the world centre of armaments technology. 
The four companies involved utilised metallurgical skill and knowledge to 
advance both armour and projectiles, in turn generating a pool of information 
regarding the scientific application of metallurgy. However, technological 
prowess was not a guarantee of generating profits from their research and the 
large number of patents emanating from the industry. As Warren has 
highlighted, „the inventor must join with a manufacturer unless he is unusually 
well placed to begin production on his own account.‟1 Bastable has also 
suggested that we should not acknowledge technological innovation as 
business entrepreneurship, and that technology does not „necessarily bring 
business success.‟2 Technological competence had to be coupled with the 
ability to supply the British Government. Vickers and Armstrong managed to 
supplement their duopoly of supply of gun mountings by sharing their technical 
knowledge in the early 1900s.3 Any inventors involved in the industry had to be 
tied to a board of directors who understood how to exploit their technological 
position to generate orders and profits from the British Government. By 
examining the business record of the armaments companies, the value of their 
technological investment can be explored. A key element of managing any 
armaments company was the establishment and maintenance of a strong 
relationship with their home monopsonist buyer, against the backdrop of an 
oligopolistic market system.   
 This chapter utilises Trebilcock‟s notion of „special relationships‟ existing 
between the state and private industry for the procurement of armaments.4 This 
unusual market arrangement emphasised the British Government‟s preference 
for maintaining close connections with a small number of companies for the 
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procurement of armaments. The term special relationships is used for continuity 
with Trebilcock‟s work, though here „special‟ is used only to signify an unusual 
and distinctive relationship rather than something exceptional for the companies 
involved. However, Trebilcock‟s work on the cordite industry views all the 
relationships the government maintained as principally equal in value and 
prestige to both procurement officials and private industry. Was this the case for 
the Sheffield armaments companies, or did a hierarchy of special relationships 
exist in the industry with some companies viewed as more special than others? 
This chapter will explore three key areas related to understanding if a hierarchy 
of special relationships existed prior to the Great War. Firstly, there will be an 
investigation into the nature of government spending with private industry, also 
known as the „Trade‟, and how special relationships developed through the 
personal connections of ex-military personnel and members of parliament 
gaining directorships with armaments companies. This section will also highlight 
the issues which could arise if companies failed to toe the line of government 
officials. The final two sections will examine the business of armour and 
projectiles in turn, examining the ordering patterns of the Government with 
Brown and Cammell for the former, and Hadfields, Firth and Cammell with the 
latter, and also evaluates the value of technological investment by each 
company.   
 
Special Relationships, Directors and Marketing 
It has been well established that the business environment in which the 
armaments industry operated was one characterised by uncertainty.5 The 
demand for armaments did not follow general trade cycles, predominantly 
sticking to „their own rhythm.‟6 In this regard, armaments companies stood 
„outside the business cycle, probably a more dangerous position even than 
inside it.‟7 As demonstrated in Table 3.1, orders to private industry during the 
Boer War increased demand to a pre-War peak, with Army orders particularly 
large.8 Orders to private industry declined after 1902, recovering around 1909 
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with the increased demands for naval weapons in the armaments race following 
the German naval scare.9 Changes in both home and international politics could 
also affect procurement patterns and defence spending. The Haldane Reforms, 
which reduced the size of the Army from 1906 onwards, negatively affected the 
nature of army procurement from the trade, whereas the German Naval scare in 
1909 promoted spending on new capital ship building in the following years.10 
As the technological development of the Sheffield Armaments industry attests 
to, Britain was principally a naval power, and as such orders to the trade were 
generally larger from the Admiralty than the War Office, as highlighted in Table 
3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Allocation of Naval and War Office Orders to Ordnance 
Factories and the Trade 1899-1914 (£ms) 
 Naval Orders War Office Orders 
Year Ordnance 
Factories 
Trade Percent to 
Trade 
Ordnance 
Factories 
Trade Percent to 
Trade 
1899-1900 1.4 1.0 42 1.9 3.6 65 
1900-1901 1.8 1.5 45 2.6 11.6 82 
1901-1902 1.7 2.0 54 2.2 9.8 82 
1902-1903 1.4 1.6 53 1.7 5.3 76 
1903-1904 1.3 1.5 54 1.5 2.7 64 
1904-1905 1.6 1.4 47 1.2 1.6 57 
1905-1906 1.3 1.3 50 1.4 2.7 66 
1906-1907 1.3 1.2 48 1.2 2.7 69 
1907-1908 1.2 0.8 40 1.1 1.4 56 
1908-1909 1.1 0.8 42 1.2 1.0 45 
1909-1910 1.3 0.9 41 1.0 1.1 52 
1910-1911 1.3 1.4 52 1.0 1.2 55 
1911-1912 1.3 2.3 64 1.0 1.5 60 
1912-1913 1.4 2.7 66 1.1 1.8 62 
1913-1914 1.5 4.8 76 1.1 1.2 52 
Source: TNA, WO 395/1 to 3, Reports of the Director of Army Contracts 1899-1914. 
 
                                            
9
 R. Lloyd-Jones, and M.J. Lewis, „Armaments Firms, The State Procurement System, and the 
Naval Industrial Complex in Edwardian Britain‟, Essays in Economic and Business History, 
Vol.29, No.1 (2011), pp.23-39. See also C. Trebilcock, „War and the failure of industrial 
mobilization: 1899 and 1914‟ in J.M. Winter, War and Economic Development, Essays in the 
memory of David Joslin (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.142.  
10
 See R. Lloyd-Jones and M.J. Lewis, Arming the Western Front: War, Business and the State 
in Britain 1900-1920 (London, Routledge, 2016), Chapter 2: The Road to War: the Edwardian 
Economy, and Military Preparedness; Singleton, Full Steam Ahead, pp.237-8.; Bastable p.163.  
 97 
As these figures demonstrate, beyond the end of the Boer War army 
orders to the Trade generally declined, while those from the Navy increased 
annually from 1908-9. However, the figures for total orders to the trade 
demonstrate the entire purchasing habits of each department; by examining the 
figures for more specific products related to the Sheffield armaments industry a 
more accurate picture of the environment which Brown, Cammell, Firth and 
Hadfields operated emerges. Allocations for „armaments‟, which in this regard 
referred principally to large guns and gun barrels, is show in Table 3.2. From 
this a greater disparity in expenditure to the trade between the two departments 
can be seen, the Admiralty heavily reliant on outside sources, with the War 
Office much smaller. These figures also demonstrate the difference in annual 
procurement of each department. The total orders for armaments from the War 
Office to both the Ordnance Factories and trade from 1905-1913 (£582,000) 
were less than the annual expenditure to the trade by the Navy from 1910 
onwards.  
 
Table 3.2: Allocation of Armament Orders to Ordnance Factories and the 
Trade 1905-1913 (£,000s) 
 
Naval Orders War Office Orders 
Year Ordnance 
Factories 
Trade Percent to 
Trade 
Ordnance 
Factories 
Trade Percent to 
Trade 
1905-1906 No data No data No data 88 10 11 
1906-1907 No data No data No data 55 8 13 
1907-1908 No data No data No data 68 5 7 
1908-1909 No data No data No data 51 1 2 
1909-1910 215 503 72 52 1 2 
1910-1911 236 763 76 49 3 6 
1911-1912 245 970 80 71 3 4 
1912-1913 245 870 78 96 21 18 
Source: TNA, WO 395/1 to 3, Reports of the Director of Army Contracts 1905-1913. In this 
regard Armament referred principally to orders for finished large guns and gun barrels.  
 
An examination of projectile orders in the same period further 
demonstrates the greater reliance on the trade by the Navy, as shown in Table 
3.3. While War Office orders were a greater proportion to the trade than for 
armaments, these were often for smaller calibre projectiles, typically not 
produced by Hadfields or Firth. In contrast, the Navy were significantly more 
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reliant on the trade for projectiles, reflected in the increasing value of orders to 
private industry from 1909 onwards.  
 
Table 3.3: Allocation of Projectile Orders to Ordnance Factories and the 
Trade 1905-1913 (£,000s) 
 
Naval Orders War Office Orders 
Year Ordnance 
Factories 
Trade Percent to 
Trade 
Ordnance 
Factories 
Trade Percent to 
Trade 
1905-1906 No data No data No data 302 65 18 
1906-1907 No data No data No data 190 55 22 
1907-1908 No data No data No data 221 65 23 
1908-1909 No data No data No data 360 27 7 
1909-1910 626 331 36 272 25 8 
1910-1911 672 427 39 328 112 25 
1911-1912 797 901 53 333 204 38 
1912-1913 811 1,241 60 322 199 38 
Source: TNA, WO 395/1 to 3, Reports of the Director of Army Contracts 1905-1913. 
 
Overall, the Navy was more reliant on private industry than the War 
Office in the years prior to the Great War. These figures also support the notion 
that the armaments companies in Britain before the Great War were part of a 
naval-industrial complex.11 One way in which the naval-industrial complex 
manifested itself was in the creation of „special-relationships‟ between private 
companies and the government. The notion of special relationships was first 
highlighted by an anonymous trade journalist in Arms and Explosives under the 
name „Cyclops‟, possibly alluding to a link with Cammell, which suggested that 
the government preferred „a special relationship with a few firms so that it may 
reap the advantages which this offers.‟12 At the core of this was a preference by 
the Government to deal with a small number of companies for armaments 
procurement in a bid to strike a balance between price considerations and an 
assurance that all contracts would be satisfactorily completed to the required 
specifications.13 This notion had been expanded by Trebilcock, who asserts that 
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„the „special relationship‟ reveals the two-way movement of influence: the 
government engineered the creation of capacity and the firms negotiated 
payment in orders for their obedient efforts.‟14 At the core of Trebilcock‟s 
definition of a special relationship is an emphasis on the links between the 
procurement departments of the Admiralty and War Office and private industry. 
In contrast to Trebilcock, other approaches have utilised a broader definition of 
the Government which included the Cabinet and Parliament, but it is 
Trebilcock‟s approach which provides the framework for the following analysis 
due to the limited availability of data regarding the Sheffield armaments 
industry‟s links to other areas of Government.15 While the notion of a special 
relationship refers to the entire industry, each armament company had their own 
singular special relationship with the government, which is shown by the 
analysis of the Sheffield case studies.  
The most effective means of maintaining a special relationship with the 
government was with the use of directors with military and governmental 
backgrounds by companies in the industry. Bastable has suggested that the 
external relationships of the armaments firms were more important than their 
internal management structure, and that „success went to those who best 
managed relationships with the state.‟16 Singleton has also highlighted that 
„Firms believed that it was highly beneficial to secure a regular exchange of 
personnel between the public and private sector‟ and that this facilitated the 
movement of influence between the two parties.17 For example, in his 
discussion of warship builders, Singleton has suggested that they „needed to 
recruit officials who knew the Admiralty ropes, but by doing so they risked 
alienating those whom they were seeking to influence.‟18 Government officials 
often looked upon their former colleagues as being stolen by private industry, 
and at times were reluctant to deal with them. The choice of directors was also 
a difficult one for each company. A balance had to be struck between bringing 
to the company new technological knowledge, which as the previous chapters 
demonstrated could have a positive impact on their research and development 
capabilities, and new knowledge of future demands. Individuals who could bring 
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both were rare and highly sought after. New appointments, above all else, had 
to enhance the position of the company in the armaments industry. In his 
exploration of Vickers‟ management before 1914, Trebilcock has emphasised 
the collective excellence of their board of directors, stressing the 
complementary experience of the group to the success of the company, while 
highlighting that the group also contained much „individual excellence.‟19 This 
balance between individual and collective excellence was one strived for by 
each company in the industry.  
 
Table 3.4: Hadfields’ Directors 1900-1914, and directors who continued 
1914 
 
Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Robert Abbott Hadfield 1888 Chairman and managing 
director from 1888 
Continued 
Benjamin Freeborough 1888 Director Died 1914 
Alexander G.M. Jack 1897 Director, MD from 1905 Continued 
Colonel Sir C. E. Howard 
Vincent (also shareholder) 
1903 Director Died 1908 
General Sir Henry 
Brackenbury 
1904 Director Retired 1914 
William Henry Dixon 1905 Director Retired 1914 
Henry Cooper 1905 Director Continued 
Admiral Sir Archibald L. 
Douglas 
1907 Director Died 1913 
Lord Claude John Hamilton 1909 Director Continued 
Peter Boswell Brown 1910 Director Continued 
Major Augustus Basil Holt 
Clerke 
1913 Director Continued 
Issiah Milne 1914 Director – head metallurgist Continued 
Source: SA, Hadfields Volume 7, OGM and EGM Minutes 1889-1919 
 
At Hadfields, a progressive expansion of important outside appointments 
began in 1903 following a downswing in orders following the Boer War, under 
the direct guidance of chairman Robert Abbott Hadfield (see Table 3.4). The 
board of directors at the company agreed that Hadfield could enter into an 
arrangement with anyone he wanted as a director without their prior approval, 
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and that they would unanimously accept their appointment.20 Consequently, 
some board members had previously been employed in other roles at Hadfields 
being appointed a director by the chairman. As a result of the hand picked 
nature of their appointments, the Hadfields‟ board was characterised by a high 
degree of loyalty, with exit only by retirement or death.21 The first outside 
appointment in 1903 was Colonel Sir Howard Vincent, who was a personal 
acquaintance of Hadfield. A Conservative MP for Sheffield Central, Vincent was 
Hadfield‟s first link to Westminster and his informant in the House of Commons, 
giving Hadfield a link to the heart of Government. Vincent‟s appointment was 
important because of his link to Sir Henry Brackenbury, at the time Director 
General of the Ordnance at the War Office, whose tenure in the position was 
due to end in early 1904. Upon the request of his „old friend‟ Vincent, 
Brackenbury came to Sheffield to inspect Hadfields‟ works and „satisfied himself 
that he could take a seat upon‟ the board „without the slightest fear that he 
would ever compromise that which was of greater value to him than anything in 
the world – his good name and reputation.‟22 Brackenbury joined the board in 
1905 following his retirement from the War Office. Making his public debut at 
the 1904 OGM, Hadfield made no secret of the intentions behind his 
appointment, remarking that „His [Brackenbury‟s] advice and his experience as 
regards war materials and his presence on the Board would be of the greatest 
possible assistance to them.‟23 Reiterating Hadfield‟s comments, Vincent also 
remarked that: 
There probably was no one, either in England or any foreign country, 
who had such a grasp of all the technical details connected with 
ordnance, and his experience, assistance and service would be very 
valuable indeed.24 
With the appointment of Brackenbury, Hadfield was not only extending his 
connections to important business networks at Whitehall, but bringing to the 
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company important knowledge regarding projectiles to supplement his own 
technological developments.  
The board was extended again in 1907 through the appointment of 
Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, whose addition allowed the fostering of a 
mutually beneficial link with the Admiralty. At the time of his appointment, 
Douglas had been a member of the Ordnance Committee and from 1905 to his 
retirement in 1907 had been Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth. Remarking in 
1907 on the addition of Douglas and Brackenbury to the board, Vincent assured 
the shareholders that they „would see that both as regarded the Army and the 
Navy the Board was as well equipped as it was possible for any Board to be.‟25 
Following the death of Vincent in 1908, Lord Claud John Hamilton was 
appointed to the board at the 1909 OGM.26 A conservative party member, 
Hamilton became MP for Kensington South in January 1910, gaining Hadfield a 
potential link to the House of Commons.27 After Douglas passed away in early 
1913, his seat was quickly filled by Major Augustus Basil Holt Clerke, who had 
an extensive knowledge of artillery and had previously worked as an inspector 
at the Royal Arsenal.28 Similar to Brackenbury, Clerke brought knowledge 
regarding the practical use of ordnance to Hadfields and would become an 
important future influence on the company‟s projectile developments. Overall, 
Hadfield was a dictatorial figure, presiding over hand-picked directors and 
creating what he considered a strong link to, and a perception of influence over 
the Government in the decade prior to the Great War. Elsewhere in the 
Sheffield armaments industry, the links between companies and the 
government were less extensive, and in many cases their directorships were 
influenced by family considerations as much as the need to foster a special-
relationship. 
Two cases which illustrate a familial ethos of company directorships are 
those of Brown and Firth (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6). In each case, a high degree 
of stability is apparent, based around the leadership of the Ellis family at Brown, 
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and the Firth family at Firth.29 Both families had been at the centre of their 
respective companies since each moved to limited liability in 1864 and 1881 
respectively. These two companies had a closer association from 1902 via a 
share exchange after which Brown controlled 7/8ths of the shares of Firth. Prior 
to the arrangement, Firth‟s shares were divided into 640 ordinary shares of 
£500 each with the eight members of the board, six of whom were Firth family 
members, controlling 276 of them at the end of 1902, with a further 300 shares 
held by the wider Firth family not directly associated with the business. In total, 
the directors and Firth family combined controlled 90% of the company‟s share 
capital.30 After the share exchange, 200,000 new 6% preference shares of £1 
each were allocated to the previous shareholders of Firth on a pro-rata basis to 
their former holdings.31 As part of the agreement, Thomas, Mark and H. 
Branson Firth all retired from the board, replaced by Charles Ellis and Charles 
MacLaren from Brown. In return, Bernard Firth joined Brown, after being 
appointed to the long vacant position of chairman of Firth. John Sampson also 
joined Brown in 1904, completing an executive group of four directors which sat 
on both boards.32 The number of family members on the board of Firth had 
been reduced from six to three by the end of 1903, but the business maintained 
the family culture which had evolved over several decades. Tweedale has 
suggested that prior to the exchange of directors with Brown, the „family 
element of control was virtually dictatorial,‟ and most of the Firth family 
members on the board „hardly emerge from the printed and manuscript 
sources.‟33  
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Table 3.5: Brown’s Directors 1900-1914, and directors who continued 
1914 
 Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
John Devonshire Ellis 1864 Chairman from 1871 Died 1906 
Charles McLaren (Baron 
Aberconway from 1911) 
1883 Deputy chairman from 1897, 
chairman from 1906 
Continued 
Charles Edward Ellis 1884 MD from 1892 Continued 
Captain Tolmie John 
Tresidder 
1891 Director Continued 
L-Col J.G.S. Davies 1896 Director Continued 
J.E. Townsend ? Director Retired 1901 
J. G. Dunlop 1899 Director Resigned 1909 
Bernard A. Firth 1903 Deputy chairman from 1906 Continued 
John Sampson 1904 Director Continued 
William H. Ellis 1906 Director Continued 
Thomas Bell 1907 Director Continued 
Sources: Grant, A., Steel and Ships, SA, X308/3/1/1-3, Brown‟s Annual Reports 1899-1902.  
 
Table 3.6: Firth’s Directors 1900-1914, and directors who continued 1914 
 Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Lewis J. Firth 1881 MD from 1900 Retired 1909 
Thomas Firth 1881 Director Retired 1903 
Mark Firth ? Director Retired 1903 
Bernard A. Firth 1888 MD from 1900, chairman from 
1903 
Continued 
H. Branson Firth 1890 Director Retired 1903 
E. Willoughby Firth 1893 Director Continued 
James Rossiter Hoyle 1893 MD from 1903 Continued 
John Sampson 1899 Director Continued 
Charles E. Ellis 1903 Director Continued 
Sir Charles McLaren 1903 Director Continued 
Frederick C. Fairholme 1909 Assistant MD from 1910 Continued 
Major Harry Bland Strange 1909 Director Continued 
Sources: SA, X306/1/2/2/1/1, Firth‟s General Meeting Minute Book.  
 
In addition to the use of family members at each company and their 
directorial overlaps, both Brown and Firth utilised external appointments to bring 
new knowledge to the board regarding armaments, and place them in closer 
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contact with the government. At Brown, Tolmie John Tresidder was appointed in 
1891 after a military career with the Royal Engineers, during which time he had 
become an expert on armour and ballistics.34 Tresidder was supplemented by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jasper Gustavus Silvester Davies, also of the Royal 
Engineers, who joined the board in 1896 and provided another link to the 
military and potentially important information networks. At Firth, James Rossiter 
Hoyle was appointed due to his independent knowledge of armaments35, and 
Frederick Fairholme was added to the board in July 1909, after leaving 
Cammell in 1907, where he had been involved in armour and projectile 
research.36 Finally, Harry Bland Strange, a former member of the Royal Artillery 
and gifted inventor joined in late 1909.37 His work with Hoyle shaped the 
trajectory of armaments research at the company before the Great War and 
illustrates the value of armaments knowledge to the Firth‟s board of directors in 
comparison with metallurgical expertise. When Harry Brearley was invited from 
Firth‟s Russian works to head up the Brown-Firth Research Laboratory in 1908, 
a seat on the board of directors was not part of the arrangement. The Firth‟s 
board saw armaments experts and knowledge as more valuable to the strategy 
of the company, compared to viewing their metallurgical research laboratory as 
the driving force behind the technological future of the company. Overall these 
appointments were the extent of ex-military and armaments experts to the 
Brown and Firth boards prior to 1914. With the exception of Davies, these all 
brought knowledge and managerial skills related to armaments, but were 
somewhat limited in their links to the government. In comparison to Hadfields, 
Brown may be criticised for relying on two appointments from the 1890s to 
provide pertinent information up to 1914, while Firth overlooked the need to 
have links with the supply ministries until much later than their contemporaries. 
As shall be seen, there is a positive correlation between numbers of ex-
governmental directors and the scale of orders received from the supply 
ministries. However, the boards of Hadfields, Brown and Firth demonstrated far 
greater stability than Cammell‟s directorship.  
                                            
34
 Tresidder‟s career is profiled in Chapter 2 in relation to his developments with armour plates 
35
 Hoyle‟s background is profiled in Chapter 1 in relation to his work with projectiles.  
36
 SA, X306/1/2/3/1/3, Firth‟s Directors Meeting Minutes, 29 June 1909. Not willing to risk any 
issues due to his past at Cammell, Firth requested the approval of both the Army and Navy 
before offering Fairholme a position on the board. The scandal which led to Fairholme leaving 
Cammell is explored below.  
37
 Strange‟s background is profiled in Chapter 1 in relation to his work with projectiles. 
 106 
Table 3.7: Cammell’s Directors 1900-1914, and directors who continued 
1914 
 Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Alexander Wilson 1864 MD to 1901, chairman 1900-
1904 
Died 1907 
Charles D. W. Cammell 1879 Director Retired 1904 
Henry Watson 1880 Deputy chairman from 1900 Died 1901 
Thomas William Jeffcock 1892 Director Died 1900 
Colonel William 
Sidebottom 
1896 Deputy chairman from 1901, 
chairman 1904-5, 1909-10 
Continued 
James Duffield c.1894-1897 Director  Retired 1904 
Samuel Roberts MP 1896 Director Continued 
John Alfred Clarke 1898 Director Retired 1906 
Robert Whitehead 1901 Director Continued 
Albert G. Longden 1901 MD from 1902 Resigned 1907 
Frederick C. Fairholme 1901 MD from 1902 Resigned 1907 
Earl Of Wharncliffe 1901 Director Retired 1905 
Herbert Hall Mulliner  1903 Director Retired 1905 
John Macgregor Laird 1904 Deputy chairman from 1904, 
chairman from 1905-1907 
Resigned 1907 
Restel Ratsey Bevis 1904 MD from 1911-1912 Resigned 1913 
Herbert Edward Wilson 1904 Director Continued 
Alexander Gracie 1905 Director Continued 
William Marshall Rhodes 1905 Director Resigned 1907 
Francis Elgar 1907 Chairman from 1908-1909 Died 1909 
Arthur Daulby Wedgewood 1908 MD from 1908-1913 Retired 1913 
Henry Edward Deadman 1908 Director Retired 1913 
Major Arthur Handley 1908 Director Continued 
Henry Westlake 1908 Director Continued 
William Lionel Hichens 1911 Chairman from 1911 Continued 
George John Carter 1912 MD from 1912 Continued 
James McNeil Allan 1913 MD from 1913 Continued 
Sources: WA, ZCL/5/171, Cammell-Laird Register of Directors 1901-1913, ZCL/5/62, Cammell-
Laird Register of Directors 1914-1924 
  
In contrast to their counterparts in Sheffield, the board of Cammell 
demonstrates a low level of continuity, with a more fluid directorship. Between 
1900 and 1914, the company was led by a total of 26 directors and five different 
Chairmen (See Table 3.7). An in-depth overview of the development of 
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Cammell‟s management in this period is provided by Warren.38 From this it is 
possible to identify three stages in the development of Cammell‟s management 
before 1914. The first period to 1907 saw the company under the direction of 
three different Chairmen, Alexander Wilson, Colonel William Sidebottom and 
John Macgregor Laird. The Wilson family had been a part of Cammell since 
their move to limited liability in 1864, Alexander becoming chairman in 1900 
after almost 40 years as managing director. After relinquishing his position as 
managing director in 1901, Wilson presided over the appointment of two 
successors in Albert Longden and Frederick Fairholme, the latter involved with 
Cammell‟s armaments research. A key appointment during this period was 
Samuel Roberts, who joined the company in 1896. His election as MP for 
Sheffield Ecclesall in 1902 gave the company a link to the House of Commons, 
a position he used to provide agitation for further orders to Cammell and the 
Coventry Ordnance Works, discussed in the following chapter. Trained as a 
barrister, Roberts was educated at Cambridge where he obtained a bachelors 
and master‟s degree, and was also a director of the National Provincial Bank. 
Wilson stepped down as chairman in 1904 but retained his directorship. He was 
succeeded by Colonel William Sidebottom, who had joined the company in 
1896 after a military career and provided a valuable link to the Government in 
his position as MP for High Peak in Derbyshire until 1900. Sidebottom was 
succeeded by John Macgregor Laird in 1905, formerly chairman of Laird 
Brothers Shipbuilding Co before the merger between the two companies, who 
would resign just two years later.   
The second phase from 1908 to 1910 saw the company initially under 
the guidance of Francis Elgar before his sudden death in January of 1909, after 
which Sidebottom once again took the chairmanship while the board looked for 
another replacement. Two of Elgar‟s appointments during his short tenure were 
Arthur Daulby Wedgewood as managing director in Sheffield at an annual 
salary of £5,000, and Major Arthur Handley, who provided the company with a 
new link to the military.39 The third phase from 1911 began with the appointment 
of William Lionel Hichens as chairman. A former colonial administrator, Hichens 
was an unusual choice, a fact he personally acknowledged. He told the board at 
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his first interview that he knew nothing of armaments or shipbuilding, and „their 
decision to recruit a man in his mid-thirties without previous industrial 
experience was quixotic.‟40 After his death, his wife recounted how she believed 
that Lord Selborne, a former High Commissioner of South Africa and First Lord 
of the Admiralty, and Lord Milner, with whom Hichens worked with in South 
Africa after the Boer War, were involved in influencing his recruitment.41 If this 
was the case, it may be speculated that there were overtures from the 
Government to place someone desirable at the head of Cammell. Hichens was 
recruited at £3,000 a year, lower than the £7,000 Elgar received. Principally he 
facilitated the retirement of Wedgewood from his expensive position as 
managing director in Sheffield, replacing him with James McNeil Allan, formerly 
of the engineering and shipbuilding company Hawthorn Leslie. Warren has 
suggested that this appointment hinted at a future advance away from 
armaments due to Allan‟s reputation as a marine engineer.42 At Birkenhead he 
recruited George John Carter, who had previously worked at Armstrong and 
was heavily involved in naval shipbuilding and design.43 While the company had 
a changing leadership over the period, Cammell‟s understood the need to retain 
important connections to the military and government. Furthermore, these 
appointments aided in the accumulation of reputation and knowledge related to 
armaments and naval shipbuilding before the Great War.  
Overall, with the four companies profiled Hadfields were most adept at 
securing ex-military and governmental personnel to their board of directors, with 
important links made to parliament, the army and navy. These appointments, 
facilitated by Robert Abbott Hadfield, brought with them important technical 
knowledge and the perception of influence over the supply ministries. Brown, 
Firth and Cammell also made important connections to the military and 
government, though these were small in number, relied on for much longer 
periods of time, and while some brought with them important armaments 
technical knowledge, they were supplemented by other non-military armaments 
experts. While broader in their scale of analysis, Pollard and Robertson have 
highlighted that the number of directors and important shareholders with 
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connections with the government, House of Commons, Civil Service, and 
Service Ministries at Armstrong was 10, and Vickers-Beardmore had 11.44 The 
difference in the scale of outside appointments begins to indicate the potential 
hierarchy of special relationship involved with the government, with Hadfields 
ahead of the other companies in the Sheffield armaments industry, yet still 
behind the much larger Vickers and Armstrong.  
In addition to key military and governmental directors, the establishment 
of offices near the supply ministries was a key element of the business 
networks of all the Sheffield armament companies and provided the scope to 
further extend their boundaries. As Boyce and Ville suggest, „the firm projects 
an influence into its environment and it is influenced by outside forces.‟45 Brown 
and Firth shared a London office at 6 The Sanctuary, on the doorstep of 
Parliament,46 and Cammell maintained an office on Victoria Street close to 
Whitehall. London offices also put the Sheffield armourers in closer contact with 
foreign embassies and potential international customers. At Firth, Strange 
moved from Sheffield to London as representative director of the company in 
relation to artillery matters in 1911. He was also given an expense budget for 
entertaining guests at his London residence, in order to entice projectile orders 
from foreign governments.47 Taking a different approach, Robert Abbott 
Hadfield moved to London in 1912 to the fashionable surroundings of Carlton 
House Terrace, „so that he could become more involved in the scientific milieu 
of technical societies, which he relished so much, and – more importantly – be 
on the doorstep of the supply ministries for armaments orders.‟48 Hadfield was 
known as an active procurer of orders for his company through his connections 
with the Government ministries, and as his co-director Brackenbury commented 
„from the inside of the War Office shield, he had learned through long 
experience that there was no one better in attacking that shield from the point of 
view of manufacturers wishing to get orders than Mr. Hadfield.‟49 It is perhaps 
not surprising then that Hadfield located his London home at 22 Carlton House 
Terrace, just a short walk from Whitehall. Most significantly, Hadfield removed 
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the privilege of receiving Government orders from Hadfields‟ London Office at 
Norfolk House, Laurence Pountney Hill, and insisted that all Government orders 
be filed through the offices he established at his home.50 No longer would 
Hadfield be reliant on employees for information about forthcoming orders. 
Under this arrangement he would receive information first-hand, and all 
Government officials would have to deal with him personally.  
Another key aspect of the special relationships between private industry 
and the government was in the marketing of armaments. This incorporated the 
personal connections established with directors and London offices, but instead 
of emphasising the capability or branding of a product, the reputation, reliability, 
and to borrow from Trebilcock‟s definition of special relationships, „obedient 
efforts‟ of each company involved were also under consideration.51 As has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, the technological developments and 
relationships built in the industry meant that the performance of armour and 
projectiles from each manufacturer were broadly comparable. Furthermore, 
while branding such as Heclon, Eron and Rendable were used by the projectile 
manufacturers, this was principally for use internally to differentiate between 
products, and for marketing to foreign customers.52 What mattered most was a 
continued maintenance of their capabilities in accordance with what was 
expected from them by the Government. Nevertheless, despite the fostering of 
special relationships between each company and the Government, they could 
still fall foul of the War Office and Admiralty. The case of Cammell in 1906-7 
demonstrates that the government retained control over their associations with 
private industry, and that special relationships and goodwill built up over the 
course of years could be swept away rapidly for non-compliance with the strict 
rules and regulations laid down to contractors. The state may have been reliant 
on the armourers for technological advancement, but the companies were more 
dependent on the government for orders, and maintaining their place on the 
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Admiralty and War Office procurement lists, suggesting a power relationship 
favouring the supply ministries in their network of special relationships.53  
At Cammell problems began in November 1906, when the chief inspector 
at Woolwich communicated to Fairholme, the managing director in Sheffield, 
allegations concerning the quality of products manufactured at their 
Grimesthorpe works. Investigations took place in April 1907 which highlighted 
deficiencies in some Government products from Grimesthorpe, but the details of 
this were kept secret and were known only to the chairman Laird and the 
managing director Longden. A special board meeting was called in September, 
by which time it was clear that there were serious problems at the works.54 The 
company was removed from the War Office list of contractors on 16 September, 
and the Admiralty list on 7 October 1907 and strict conditions were insisted 
upon by both departments before Cammell was reinstated as a Government 
contactor. They needed to reconstruct the directorate under a new chairman, 
remove the managing directors from Grimesthorpe, and prosecute those 
involved in the scandal at the company.55 With no alternative, Laird, Longden 
and Fairholme resigned. The lack of Government orders thereafter shows how 
reliant the company had been on armaments for their financial prosperity. 
Losses were made in 1907 and 1908, and Cammell paid no ordinary dividend 
for five years. The company was pressurised by the government to change and 
dutifully complied, the failure to do so potentially ruinous. The board was 
reconstructed under the guidance of a new chairman Francis Elgar, former 
director of Her Majesty‟s Dockyards and managing director at Fairfields.56 Four 
new appointments to the board were made in 1908, and in February Elgar 
requested full restoration to the list of Admiralty and War Office contractors. 
One of his main concerns was that no foreign governments would give them 
work until their full restoration to the War Office and Admiralty lists.57 This again 
gave the Government the upper hand, as it was impossible for Cammell to 
supplement lost business with orders for overseas customers. On 25 March 
1908, the Admiralty placed an „important‟ order for armour with the company, 
and fully restored them to their list on 1 April, followed by the War Office on 2 
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April.58 Upon restoration, E.W. Ward at the procurement department of the War 
Office issued Cammell with a stern warning: 
This decision is given on the understanding that the severance of the 
connection between your firm and all the late officials of the Company 
who have been discharged or have received notice to leave in 
connection with the disclosures of improper practices is permanent and 
final.59 
Effectively, there would be no second chances. Two conclusions can be drawn 
from Cammell‟s experience in what was known as the „list scandal‟. Firstly, in 
the network of special relationships between the Government and private 
industry, the Government held a more powerful position than the companies on 
their procurement list. They could choose not to use a company due to 
irregularities, the consequences potentially ruinous to any armaments 
manufacturer due to their heavy reliance on Government orders for profitability. 
In this regard, Cammell were used as an example to warn other armament 
companies that the Government was in control of their relationships, though 
with the small number of suppliers for heavy armaments it is unlikely that 
Cammell would have been allowed to collapse. Secondly, Cammell‟s 
experience demonstrates that being a supplier for the Government was the 
paramount requirement to enable access to the international armaments 
market. For foreign orders, the most essential marketing tool was being a 
supplier for the British Government. As will be explored in the following chapter, 
the use of international markets as part of a multi-faceted corporate strategy 
was an important defensive mechanism used by the armaments industry to 
counter the uncertainty in their home market. 
 The potential hierarchy of special relationships can be further explored 
by examining the business of each of the four Sheffield armaments companies, 
their strategies for securing orders from the British Government, and evaluate 
the importance of their investments in armaments technology. The following two 
sections will explore the business of armour and the business of projectiles in 
turn, the allocation of orders for each product having previously been 
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overlooked in favour of exploring the shipbuilding industry with Vickers and 
Armstrong as case studies.  
 
The Business of Armaments: The Armour Manufacturers 
Armour was indelibly linked to the cyclical demands for warships, which 
consequently affected each manufacturer‟s efforts to maintain their works at full 
capacity and maintain profits on outputs. For Brown and Cammell, their ability to 
secure orders was made increasingly difficult by efforts to control the market by 
Vickers and Armstrong. In 1903 they came to an agreement with the Admiralty 
to limit naval gun orders to the two companies, so long as no other competitor 
could produce a superior product. This was followed by an attempt to force the 
Admiralty to order armour and guns as a package, limiting supply for new 
warship building to only companies which could manufacture both.60 While not 
entirely successful due to the opening up of supply by the procurement 
departments, this did force Brown and Cammell to commence gun manufacture 
at the Coventry Ordnance Works, discussed in the following chapter. Overall, 
this made an already difficult trading environment more taxing. One key issue 
was that all of the armour for a ship was not ordered together. Instead test 
plates were required to prove their resistance, and consequently the armour 
manufacturer had to convince the buyer of their competence to produce before 
the armour for a whole ship was ordered. The Engineer summarised the 
ordering pattern of armour as follows:  
The British system of Admiralty control over armour plate manufacture is, 
for each order or series of orders, to subject to firing test a preliminary 
sample plate made under the direct supervision of the Admiralty 
overseers, and, if this sample is satisfactory, to order a number of plates 
to be made like it, also under direct supervision. The advantage of this 
system is that the Government officials have, and fully exercise, the right 
to watch and check the manufacture in all its details and at all stages.61 
This acquisition process meant that maintaining accuracy in the production and 
treatment of armour was essential. Strict supervision of this kind obviously led 
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to frustrations over delays in ordering, but there were also grievances by 
manufacturers over the method of payments from the Admiralty, which reduced 
stocks of working capital. After contracts had been agreed between the 
manufacturer and Admiralty, payments were made as manufacture progressed. 
The first 45% was paid once the plate was rolled or pressed to the required 
thickness, had passed the required metallurgical analysis, and was face treated 
and carburised. A second 45% was paid after hardening and the plate 
subsequently bent, machined, drilled and finished at the works. The final 10% 
was paid once the plate arrived at the shipbuilders and been approved.62 In 
essence, maintaining an efficient works and timely output was paramount to 
ensuring a consistent payment for armour orders.  
   
Table 3.8: Cammell’s Sheffield Works (Cyclops, Grimesthorpe, 
Penistone) Invoiced Output, Profit and Dividends 1900-1913 
 Sheffield Works (£,000s) All Cammell Business 
 
Commercial 
(Percentage) 
Armour, 
Cyclops West 
Forge 
(Percentage) 
Profit or 
Loss (£) 
Ordinary 
Dividend (%) 
1900 2,525 (72) 970 (28) 260,015 17.5 
1901 2,419 (74) 871 (26) 201,403 15 
1902 2,367 (86) 376 (14) 144,724 10 
1903 2,205 (83) 444 (17) 144,670 7.5 
1904 1,745 (85) 303 (15) 185,730 7.5 
1905 2,158 (85) 373 (15) 231,806 10 
1906 2,508 (82) 567 (18) 273,780 10 
1907 2,798 (88) 372 (12) -1,617 2.5 
1908 1,623 (87) 237 (13) -152,133 Nil 
1909 1,416 (86) 235 (14) 50,714 Nil 
1910 967 (62) 589 (38) 218,836 Nil 
1911 1,039 (62) 647 (38) 120,962 Nil 
1912 1,166 (64) 643 (36) 144,988 Nil 
1913 1,320 (65) 724 (35) 174,126 2.5 
Sources: WA, ZCL/5/54, Final Company Accounts 1910-1913. Note: Tweedale erroneously lists 
Preference, rather than Ordinary Share dividends for 1910-1912 in Steel City, pp.124-125.  
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By examining the business of both companies it is possible to 
demonstrate their ability to maintain profitability from armour production in the 
years before the Great War. At Cammell, two phases can be identified with their 
armour business, demonstrated in Table 3.8. Firstly, from 1900 to 1907 the size 
of their dividend was linked to the amount of armour produced at the company, 
the two rising and falling in tandem. However, there were years of lower 
demand such as 1902, which showed a decline in armour sales followed by the 
product representing a decreased proportion of the works output until 1907. 
This was lower than Brown, where armour averaged around 40% of their yearly 
invoiced output. Cammell were less reliant on selling armour for their profitability 
due to the commercial output of the company from their three Sheffield works, 
and commercial shipbuilding undertaken at Birkenhead. Secondly, Cammell‟s 
decline from 1908 to 1913 is a direct result of being dismissed from the 
Government procurement lists and their reduced reputation in the international 
market for armaments. During this period the company made significant losses, 
recorded no dividend payments for five consecutive years, and only returned to 
paying dividends in 1913. Once armour orders were restored, from 1910 their 
production was around 40% of the works output, with Cammell‟s commercial 
output shrinking during this period. After his appointment in 1911, Hichens 
noted that he saw the company as „like an inverted pyramid standing not on its 
base but on its apex…so long as we continue to depend on one thing for our 
profits, our foundations will always be insecure.‟63 Overall, Hichens saw the 
relative value of armaments, but as part of a broadening of trade and an 
increase in commercial output.  
By examining the profitability of Cammell‟s armour production the flexible 
returns from the product are apparent, demonstrated in Table 3.9. The decade 
began with large sales and profitability, followed by a decline in the size and 
returns from armour between 1906 and 1908. As orders increased their rate of 
profit fluctuated, before stabilising in 1911. By comparison, between 1911 and 
1913 the profit on commercial outputs at the Cyclops Works averaged between 
8 and 10%, while armour returned a minimum of 33% profit. This indicates that 
the profits from armour were related to economies of scale and the growing 
experience and expertise of their trained staff at the Cyclops Works West 
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Forge. This is further exemplified in Table 3.10: between 1911 and 1914 the 
average cost of producing armour continually declined at Cammell. By the 
Great War, armour manufacture at the company was increasing efficient.  
 
Table 3.9: Cammell’s Profits on Armour Sales at Cyclops Works West 
Forge 1900-1913 
Year Armour Sales (£,000s) 
Armour Profit 
(£,000s) 
Rate Of Profit 
(%) 
1900 970 289 30 
1901 871 267 31 
1902 376 175 47 
1903 444 166 37 
1904 303 121 40 
1905 373 73 20 
1906 567 83 15 
1907 372 37 10 
1908 237 41 17 
1909 235 95 40 
1910 589 159 27 
1911 647 212 33 
1912 643 217 34 
1913 724 273 38 
Sources: Calculated from WA, ZCL/5/54, Final Company Accounts 1910-1913, ZCL/5/127, 
Private Accounts to 1915, SA, ESC Box 192, Sheffield Plant and Sales details 1910-1917. Note 
that for 1908 and 1909 the profit figure is for all the Cyclops Works, not just the West Forge.  
 
Table 3.10: Cammell’s Output Of Armour Over 2” thick, West Forge 
Cyclops Works 1911-1914 
Year Output (Tons) Total Cost (£,000s) 
Average Cost 
Per Ton (£) 
1911 5902 582 99 
1912 6055 582 96 
1913 6701 630 94 
1914 5222 479 92 
Sources: Calculated from WA, ZCL/5/54, Final Company Accounts 1910-1914. 
 
By comparison Brown had a greater reliance on armour for their overall 
profitability, demonstrated in their business record in Table 3.11. From 1900 to 
1905, more than half of the output of the Atlas Works was armour plate with a 
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high of two thirds in 1901-2, reflected in the dividend declared in those years. In 
this period the relationship between profits and armour output is broadly 
relational, though the figures for 1901-2 indicate that returns on armour 
production were declining at the company. In 1905-6 the commercial output of 
Brown continued to expand with armour falling to its lowest output of the 
decade, though profitability expanded at the company. Brown‟s commercial 
business continued to grow up to 1913-14, in conjunction with expanding 
armour outputs and profits from 1909-10. 
 
Table 3.11: Brown’s Atlas Works Invoiced Output, Profit and Dividends 
1900-1914 
 Atlas Works (£,000s) All Brown’s Business 
 Commercial 
(Percentage) 
Armour 
(Percentage) 
Profit (£) Ordinary 
Dividend (%) 
1900-1901 361 (35) 657 (65) 440,393 20 
1901-1902 325 (33) 657 (67) 232,789 15 
1902-1903 No data No data 185,750 10 
1903-1904 299 (40) 446 (60) 159,109 8 1/3 
1904-1905 340 (43) 445 (57) 198,936 8 1/3 
1905-1906 410 (69) 188 (31) 223,881 10 
1906-1907 456 (59) 322 (41) 234,237 10 
1907-1908 462 (58) 339 (42) 218,405 10 
1908-1909 388 (56) 301 (44) 204,896 7 1/2 
1909-1910 515 (60) 342 (40) 202,017 7 1/2 
1910-1911 614 (57) 454 (43) 212,523 7 1/2 
1911-1912 650 (55) 531 (45) 227,109 7 1/2 
1912-1913 775 (60) 526 (40) 271,901 7 1/2 
1913-1914 781 (59) 541 (41) 377,498 10 
Sources: Calculated from SA, X308/1/2/1/3/1-10, Brown‟s Managing Directors Reports 1905-
1914; SA, ESC Box 280, Brown‟s Managing Directors Reports No.8.;Tweedale, Steel City, 
pp.124-125. Brown‟s financial year ran April through to March the following year.  
 
Essentially, from 1905 onwards Brown‟s payment of an annual dividend 
to their shareholders was less reliant on their armour sales. The increased steel 
and marine forging requirements for their expanding shipbuilding interests on 
the Clyde facilitated a move away from relying solely on armour production and 
provided an outlet for their expanding commercial steel and forging capacity. 
This was a clear break from their decade‟s long reliance on armour as the 
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foundation of their financial strength. At the 1907 AGM, Brown‟s chairman Sir 
Charles Mclaren commented that in 1884 when he joined the company they 
were entirely dependent on armour-plate and coal for profitability.64 This change 
in the diversity of Brown‟s business continued up to the Great War, and in 1914 
the directors commented that it was: 
„…gratifying to note that a very large part of the profits in the Atlas Works 
had been derived not so much from armaments work as from general 
commercial orders connected very largely…with their great shipbuilding 
enterprises.‟65 
This is not to suggest that armour was no longer an important part of Brown‟s 
business, but as the demands for armour were inconsistent to broaden the 
company‟s operations was strategically important to maintain continued 
financial stability. The cyclical nature of armour orders at Brown can be 
explored in Table 3.12. 
 
Table 3.12: Summary of Brown’s Armour Orders 1904-1914 
Year Total Armour 
Orders (£) 
Largest 
Month Total 
(£) 
Average 
Monthly 
Total (£) 
Number Of 
Months With 
Orders Over 
£10,000 
1904 501,800 298,485 41,817 2 
1905 22,269 5,737 1,856 0 
1906 766,545 368,618 63,879 4 
1907 8,237 3,779 686 0 
1908 320,455 288,776 26,705 2 
1909 350,663 169,900 29,222 3 
1910 806,932 274,350 67,244 6 
1911 536,424 249,605 44,702 6 
1912 661,138 245,298 55,095 6 
1913 856,273 611,002 71,356 4 
1914 (To July) 347,410 287,576 49,630 3 
Source: Calculated from SA, X308/1/2/1/3/1-10, Brown‟s Managing Directors Reports 1905-
1914 
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By examining 1904 to 1908 the inconsistent demand for armour is 
apparent, with some single monthly orders accounting for the majority of the 
year‟s total, while in other years few orders were recorded. A different picture is 
shown from 1909 to 1914, with orders more consistent but at times annual 
totals were principally derived from a single month of orders. Those received in 
June 1913 for over £600,000 of armour made up 71 percent of the total for the 
year. Essentially, British Navy orders could not be entirely relied upon to keep 
Brown‟s armour shops occupied, with the company actively seeking foreign 
orders to supplement Admiralty requirements, as explored in the following 
chapter. It is also apparent that Brown was principally a naval supplier; the only 
orders from the Army during the period 1904-1908 were for gun forgings, 
totalling £35,721.66 In the same period, Admiralty orders for armour totalled over 
£1.6million, 98% of Brown‟s total armaments output. Beyond 1908, aside from 
orders received from the Coventry Ordnance Works, Brown‟s armaments 
production was entirely devoted to naval applications. Brown‟s reliance on 
armour required the company to maintain production efficiency, and 
consequently maintain the profits derived from their production, as explored in 
Table 3.13.  
 
Table 3.13: Brown’s Armour Production Costs 1906-1911 
Year 
Average 
Selling Price 
(£ per ton) 
Cost 
(£ per ton) 
Profit 
(£ per ton) 
Rate of 
Profit (%) 
1906-1907 103 85 18 17 
1907-1908 114 94 20 18 
1908-1909 107 86 21 20 
1909-1910 103 82 21 20 
1910-1911 101 70 31 31 
Source: SA, X308/1/3/1/3, Secretary‟s Copy Letter Book No.6., Alfred Tongue to Charles Ellis, 
28 August 1912.  
 
Between 1906 and 1911 Brown‟s armour plant was increasingly cost 
effective, as selling and production prices declined while profits per ton 
continued to grow. As part of an Admiralty exploration into the costs of armour, 
the data in Table 3.13 had been prepared on Brown‟s behalf by Alfred Tongue 
of W.B. Peat & Co, a London based accounting company, who also worked with 
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Armstrong, Cammell and Vickers. As Tongue had access to the cost data of 
other armour manufacturing companies, he highlighted to Brown that he was 
„sorry to say that your figures are likely to show the lowest cost and the highest 
profit for 1911 as compared with the other makers.‟67 By focusing on the 
production of armour Brown had become the most efficient producer in the 
country, yet were drawing what would have been viewed by the Admiralty as an 
excessive profit. Had their costs been higher, they would have been justified in 
charging more. The Navy may have been reliant on the trade to produce what 
they required, but they did not want to pay disproportionately more to a 
company than what they considered appropriate. Even with their low costs and 
proven ability with armour, Brown‟s relative position in the industry declined 
before the Great War due to changing armour requirements.  
In 1911 Brown‟s armour shops were extended as orders were anticipated 
for up to 40,000 tons of armour from the Admiralty and foreign customers, with 
an expenditure of £60,000 authorised by Brown‟s Works Committee.68 An 
increase in orders two years later led to a further extension of the works, with 
new Krupp and Harvey treatment furnaces installed at a cost of £15,000.69 
However, these extensions failed to keep Brown at the forefront of the armour 
business. In early 1914 Charles Ellis reported to Brown‟s Works Committee that 
with increasing demand for thicker plates, the company was having serious 
problems treating armour. Furthermore, it was reported that with their continued 
issues at their armour plant, Brown risked „rapidly falling into the fourth position 
in the trade as to output‟ due to their increasing difficulty at maintaining the 
required quality.70 While being an armour manufacturer could produce profitable 
returns, each manufacturer was required to maintain their capabilities in line 
with the requirements of the Admiralty. In order to satisfy the new requirements, 
Brown‟s Works Committee sanctioned a further £100,000 of extensions, with 
much of the Atlas Works rearranged as a consequence. At the same time, the 
Committee highlighted that „every effort should be made to retain and expand 
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the general trades of the Company.‟ 71 Despite their extensions, Brown saw an 
expansion of both their commercial and armour trade as central to their future 
business, much like Cammell explored above. The expansion of the company‟s 
commercial business was emphasised at their 1914 AGM, no doubt to maintain 
their public profile as a steel rather than an armament company, when chairman 
Baron Aberconway remarked to shareholders that „The Company…were 
infinitely more interested in the development of peaceful trades than in warlike 
trades.‟72 Overall, by the outbreak of War in August 1914, Brown were 
struggling to maintain their relative position in the British armour business.  
Brown and Cammell provide further evidence for a hierarchy of special 
relationships with the Government. While Vickers and Armstrong were able to 
secure large orders for armour and armaments, based on their duopolistic 
arrangements and favourable position with the Government, by 1914 Brown 
and Cammell were progressively exploring and expanding their commercial 
output as they could no longer solely rely on the limited number of armour 
orders for profitability. In comparison to the two companies, the proportion of 
annual profits provided from armaments at Vickers‟ River Don Works in 
Sheffield between 1909 and 1914 varied between 89 to 98 per cent.73 
Essentially, these two companies were viewed by the Admiralty as second-tier 
suppliers in comparison to their larger competitors. Away from armour 
production, there is also evidence of a hierarchy of supply for projectiles, as the 
exploration of the business of Hadfields and Firth below will demonstrate. 
 
The Business of Armaments: The Projectile Manufacturers 
In contrast to armour, projectiles involved a much larger investment in 
technological research and development, and a different type of procurement 
strategy from the Government. Projectiles were an expendable product, with 
new stocks required for every new ship construction and each new calibre of 
gun introduced. Between 1900 and 1914 this increased from 12 inch calibre to 
13.5 inch and ultimately 15 inch, requiring the armament companies to update 
their equipment and capabilities to construct the new sizes of guns and 
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projectiles.74 Technological advances could also lead to technological 
obsolescence with older projectile designs, and stocks could be diminished due 
to testing and firing practice.  
To assess Hadfields‟ investment in projectile technology, an examination 
of the commercial performance of the company and their strategies for 
obtaining orders is required. Table 3.14 shows the ordnance turnover (an 
aggregate of both shell and projectile manufacture) for Hadfields between 1897 
and 1913, along with the company‟s profits and ordinary dividends paid to 
shareholders.  
 
Table 3.14: Hadfields’ Turnover, Profits and Dividends 1897-1913 
 Ordnance, 
£,000s 
(Percentage) 
Commercial, 
£,000s 
(Percentage) 
Profit (£) Ordinary 
dividend 
(%) 
1897 63 (31) 139 (69) 19,377 7 
1898 119 (42) 166 (58) 18,080 8 
1899 95 (29) 231 (71) 17,368 9 
1900 148 (36) 267 (64) 39,500 20 
1901 427 (60) 281 (40) 82,818 25 
1902 369 (50) 364 (50) 86,121 25 
1903 236 (33) 482 (67) 84,051 35 
1904 143 (21) 528 (79) 76,866 30 
1905 178 (23) 580 (77) 86,733 30 
1906 251 (24) 790 (76) 101,497 35 
1907 77 (8) 853 (92) 66,170 17.5 
1908 146 (16) 754 (84) 72,554 17.5 
1909 67 (8) 735 (92) 68,234 17.5 
1910 116 (13) 761 (87) 69,955 17.5 
1911 163 (16) 842 (84) 79,477 17.5 
1912 335 (27) 885 (73) 116,297 20 
1913 373 (26) 1,081 (74) 109,512 20 
Sources: SA, Hadfields Volume 7, OGM and EGM Minutes 1889-1919, Hadfields Box 145, 
Statement of Output 1888-1929. 
 
While in the late 1890s the proportion of armaments turnover at 
Hadfields had averaged a third of all production, it had not yet provided an 
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increase in profits or rate of dividend. From 1900 onwards, following the vast 
increase in armaments orders to the private sector during the Boer War, the 
decade of investment Hadfield had put into armaments development began to 
pay dividends. It was at this point that the company‟s investment in armaments 
production began to have a positive impact on profits and dividend payments. 
For the following six years dividend payments reached their pre-Great War 
peak. However, Hadfield was keen to avoid the image of profiteering from 
armaments orders with the British Government. William Francis Kett, a 
Hadfields‟ employee from 1903 to 1905 remarked in his autobiography that: 
„…whenever the Company declared a substantial dividend, it was 
customary to indicate to the government officials that the general steel 
business was responsible for the earnings, while the engineering 
customers were given to understand that the profits came mostly from 
government orders.‟75  
From Table 3.14 we can see that the latter is the case; between 1900 and 1913, 
when the proportion of ordnance turnover fell below 20 percent of Hadfield‟s 
total output, dividends paid to ordinary shareholders were at their lowest level 
during the period. Clearly, there was a relationship between Hadfields‟ rate of 
profit and the scale of their armaments output.  
From 1911 to 1914, figures for the value and tonnage of Hadfields‟ 
commercial and armaments production are available, and it is from these 
figures the importance of armaments production to the company can be 
evaluated. For this period, as presented in Table 3.15, the average value per 
ton of commercial work output was around £25, whereas the average value per 
ton of armaments work was around £80, and increased during 1914. This 
difference in value per ton of output is a clear indication of the lucrative returns 
the company could make from armaments production. However, these figures 
only illustrate half of the story. By exploring Table 3.16, which shows the 
proportion of armaments work to the overall annual output of Hadfields by ton 
and value, a more accurate picture emerges. While the overall proportion of 
Hadfields‟ annual output of armaments accounts for less than one-fifth of the 
total, the value of this output accounts for a significantly higher proportion of the 
company‟s financial returns. Therefore, while Hadfields‟ production of war 
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materials may be seen as only a small proportion of their annual tonnage 
output, the value of such products made armaments production a very 
important aspect of their commercial success.  
 
Table 3.15: Hadfields’ Work Invoiced and Average Value Per Ton Of 
Output 
 Armaments Work Commercial Work Value Per Ton 
Year Tons Value Tons Value War Comm. 
1911 2,335 £192,100 31,109 £812,600 £82.27 £26.12 
1912 4,867 £375,100 35,191 £844,600 £77.07 £24.00 
1913 4,918 £414,100 40,120 £1,040,500 £84.20 £25.93 
1914 7,379 £641,500 33,277 £886,700 £86.94 £26.65 
Source: Calculated from Hadfields Box 57, Hadfields Invoiced Output 1911-1916 
 
Table 3.16: Hadfields’ Armaments Work As A Proportion Of Total Output 
 Armaments Work Total Output 
Armaments Work 
as a Proportion of 
Total 
Year Tons Value Tons Value Tons Value 
1911 2,335 £192,100 33,444 £1,004,700 7.0% 19.1% 
1912 4,867 £375,100 40,058 £1,219,700 12.1% 30.8% 
1913 4,918 £414,100 45,038 £1,454,600 10.9% 28.5% 
1914 7,379 £641,500 40,656 £1,528,200 18.1% 42.0% 
Source: Calculated from Hadfields Box 57, Hadfields Invoiced Output 1911-1916 
 
Hadfields‟ orders for projectiles expanded rapidly in 1900 due to the 
unprecedented level of demand during the Boer War. Between February and 
June 1900 the Navy ordered over 200,000 projectiles consisting of 12 different 
types and calibres, with 120,000 of those ordered on 7 June alone.76 During the 
same period, the Army had also ordered in excess of 30,000 shells. The 
Engineer reported on 6 July that „A number of very heavy orders for projectiles 
and shells generally have recently been placed in Sheffield, the business in that 
description of war material being unprecedentedly large.‟77 By the end of the 
year the Government had ordered almost 278,000 shells from Hadfields. 
However, the level of demand far exceeded the productive capacity of the Hecla 
works and Hadfields‟ suffered the same productive bottlenecks encountered by 
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other armaments manufacturers.78 One order placed on 10 February 1900 for 
10,000 15 pound shrapnel shell, for example, which the Army had requested 
2,000 per week from mid-March, did not start deliveries until November and 
took a further 12 months to complete.79 Demand continued to the end of the 
conflict, with Hadfields‟ investing £40,000 of capital into new projectile plant 
between 1900 and 1902, including £2,100 at the East Hecla works.80 Army 
orders had declined by 1903, with Hadfields‟ orders from the Navy providing the 
majority of output.  
 Following the introduction of the Heclon AP projectile by the Navy in 
1904, negotiations had begun in early 1905 between Hadfield and Hugh 
Oakeley Arnold-Forster, then Secretary State for War, for a formalised 
agreement guaranteeing a set proportion of orders to Hadfields every year. 
Arnold-Forster had encouraged Hadfields to install new plant for the production 
of 18-pound shrapnel shell for use with new field guns introduced after the Boer 
War. Hadfields obliged, and in January 1905 work began on a new shrapnel 
shell shop at the East Hecla works, which was completed in April after 10 
weeks construction, with a capacity of 400,000 to 500,000 shells per annum.81 
When the new plant became operational in May 1905, two orders had been 
received for 18-pound shell in January and March totalling 97,000 shells.82 The 
orders were completed in 13 months, and delivered in June 1906. Negotiations 
with Arnold-Forster were finalised in May 1905, with the resulting agreement 
promising Hadfields the opportunity to tender for all projectiles ordered by the 
British Government for both the Army and Navy, and that 50 percent of the 
aggregate value of annual orders to the Trade would be placed with Hadfields 
for the four years from November 1904.83 Orders received under the agreement 
in 1905 were more than double what had been placed by the Government the 
previous year, although the improvement in orders was short-lived. The 
resignation of the Balfour government in December 1905 removed Arnold-
Forster from his position in the War Office, being replaced by Richard Haldane. 
The change in Government reflected a change in procurement strategy from the 
War Office, and in the wake of the Haldane Army Reforms orders to the Trade 
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rapidly declined in 1906.84 A letter sent by Hadfield to the War Office in 
December 1906 reflected the depressed state of the trade. He reported that the 
number of workmen employed in Hadfields‟ shell department had fallen from 
around 1,000 under normal conditions to 230, and work in hand totalled just 
£19,000. One year before, Hadfields‟ had £180,000 of projectile orders on their 
books. Drawing attention to their idle shrapnel plant, and the rumour no new AP 
projectile orders would be forthcoming, Hadfield urged the War Office to assist 
them in the retention of their skilled workforce and stores of raw materials 
required.85 In concluding his letter Hadfield proclaimed:  
Our works may truly be described as having been your shell Arsenal in 
the North of England, as outside Field Artillery Shrapnel shell, we believe 
we have made not far short of about 75% of your total requirements in 
common, semi-armour piercing, practice, capped and uncapped shot and 
shell.86 
This is an interesting insight into the value which Hadfield placed on his works 
contribution to the British military, viewing it as equally important as those 
maintained by the Government. When a response came in January 1907, 
Hadfield were informed that only orders for 18-pound shrapnel shell would be 
forthcoming.87 He readily accepted, while again emphasising the need to not let 
AP shell manufacture cease.88 Two orders for 18-pound shrapnel shell from the 
War Office, totalling 37,500 units were placed in February and June 1907, along 
with a solitary order for 800 12 inch Heclon AP shells in April worth £25,000. 
Hadfield‟s efforts to gain orders had not gone unheeded, but it would be the last 
time the shrapnel plant would be in operation. Haldane visited the East Hecla 
works in November 1907, at which time the 18-pound shell orders had been 
completed. Haldane was informed that Hadfields were in desperate need of 
more orders but none were placed. 89 Further letters requesting orders were 
sent to the War Office but all were unavailing.90 The shrapnel shell plant was 
kept in working order until May 1909, at which time the plant was permanently 
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closed and dismantled through to September 1911.91 The issue of Hadfields‟ 
shrapnel plant would resurface in 1915 during the height of the Shell Crisis. 
While Hadfield may have believed he could exert an influence over the supply 
ministries, in reality the Admiralty and War Office held the most powerful 
position in their relationship with private industry.  
The record of Hadfields reflects the instability of demand when dealing 
with a monopsonist buyer, which was influenced by changes in the international 
environment, requirements needs in national crises, and changes in 
procurement strategies by successive Governments. While being offered 50 
percent of the value of all orders, in times of low demand this could result in few 
orders being placed. The decline in demand from late 1906 until 1907 was 
reflected in Hadfields‟ performance (See Table 3.14), the company reporting at 
its 1908 OGM that „There has…been an exceptional falling off in the orders 
received from the British Government for War material.‟92 At the same meeting, 
Hadfield vented his frustrations at the preferential treatment that had been 
granted to the British ordnance factories during these slack years. Quoting 
figures which showed that the Royal Arsenal had gained 26 percent of work in 
1900-3, and 42 percent in 1904-6, Hadfield stated that he „thought the Arsenal 
ought to suffer proportionately‟ in time of lean demand.93 At the 1909 OGM, 
Hadfield‟s anger with the Government did not abate, and he accused them of 
introducing an „irreducible minimum‟ at Woolwich, which guaranteed a set 
amount of work each year to the Ordnance Factories. If the Government was to 
give preferential treatment to its own arsenal, Hadfield concluded, then it was 
only fair that this should be extended to the private sector. After all, „Sheffield 
had done far more for the Empire than Woolwich ever had, or could do. He did 
not see why one part of the country should be benefitted at the expense of 
another part of the country.‟94 Hadfields‟ „Arsenal in the North of England‟ was 
clearly not as highly valued as Hadfield had hoped in Whitehall.  
By examining Hadfields‟ invoiced output to both the Army and Navy in 
Table 3.17, it can be seen that orders for the Admiralty were predominant at 
Hadfields, backed by the introduction of three key products; Heclon AP 
projectiles, Eron CPC projectiles, and ERA cast steel armour. Conversely, Army 
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orders can be examined in three phases. From 1900 through to 1903, Army 
demand was inflated due to the Boer War, in 1903 accounting for almost two-
fifths of Hadfields British Government output. Following the end of the conflict, 
Army orders rapidly declined, before being bolstered by initially large shrapnel 
shell orders under the 1904-1908 British Government agreement, before 
becoming virtually non-existent prior to the Great War.  
 
Table 3.17: Hadfields’ Invoiced Output For British Army and Navy 1900-
1914 
Year Army, £,000s 
(Percentage) 
Navy Including 
ERA Steel, 
£,000s 
(Percentage) 
Total British 
Government, 
£,000s 
1900 11 (8) 131 (92) 142 
1901 106 (25) 321 (75) 427 
1902 94 (27) 258 (73) 352 
1903 93 (39) 143.5 (61) 236.5 
1904 7.5 (6) 120 (94) 127.5 
1905 38 (21) 140 (79) 178 
1906 69 (27) 186 (73) 255 
1907 17 (18) 75 (82) 92 
1908 12 (8) 144 (92) 156 
1909 0.6 (1) 75 (99) 75.6 
1910 0 (0) 79 (100) 79 
1911 1 (1) 153 (99) 154 
1912 3 (1) 250 (99) 253 
1913 0 (0) 274 (100) 274 
1914 27 (5) 509 (95) 536 
Source: Hadfields Box 113, Hadfields Invoiced Outputs 1899-1915. 
 
In 1905, after their agreement with Arnold-Forster Hadfields began to 
expand their productive capacity to serve the whole of the British military in 
peacetime. The company invested capital in establishing a shrapnel plant which 
could initially supply up to 500,000 projectiles annually, with the possibility to 
expand to 1 million rounds a year. However, a change in government and a new 
procurement strategy under Haldane curtailed this expansion and moved 
Hadfields away from being a producer for the British Government, and back to 
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one principally concerned with supplying the Navy. In this regard, Hadfields 
were the only one of the four Sheffield armaments companies which managed 
to foster, albeit temporarily, a closer working arrangement with the Army.  
 Following the end of Hadfield‟s original four year agreement with the 
Government, a revised arrangement was signed exclusively with the Navy for 
the two years from November 1908 to November 1910. Once again the contract 
agreed that Hadfields would receive half of all the projectile orders placed with 
the Trade for the duration of the agreement.95 This change in contract reflected 
a forthcoming change in procurement arrangements at Whitehall, as from 1909 
the Admiralty would take control of the allocation of Naval contracts from the 
War Office.96 Two Navy orders totalling 800 12 inch Heclon AP shells were 
received in December 1908 worth £20,000, although it would be almost a year 
before further orders were received for either the Heclon or Eron. When the 
agreement was renewed a third time in January 1911, the Admiralty opted to 
reduce Hadfields‟ guaranteed share of orders from one half to two fifths of all 
orders placed with the Trade.97 While the prices agreed for projectiles (See 
Table 3.18) reflected the high price of the technological research and 
development behind the Heclon and Eron calibres compared with common shell 
types, the reduction in Hadfield‟s proportion of orders was clearly a catalyst for 
Hadfield to sign a similar agreement with the Imperial Japanese Navy just two 
months later, examined in the following chapter. Hadfields‟ original 50 percent 
proportion of orders was restored in January 1913 when the company‟s fourth 
agreement was signed with the Admiralty. By this point, the revised three year 
agreement covered only Heclon AP and Eron CPC projectiles. The company 
had finally secured a guaranteed proportion of only the highest priced 
projectiles they manufactured.  
The series of agreements from 1905 to the Great War demonstrate the 
nature of the special relationship Hadfields had with the Government. By 
securing at least half of all the projectile orders to the trade each year, the 
company was the most highly regarded projectile manufacturer in the country 
and was certainly in the „first tier‟ of armaments suppliers. However, this did not 
make them immune from armaments supply changes in Whitehall, again 
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demonstrating a power relationship which favoured the Government. Hadfields 
obliged in constructing new capacity for Army requirements in 1905 and were 
initially rewarded for their investment. With a change in Government, Hadfields‟ 
compliance was no longer as highly regarded and their new capacity was 
rendered surplus to requirements. Nevertheless, by securing a set proportion of 
all orders to the trade for naval requirements the technological investment made 
by Hadfields in projectiles was regarded by the Government. As the case of 
Firth will demonstrate, not all the projectile manufacturers in the industry could 
command such a relationship.   
 
Table 3.18: Hadfields-British Admiralty Shell Prices 1911 
Type of projectile Price per 100 (£) 
15 inch Heclon armour piercing with cap 6400 (1913 price) 
15 inch Eron common pointed with cap 6525 (1913 price) 
13.5 inch Heclon armour piercing with cap (1,400 lbs) 4345 
13.5 inch Eron common pointed with cap (1,400 lbs) 4525 
13.5 inch Heclon armour piercing with cap (1,250 lbs) 4350 
13.5 inch Eron common pointed with cap (1,250 lbs) 4350 
13.5 inch lyddite (1,400 lbs) 2750 
13.5 inch lyddite (1,250 lbs) 2575 
12 inch Heclon armour piercing with cap 2555 
12 inch Eron common pointed with cap 2475 
12 inch lyddite 1560 
10 inch lyddite 1092 
7.5 inch lyddite 355 
6 inch Eron common pointed with cap 483 
6 inch lyddite 220 
4 inch lyddite 86 
4 inch common pointed shell 73.5 
12 and 14 pounder lyddite 52.5 
Source: SA Hadfields Box 103, Hadfields Shell Agreement 1911-1913, Volume 152, Hadfields 
projectile orders No.2, p.104, 28 May 1913, and p.114, 26 July 1913.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Firth invested in projectile technology in a 
comparable manner to Hadfields and were able to licence their Hollow Cap 
design across the world. By examining the financial record of the company and 
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their strategies for obtaining projectile orders the value of Firth‟s technological 
investment can be explored. An overview of their financial performance 
between 1899 and 1913 is provided in Table 3.19. 
 
Table 3.19: Firth’s Sales, Profit and Dividends 1899-1913 
 Commercial 
To 1909,   
Total Sales 
From 1910  
(£,000) 
(Percentage) 
Gun Works 
(£,000s)  
(Percentage) 
Profit (£) Ordinary Dividend (%) 
1899 252 (52) 236 (48) £110,850 20½ 
1900 287 (49) 300 (51) £144,017 25 
1901 270 (43) 365 (57) £136,326 22½ 
1902 250 (60) 166 (40) £50,454 10 
1903 245 (52) 225 (48) £62,348 10 
1904 265 (65) 141 (35) £56,884 7½ 
1905 315 (65) 169 (35) £82,853 10 
1906 347 (58) 248 (42) £85,971 10 
1907 328 (67) 161 (33) £51,702 7½ 
1908 319 (63) 189 (37) £58,203 5 
1909 311 (58) 223 (42) £69,265 5 
1910 598 (100) No data £62,609 5 
1911 709 (100) No data £99,693 7 ½ 
1912 837 (100) No data £123,349 12 ½  
1913 1,068 (100) No data £159,004 12 ½  
Sources: SA, X306/1/2/2/1/1, Firth‟s General Meeting Minute Book No.1, X306/1/3/2/2, 
Secretary‟s Reports No.3., X306/1/2/3/2, Firth‟s Directors Meeting Agendas and Papers 1903-
1914.  
 
The large influx of orders during the Boer War helped boost the Gun 
Works sales to half of the output of Firth during 1899 to 1901, but this increase 
in orders was short-lived. In December 1901, Bernard Firth reported that orders 
for the British Government were „exceedingly light‟, and at the start of 1902, the 
Gun Works were short of shell work and forgings.98 Firth failed to secure any 
projectile orders in 1901, demonstrating the inconsistent demand from the 
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British Government for armaments. The once busy Gun Works could be rapidly 
rendered idle when orders for projectiles failed to materialise. This is reflected in 
the declining dividends from 1902 when sales at the Gun Works fell below half 
of the Norfolk Works output. However, after 1903 it is less reliable to use 
dividend payments to gain a perspective on the year on year prosperity of Firth. 
As 7/8ths of Firth‟s ordinary stock was held by Brown thereafter, the majority of 
dividend payments would be direct to their parent company. In 1911 it was also 
stated that „It was considered policy not to pay more than a 5 percent dividend 
and to meet alterations and improvements out of Revenue and not to allow the 
Capital to rise to unwieldy dimensions.‟99 This policy was applauded by Firth‟s 
directors and shareholders in 1912 for the increase in the previous year‟s profit.  
 
Table 3.20: Firth’s British Government Projectile Orders 1900-August 
1914 
Year 
British Army 
(£,000) 
(Percentage) 
British Navy 
(£,000) 
(Percentage) 
Total British 
Government 
(£,000) 
1900 37 (20) 147 (80) 184 
1901 None None None 
1902 125 (100) 0 (0) 125 
1903 4 (20) 16 (80) 20 
1904 9 (13) 61 (87) 70 
1905 10 (9) 97 (91) 107 
1906 None None None 
1907 None None None 
1908 0 10 (100) 10 
1909 0 34 (100) 34 
1910 0 97 (100) 97 
1911 0 102 (100) 102 
1912 3 (5) 61 (95) 64 
1913 3 (3) 107 (97) 110 
1914 (To August) 0 230 (100) 230 
Sources: Calculated from TNA, WO 395/1 and 2, Director of Army Contracts Reports 1900-14, 
Firth‟s Directors Records, Firth‟s Reports to Brown‟s Board, 1906-1913. 
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However, when profits and output fell Firth were quick to blame a falling 
away of Government orders at their AGM in 1907, unsurprising as Firth 
received no projectile orders since 1905.100 Turnover from Government work 
was £2,000 lower per week in 1907 than the previous year, as shown in Table 
3.20.101 Poor results at the Gun Works in 1910 were once again blamed on a 
lack of projectile orders.102 This indicates that, much like other Sheffield 
armourers, Firth were predominantly tied to their Gun Works and continued 
technological development of projectiles for their profitability. An attempt to 
move away from this reliance was made with the completion of a new works at 
Tinsley in 1908, and the expansion of the foundry and Siemens departments at 
the Norfolk Works. These developments promoted the growth of Firth‟s 
commercial output and helped decrease the company‟s reliance on armaments 
orders for profitability.  
However, Firth did not overlook investment in the Gun Works as part of 
their expansion plans. In addition to maintaining their technological position, 
Firth were also determined to expand their production capabilities in line with 
British Government requirements. Before the Great War, 13.5 and 15 inch guns 
were introduced on Navy ships, necessitating projectiles of the same calibre to 
be manufactured for their operation.103 In order to ensure the company could 
tender for and supply 13.5 inch projectiles the machining capacity at the Gun 
Works was expanded in 1910 beyond their previous limit of supplying 12 inch 
projectiles.104 The capacity was again expanded in April of 1913 to enable the 
production of up to 80 16.5 inch calibre projectiles per week.105 Even in times of 
low demand, Firth needed to keep the company in a position to supply the 
British Government. The increasing size of projectiles was also reflected in their 
increasing price. If a lucrative order was forthcoming from the Government the 
company had to be prepared for their manufacture or risk loosing potentially 
large profits. 
By examining the orders received by Firth for projectiles from the British 
Government in Table 3.20, it is apparent that the company was predominantly a 
Navy supplier, outside of a small period of increased Army orders during the 
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Boer War.106 The Army orders received in 1902, which boosted the fortunes of 
the Gun Works temporarily, were all received on 14 June. It was Firth‟s first 
shell order in 18 months, and it would be another 10 months before any more 
were received. After this brief increase, Army requirements disappeared, 
leaving Firth reliant on the Navy for orders from the British Government, whose 
demands could rapidly fluctuate or disappear as they had in 1906-7. A 
predominant issue for Firth was that, unlike Hadfields, they were outside of any 
formal arrangement for supply to the Government. The company did explore the 
possibility of ensuring some stability for their projectile output, though they were 
unsuccessful in attempting to arrange a schedule of prices with the Admiralty in 
1911.107 Considering that from 1905 though to the Great War, Hadfields gained 
around a half share of all Navy orders, this left Firth fighting for a proportion of 
the remaining half with other manufacturers. By 1914 the list included 
Armstrong and Cammell, both of whom licensed Firth‟s Hollow Cap designs, for 
armour piercing projectiles, Vickers and the Projectile Co for smaller calibre 
common shell, and Harper Bean for practice shot.108 Cammell had introduced 
the manufacture of projectiles in 1898 as an adjunct to their armour business. 
Orders had increased due to Army demands during the Boer War, but the 
company too suffered a dearth of orders in 1901, 1906 and 1907 the same as 
Firth, as shown in Table 3.21. Orders increased through to 1914 with a growing 
number from the Admiralty, which in part rescued the fortunes of the 
department which had been running at a loss for some years, as shown in 
Table 3.22.  
At Firth, the problems stemming from being outside of favourable 
arrangements with the Government were evident in February 1912 when the 
company received orders for 400 13.5 inch AP and 400 13.5 inch CPC 
projectiles, worth £39,000. After recent successful trials with their projectiles, 
Firth‟s board of directors had expected more, and communicated to the 
Admiralty their disappointment at the small size of the order.109 The same 
month, Hadfields received orders for 2,400 13.5 inch Heclon AP and Eron CPC 
projectiles, worth £107,000. Hadfields had, through their relationship with the 
Admiralty, secured three quarters of the orders available. The Government 
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clearly had a preferred partner for projectiles in their network of „special 
relationships,‟ compounded by Hadfields‟ arrangements with the Admiralty 
regarding their minimum share of orders. Firth were suppressed into the second 
tier of „special relationship‟ suppliers, and would have to find alternative means 
of maintaining production at the Gun Works, and retaining the specialist staff 
involved in projectile manufacture. The use of international markets as a 
defence against this type of uncertainty is explored in the next chapter.  
Table 3.21: Cammell’s Shell Orders From British Government, 1900-1914 
Year 
British Army 
Shell Orders, 
£,000s 
(Percentage) 
British Navy 
Shell Orders, 
£,000s 
(Percentage) 
Total British 
Government 
Orders, £,000s 
1900 153 (83) 31 (17) 184 
1901 None None None 
1902 18 (50) 18 (50) 36 
1903 4 (100) None 4 
1904 2 (13) 13 (87) 15 
1905 54 (92) 5 (8) 59 
1906 None None None 
1907 None None None 
1908 None No data Unknown 
1909 None No data Unknown 
1910 0.9 No data Unknown 
1911 18 (58) 13 (42) 31 
1912 8 (9) 85 (81) 93 
1913 0.7 (2) 28 (98) 28.7 
1914 (To July) 0.7 (1) 85 (99) 85.7 
Source: Calculated from TNA, WO 395/1 and 2, Director of Army Contracts Reports 1900-14 
 
Table 3.22: Cammell’s Shell Plant 
Profits and Losses 1910-1914 
Year Profit (Loss) (£) 
1910 (14,747) 
1911 (6,111) 
1912 (3,822) 
1913 2,118 
1914 5,831 
Source: SA, ESC Box 192, Cammell Laird Sheffield Outputs 1910-1927 
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One way to combat Firth‟s singular dependence on the Government was 
to collaborate with other companies which supplied projectiles. This was the 
case with the London based Projectile Co, which also had Bernard Firth as its 
chairman. A broad technology sharing and supply arrangement was entered 
into between the two in 1905, without the signing of a formal agreement. Part of 
the understanding was for Firth to supply cast steel blocks for some of the 
Projectile Co‟s requirements.110 Firth would also promote the Projectile Co 
alongside their own works in advertising materials.111 There was also some joint 
tendering for projectiles between the companies, with the two securing 
£130,000 of orders for 13.5 and 15 inch AP projectiles in January 1914. 
However, due to a lack of communication and co-ordination between the two, 
the order was wholly taken up by Firth as the Projectile Co could not machine 
the size of projectiles required. While this appeared to be a suitable 
arrangement in principle, the debacle resulted in Firth rearranging most of the 
Gun Works and spending £5,000 on new machinery in order to manufacture the 
required 60 13.5 inch shell per week.112 This was certainly not the most ideal 
arrangement for Firth, and highlights the issues of inter-company collaboration 
without any explicit means of managing and co-ordinating the arrangements 
entered into. As chairman of both companies, Bernard Firth was the only formal 
means of communication between Firth and the Projectile Co, though his 
activities as a facilitator of collaborative productive efforts were inefficient and 
ineffective. As will be explored in the following chapter with the Coventry 
Ordnance Works, a greater overlap of directors and armaments experts in 
conjunction with formal arrangements for supply helped to mitigate this level of 
inter-firm uncertainty.  
Despite being outside of any supply agreements with the British 
Government, Firth strived to maintain their position as a key supplier of 
projectiles. In order to remain competitive for tendering with an expanding range 
of calibres in use, the company was forced to increase their capabilities to 
manufacture the larger projectiles with no guarantee of orders. Firth were firmly 
in the second tier of „special relationships‟ with the Government, and in 1901, 
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1906 and 1907 failed to secure any projectile orders from their home buyer. 
Their collaborative relationship with the Projectile Co had the potential to 
counter the general uncertainty of orders from the Government, but it lacked the 
required managerial coordination to ensure any successes. Nevertheless, at 
home Hadfields were certainly the preferred supplier for their monopsonist 
buyer, leaving Firth to fight for a portion of the remaining tenders available each 
year.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the Sheffield armaments industry was part of a naval-industrial 
complex, supplying the Admiralty with armour and projectiles in an environment 
characterised by uncertainty. The relationships between the government and 
private industry can be explored through the notion of „special relationships‟ as 
outlined by Trebilcock, a relationship in which strong home demand allowed the 
armourers to finance their own research and development activities and market 
their products to their home governmental buyers. However, by going beyond 
this definition it is possible to demonstrate a hierarchy of relationships involved, 
with more favoured suppliers in the first rank, the remaining companies in the 
second rank. Those in the first rank included Vickers and Armstrong for armour 
and Hadfields for projectiles, though this is not to suggest that Hadfields were 
viewed in the same high esteem as their larger counterparts. The second rank 
of companies comprised the remaining members of the Sheffield armaments 
industry, Brown, Cammell and Firth. The companies in the first rank were 
involved in favourable relationship with the government, either through attempts 
to stifle rivals in armour and gun manufacture or with guaranteed supply 
arrangements as Hadfields secured. The companies in the second rank had to 
fight for a share of the remaining orders. Relationships with the supply 
ministries were also facilitated by the addition of ex-military personnel to the 
boards of directors of all the armaments companies, the use of London offices 
and in the case of Robert Abbott Hadfield, his home close to Whitehall. The 
relationships between companies and the supply ministries also demonstrate 
one aspect of armaments marketing. A key part of the special relationships 
involved the compliance of the companies involved, the case of Cammell 
demonstrating the consequences of falling from favour of the Government. 
Away from supplying the Government with their main armaments products, the 
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Sheffield armaments companies all implemented multi-faceted corporate 
strategies which incorporated a number of defensive measures to counter 
uncertainty in the industry. The use of director networks, collaborative 
production, and international business are all explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Defence against Uncertainty – Director Networks, Collaboration 
and International Business 1900-1914 
 
In the decade before the Great War British armaments companies were 
technological leaders and innovators in the industry despite the fact that they 
faced a home market characterised by uncertainty. Although favourable special 
relationships with the government were available to a select few, including 
Vickers, Armstrong and to some extent Hadfields, and less favourable 
relationships for Brown, Cammell and Firth, there were no guarantees of orders 
to private industry. In response, each company implemented their own multi-
faceted corporate strategy, which included a number of defensive measures in 
an attempt to counter the insecurity of their home market. The degree to which 
each company sought defensive measures was related to how favourable they 
were in the eyes of the British Government, but in all cases each hoped to 
capture more orders, make further returns on their investment in research and 
development, and maintain their trained staff and productive facilities in 
operation. 
The means by which the armaments companies defended against the 
uncertainty in their home market can be divided into three areas, which provide 
the structure for this chapter. Firstly, companies may act collaboratively in order 
to place them in a more favourable position with their home buyer. In this 
regard, the actions of Brown, Cammell and Firth require further examination. 
Through share exchanges, mergers and acquisitions, by 1905 the three 
companies had constructed a network of productive facilities, and an important 
network of directors centred on the Coventry Ordnance Works (COW), a 
company established to manufacture guns and gun mountings to counter the 
duopoly of Vickers and Armstrong. The director network constructed also 
allowed the group of companies to share risk and knowledge. Secondly, in 
order to capture foreign markets companies may again act collaboratively to 
increase their chance of success. Here, the actions of Brown come to the fore. 
Uniquely, the company was part of two combines attempting to enter foreign 
markets for armaments. One group was linked to their involvement with COW, 
the other a combined effort with Vickers and Armstrong to gain orders in Spain 
and Turkey, a grouping in which Brown found themselves the junior member 
and a cause of tension regarding the foreign prospects for the products of the 
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COW. The level of collaboration in the British armaments industry was 
somewhat unique compared to their European rivals. Research into German 
and Italian armaments production prior to the Great War, for example found a 
weak association between companies in both countries.1 Essentially, the British 
armaments industry utilised a mix of competition and cooperation, especially in 
the international market. Companies may often complement each other in 
making markets, but are competitors when dividing them up.2 Thirdly 
companies attempted to enter international markets individually in a bid to 
secure orders from a foreign government without having to share them. 
International orders were certainly valuable to armaments companies, who can 
be seen as „pioneer multinationals‟3 Overall these efforts were an essential part 
of being an armaments company, the highly specialised nature of their work 
promoting the need to actively seek new ways to profit from their heavy 
investment in research and development and production facilities.  
 
Director Networks and the Coventry Ordnance Works 
In order to explore the relationships between Brown, Cammell and Firth, 
a brief overview of the evolution of the group and the facilities they controlled is 
required (See Figure 4.1). In 1899, Brown took over the Clydebank Engineering 
and Shipbuilding works to gain an outlet for their armour production, and 
supplemented their shipbuilding interests by acquiring a controlling interest in 
the Belfast based Harland and Wolff Company in 1908.4 The Clydebank 
shipyards became part of Brown, while Harland and Wolff remained 
independent and not involved in the armaments business. Brown also gained a 
majority interest in Firth in 1902 which led to an exchange of shares and 
directors, though the two companies retained independent identities.5 Firth from 
1896 operated the Firth Sterling Steel Company in the US, and the Salamander 
Works for producing shell in Riga from 1904. In 1908, the armaments side of 
Firth Sterling became a separate company, the Washington Steel and 
Ordnance Works. Each was managed by Lewis Firth, one of the original 
                                            
1
 G. Marchisio, Battleships and Dividends: The Rise of Private Armaments Firms in Great Britain 
and Italy c.1860-1914, (Durham University, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2012), p.231. 
2
 B.J. Nalebuff and A.M. Brandenburger, Co-opetition (London, Harper Collins Business, 1996), 
p.34. 
3
 K. Warren, Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth in Engineering and Armaments to the Merger with 
Vickers (London, Macmillan, 1989), p.xii. 
4
 A. Grant, Steel and Ships, The History Of John Browns (London, Michael Joseph, 1950), p.37. 
5
 Grant, Steel and Ships, p.38. 
 141 
directors of Firth from 1881. The use of family networks was the most common 
approach to international business, and a cost-effective means of developing an 
overseas business organisation.6 Finally, in 1903 Cammell took over the Laird 
Brothers shipyard in Birkenhead and acquired the Coventry based Mulliner-
Wigley Co for the production of guns. Mulliner-Wigley evolved into COW, whose 
ownership pattern changed in 1905 with Brown acquiring half of the shares in 
the company. The same year Cammell obtained half the shares of the Fairfield 
Shipbuilding Company, and transferred a quarter of the shares in COW to the 
shipbuilder.7 Overall, the group had at their disposal the facilities to construct 
and equip a complete battleship. These connections were part of a move in the 
armaments industry to create vertically-integrated „complete‟ groups able to 
manufacture the widest range of products for the Government.8 The focus of 
this discussion of COW is based upon the development of cross-directorships 
and the formation of a knowledge and risk sharing network, and in the following 
section collaborative action in the international armaments market.9  
The development of COW began with the acquisition by Cammell of gun 
manufacturers Mulliner-Wrigley in 1903, which by March 1905 had secured an 
order for the production of complete 13 and 18 pound artillery batteries.10 This 
was part of an attempt by Cammell to become a more complete armaments 
company through diversification into gun manufacture and shipbuilding. The aim 
was to achieve a position which would provide Cammell, alone or 
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collaboratively, the ability to fully equip a battleship with the largest guns and 
gun mountings. As Warren argues:  
For these later steps it was felt desirable to form a still wider association 
of interests, making what had already been achieved into the nucleus for 
a „complete‟, major, armaments group, which might match the 
comprehensiveness and even the size of Armstrong-Whitworth and 
Vickers-Beardmore.11 
This desire to break the duopoly of Vickers and Armstrong was solely based on 
increasing each company‟s market share, increase their profitability, and make 
their products more desirable in the uncertain environment that the companies 
faced. In response, Vickers and Armstrong actively campaigned to keep COW 
out of a market which they had „come to see as their shared domain.‟12 
Nevertheless, the establishment of COW was welcomed in the supply 
ministries, and Davenport-Hines has suggested that the Government used the 
company to check on the prices of their competitors.13 Overall, the 
establishment of COW and its ownership pattern gave each of the shareholders 
access to external networks to extend their production capabilities, in contrast to 
the use of costly internal expansion.14  
 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of Brown‟s, Cammell‟s and Firth‟s business connections 1896-1908. 
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 A key part of the development of inter-company collaboration was the 
creation of a small network of directors centred on Coventry, which reflected the 
interests and technological capabilities of not just the three partners, but Firth as 
well (See Table 4.1). Cross directorships were not uncommon in the industry, 
for instance from 1902 William Beardmore, Albert Vickers and Trevor Dawson 
were on the board of Vickers and Beardmore after an exchange of shares 
between the two companies.15 This network of directors served three purposes 
for the companies involved; it was a means of sharing and exploiting knowledge 
related to armaments, a means of spreading the burden of new technological 
risks, and finally a means of facilitating collaboratively tendering for international 
orders. The use of a director network for inter-firm collaboration can also be 
seen as an effective means of communicating explicit knowledge. Grant 
suggests that:  
Inter-firm collaborative arrangements are efficient mechanisms to 
transfer and integrate explicit knowledge and to support vertical supply 
relations in instances where knowledge cannot be completely embodied 
within the products being exchanged.16  
Research and development was core to the business of any armaments 
company, and the marketing and licensing of technology a key element of the 
industry. Thus, the means of simplifying the exchange of technology through 
formal collaboration between companies was welcomed by those involved as it 
supported vertical supply relations.  
A broader view of the whole network has been taken by Pollard and 
Robertson who examined the number of directors and important shareholders 
with connections with the government, House of Commons, civil service, and 
service ministries the armaments companies had. In their analysis, the 
Cammell-Brown-Firth-Fairfield-COW group contained 18 such individuals, while 
Armstrong had 10 and Vickers-Beardmore 11.17 This was a well connected 
network which could access key marketing channels when required. One of 
Cammell‟s longest serving directors, Samuel Roberts MP, was recorded in 1909 
as having asked six questions in just five weeks to the House of Commons to 
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enquire „with increasing indignation‟ how soon gun mounting orders would be 
placed with COW.18 Furthermore, COW became the communication point for 
the network, where the most efficient means of sharing information and 
knowledge could take place.19 This was facilitated by the number of important 
and well connected armaments directors serving with the company.  
 
Table 4.1: Brown-Cammell-Firth-COW Network Cross Directorships To 
1914 
Name Firth Brown Cammell-Laird COW 
Baron Aberconway 
(Charles McLaren) 
A: 1903 A: 1883, DC from 
1897, C from 1906 
  
Restel Ratsey  
Bevis 
  A: 1904, MD from 
1911 to 1912 
L: 1913 
A: 1905 
L: 1905 
George J. Carter   A: 1912, MD from 
1912 
A: 1912 
Charles E. Ellis A: 1903 A: 1884, MD from 
1892 
 A: 1905 
Bernard A Firth A: 1888, MD 
from 1900, C 
from 1903 
A: 1903, DC from 
1906 
 A: 1912 
Alexander Gracie   A: 1905 A: 1906 
Major Arthur 
Handley 
  A: 1908 A: 1908 
L: 1911 
William Lionel 
Hichens 
  A: 1911, C from 
1911 
A: 1911, C 
from 1913 
John Macgregor 
Laird 
  A: 1904, DC from 
1904, C from 1905 
L: 1907 
A: 1905 
L: 1907 
Herbet Hall 
Mulliner 
  A: 1903 
L: 1905 
A: 1905, MD 
from 1905 
L: 1909 
John Sampson A: 1899 A: 1904   
Captain Tolmie 
John Tresidder 
A: 1891   A: 1905 
Key:  A = appointment to board L = left board  C = chairman 
DC = deputy chairman  MD = managing director 
Note: Two included on the table – Aberconway and Sampson – were not part of the COW 
board. A third director, Frederick C. Fairholme, served on both the Cammell and Firth 
boards, but not at the same time and is not included. 
 
Structurally, the group of companies resembles the Network-Form as 
outlined by Wilson and Thompson, albeit without the required investment in 
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central management and co-ordination centred on COW. This type of 
organisational is characterised by the highly devolved nature of decision 
making, and „also imposes even more managerial strains on a firm, given the 
need not only to run these geographically dispersed operations, but also to 
monitor relations with partners that might be prone to opportunistic behaviour.20 
This was the case with the COW network, as the construction of a completed 
capital ship could involve the co-ordination of productive facilities in Sheffield, 
Coventry, Birkenhead and Glasgow, across up to five companies, without an 
effective means of centrally managing the whole productive process. As 
Whittington highlights, „networks need managing no less than hierarchies.‟21 
Furthermore, Renneboog and Zhao have suggested that „networks not only 
increase a director‟s influence but also bring additional skills, knowledge and 
information to the company.‟22 In terms of influence, three directors require 
attention: Charles Ellis, Bernard Firth and William Lionel Hichens, key figures at 
Brown, Firth and Cammell respectively. All command authority in their dealings 
with the COW board.  
 A key aspect of the COW network was the sharing and licensing of 
technical knowledge. Initial arrangements between Brown and Firth in 1903 
emphasised the desire to exchange armaments technology. Bernard Firth is 
recorded as stating that Brown „desired this Company [Firth] to give them 
information in reference to the manufacture of Gun Material.‟ Furthermore, it 
was ultimately agreed that the two Companies would „give the fullest 
information and render every possible assistance to each other.‟ 23 Brown were 
aware that the acquisition of Firth would give them access to armour piercing 
projectiles, cast steel shell, and heavy marine steel castings, all materials 
required for their shipbuilding activities but previously purchased from outside 
sources.24 Two further examples of knowledge sharing come from Firth‟s 
association with the COW partners. While not directly involved in the ownership 
of the company, their representation on the COW board of directors by Charles 
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Ellis and Bernard Firth facilitated the licensing of their fuze designs to COW, 
and their projectile caps with Cammell. The royalties involved were small, 
Cammell paid Firth just £150 for caps in 1914, but such arrangements would 
have been more difficult without an already established network for 
communicating such possibilities.25  
However, there were issues regarding the position of knowledge and 
experts within the network to best exploit their perceived value, such as with the 
Holmstrom breech mechanism. In 1905 after purchasing a half-share in COW, 
Brown established an ordnance department at their London offices and brought 
to the company Carl Albert Holmstrom, an expert in ordnance and gun design. 
Born and educated in Sweden, Holmstrom came to England in 1886 to work in 
the drawing office of Maxim-Nordenfeldt, before moving to China in 1895 as 
Vickers‟ technical representative. In 1901 he returned to England and took up a 
position as manager of Beardmore‟s ordnance department. By the time he 
joined Brown in 1905 Holmstrom had several patents to his name, and had 
invented a semi-automatic gun while at Maxim-Nordenfeldt in 1889. 26 An 
accomplished specialist in the field of ordnance, Holmstrom‟s appointment 
appears to not fit the armaments strategy of Brown at the time. His expertise 
and patent portfolio covered breech mechanisms of guns, a product not 
manufactured by the company. While at Brown, Holmstrom invented a new type 
of breech mechanism for medium calibre guns, a product whose special 
features were claimed to be „…the methods of obturation, safety, simplicity, 
reliability, case of manipulation and accessibility of working parts.‟27 Placed 
under the commercial control of Brown, the sole British licensees of the breech 
mechanism was COW, who had played a key part in the development of the 
mechanism and had covered the expense of its development while Brown paid 
Holmstrom‟s salary.28 When the mechanism had been successfully tested, it 
was agreed by Bacon and Holmstrom that „probably better financial results 
would be obtained if the arrangements for dealing with the rights for use of the 
Mechanism were in the hands of [Brown] rather than those of Coventry 
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Ordnance Works.‟29 The reputation of Brown, who had more experience and 
connections in the international armaments market, was emphasised over COW 
and strengthened by retaining the employment of Holmstrom with Brown. 
Despite this potentially favourable marketing position, only the Greek Navy 
introduced the mechanism. In 1913 the Admiralty decided not to proceed any 
further with the breech mechanism after their trials.30 By the time of his death in 
1915, Holmstrom had obtained thirteen further patents related to ordnance 
since joining Brown.  
 In addition to the sharing of knowledge, COW also represented a means 
of sharing risk for the three partners. As Cammell discovered, entering into gun 
manufacture alone in 1903 was extremely demanding. By sharing ownership 
the risks could be distributed among them, but there were no guarantees of 
success. The COW network also facilitated the sharing of future risks, in 
particular the manufacture of aircraft.31 In response to a War Office trial for 
military aircraft in 1911, the COW directors discussed commencing aircraft 
manufacture, without spending more than £5,500.32 The decision was made to 
purchase the aircraft business of Howard Wright at Battersea in London, and 
employ Thomas Sopwith for two years as an aviator, who would receive half 
any prize money they might win in addition to his regular pay. An unnamed 
COW director wrote in early 1912 of aircraft manufacture:  
I favour the idea, however, not only because I think the business at any 
rate in its early stages will be a profitable one, but because I think it will 
be a valuable adjunct to any firm interested in Naval and Military 
manufactures.33  
At the War Office trials in September 1912 the COW aircraft was unsuccessful, 
as it failed to lift the test weight more than 400 feet into the air.34 However, 
COW was congratulated by War Office officials at Farnborough for the progress 
they had made in comparison to Vickers, who had invested ten times as much, 
and the Bristol Aircraft Company which had spent forty times as much as the 
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company for the trials.35 Despite the partial success, Brown suggested that 
COW cease further expenditure on aircraft and discontinue the manufacture of 
aircraft at COW in November 1912, with Bernard Firth expressing the same 
opinion at a board meeting in December.36 Despite these protests from one of 
the COW‟s parent companies, aircraft manufacture continued and the company 
received an order for six machines in early 1913, and a further 10 in June 1913. 
For the initial order, the estimated cost of manufacture for each was £240 with a 
selling price of £480, a 50% profit margin.37 This was a potentially lucrative 
future market for armaments companies, and aircraft manufacture continued 
until the Great War at COW. In this case, the partner companies were willing to 
use COW to take a small financial risk with a new technology, and one which 
individually they would have been reluctant to take. Brown‟s reaction to the 
failure of the COW aircraft indicates that the company were more risk adverse 
away from their production of armour plate, and it is probable they would have 
never contemplated aircraft manufacture as an independent venture. As the 
largest shareholders in COW, Brown had attempted to exert influence over their 
fellow directors with limited success.  
Reflecting on their diverse business holdings and ventures, Brown‟s 
management publicly stated in 1914 that they „maintained the principle of 
decentralisation which had operated so successfully in their affiliated companies 
for so many years.‟38 This indicates that away from the management of their 
subsidiaries, Brown had an arms length approach to the day to day running of 
their investments. In 1914 Firth had accepted an order from COW for cast steel 
shields which required treatment in Krupp furnaces and had asked Brown for 
the use of their capacity at the Atlas works. After discussion at a Brown‟s Works 
Committee meeting, it was decided that:  
The general opinion was that Messrs. Firth should be assisted as much 
as possible, but, in view of the congested state of Krupp shop with the 
output of armour, it was advisable for Messrs. Firth to see assistance 
elsewhere.39 
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Brown had their own business to attend to, and were not prepared to facilitate 
Firth‟s requests. The principle of decentralisation had the potential to have an 
adverse impact on Brown‟s subsidiaries when they required more assistance 
than the parent company were prepared to offer.  
 While there were some managerial and control issues with the group, 
COW did eventually succeed in breaking the duopoly of Vickers and Armstrong 
for large calibre naval gun manufacture. In 1913, COW was „fully recognised by 
the Government as an essential part of the national armament works‟, and was 
regarded as one of the most important suppliers for the Government, instead of 
being „cold-shouldered‟ as they had been in previous years.40 Their 
collaborative defensive action produced an armaments group more 
comprehensive than any individual company could offer, yet they suffered from 
being lower down the hierarchy of special relationships as outlined in the 
previous chapter. Overall, the development of COW provided the opportunity to 
share risks of entering new markets, establish a network for the communication 
of knowledge related to armaments, and as will be explored in the following 
section, the opportunity to collaboratively enter the international market for the 
companies involved.  
 
Collaborative Approaches to International Markets 
In addition to business relationships, the armaments industry also worked 
collaboratively in the international market. The use of foreign sales was a key 
strategy to counter the general uncertainty in the armourers‟ home market, 
continue to keep their plant in operation, and make a further return on their 
heavy research and development commitment. The British Government tended 
to look the other way when it came to armaments technology and its 
international transfer by the companies involved in developing it. Thomas 
Macnamara, Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty between 
1908 and 1920, remarked to the House of Commons in 1914 that:  
All contracts that in any way comprise confidential matters contain strict 
stipulations in regard to the observance of the Official Secrets Act, and 
other necessary precautions. The Admiralty have no reason to doubt the 
adequacy of the steps taken in all matters that admit of being treated as 
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Government secrets or of being kept confidential in national interests. 
The Government does not interfere with the construction of armaments 
of contractors‟ design for foreign Powers, and cannot any more than any 
other Government necessarily monopolise all inventions and 
improvements, many of which from their nature could either not be kept 
confidential at all or only for a very limited period.41 
When the armaments companies had foreign orders, their works remained in 
operation and they were not reliant on the British Government to provide orders 
to maintain such plant. During periods of „slack‟ demand, as Trebilcock argues, 
„the private armament sector could not afford to maintain its expensive and 
complicated plant in peak condition, in times of resumed demand, it could not 
afford not to do so.‟42 Foreign orders were therefore utilised to keep plant in 
operation. The result of being the most technologically advanced armaments 
centre in the world, and having a government favourable to the utilisation of 
such knowledge for foreign orders, was the international nature of the Sheffield 
armaments industry before the Great War. This aspect of the business also 
meant that private industry was a prime source of intelligence on foreign naval 
and military plans before 1918.43  
 Brown was the most active collaborator with other companies with 
foreign business. Their approach to international orders was „to act alone‟ when 
„the circumstances render it desirable, and, where co-operation is in our opinion 
necessary, to select the firm or firms to work with us who in our opinion are 
most useful for the purpose.‟44 With this in mind, Brown‟s association with both 
Vickers and Armstrong in two overseas markets requires further exploration.45 
In the international market, the grouping was a formidable one. As Trebilcock 
has observed they were:  
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Able to offer in one vessel, Armstrong hulls from the two yards at Elswick 
and Walker, Brown armour, and Vickers ordnance, mountings and 
engines, commodities separately of the highest international repute, here 
available in combination, this armourers‟ conclave could deliver a sales 
pitch which brooked few equals in overseas trade.46 
The Brown-Armstrong-Vickers group would work together in Spain, assisting 
with the construction of the Spanish Navy, and in Turkey, where they built one 
battleship and received enquiries for three more, the possibility of building a 
floating dock, and providing assistance with the reconstruction of an arsenal in 
Constantinople. Prior to their association with Brown, Vickers and Armstrong 
had informal arrangements regarding royalties on foreign orders. Whichever 
company secured an order paid the other a proportion of profits, for example 2-
3% of the cost of a ship hull and £6-10 per ton of armour. A confidential report 
at Vickers claimed the arrangement was necessary as without them 
„competition between the two firms would reduce profits to vanishing point.‟47 
 In Spain, Brown had entered the market in the 1890s and had suggested 
to their Minister of Marine that a number of British shipbuilders could work 
together to construct the Spanish Navy. Brown had discussed possible 
arrangements with both Vickers and Armstrong, but owing to the Spanish-
American war in 1898 the plans were put on hold. When the market re-emerged 
Vickers approached Brown to join with them and Armstrong, and from 1908 
they assisted in the formation of the Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval 
(SECN).48 In 1911, Brown‟s Spanish naval work was described as a „valuable 
adjunct to the Company‟s business,‟ and provided lucrative profits.49 The three 
manufacturers agreed to supply SECN with all the armour required for three 
battleships, with prices set at the end of 1909 at £120 per ton. The specification 
agreed that KC armour would be used, and „must be of the best quality used by 
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the British Admiralty at the time of the order of manufacture.‟50 During the 12 
months commencing April 1910, Brown‟s works could produce a ton of KC 
armour for £70, with a selling price to the British Admiralty of £101, a 31 percent 
profit margin. By selling to SECN at £120 per ton, Brown was able to make a 42 
percent profit margin on each ton of armour supplied. This was certainly a 
profitable extension to Brown‟s armour business. However, not every foreign 
contract the Browns-Armstrong-Vickers group acquired would be so rewarding 
for the company, as demonstrated by their ventures in Turkey.  
 In February 1910, the three companies signed an agreement for the 
Turkish battleship Retshadeh, which required Brown to supply one-third of the 
armour for the finished vessel that was being built at Vickers‟ Barrow shipyards. 
Vickers had agreed to build the vessel and engines at cost in order to secure 
the contact against fierce competition from other tenders, with Brown noting that 
„the Contract is a very bad one both for ship and armament.‟51 The division of 
the order came under further scrutiny in February 1912, with Charles Ellis 
believing that Brown were due a proportion of the shell order to supply the 
battleship, to be supplied by Firth. After some correspondence with Vickers, 
their reply was rather blunt, stating that „…armament, including guns and 
ammunition, is divided between Armstrongs and Vickers, and Browns are not to 
have an interest in this item.‟52 The whole order ultimately proved of little value 
to Brown. Once the order had been delivered to Vickers in July 1914, Brown 
had produced 1,437 tons of armour, and received £82,210 of the £123,650 
owed to them. Payments had begun for the armour in August 1911, and final 
payment was not received until 1915.53 Even with the total paid to Brown, the 
amount they received would be £86 per ton of armour, a figure little above the 
cost of production, and well below the profit margin of producing for the 
Admiralty. Ultimately the order was for prestige rather than profit for the 
company. Brown knew this as well, and as early as 1911 acknowledged that 
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their two partners continually secured the „lion‟s share‟ of profitable work 
between them.54 The company was the junior partner of the group, relied upon 
only for extra armour capacity when required for ship construction. In order to 
counter this, Brown looked to their COW partners to explore other foreign 
markets.  
Brown‟s involvement with Vickers and Armstrong was due to 
arrangements made prior to the establishment of COW. Effectively, this had 
shut out the COW group from competing in Spain and Turkey:  
This may have seemed an advantage to us [Brown], but it has had the 
desired effect of closing every outlet in these countries for Coventry 
guns. The guns are what our rivals want, and as outside competition in 
every case reduces the hulls to little better than net cost, it is of 
comparatively small importance to them whether or not we get a hull at a 
low price or even a share of armour.55 
In August 1911, an unknown Brown‟s director (presumably Charles Ellis), 
suggested the building of an armaments group solely for foreign business under 
the name of „British and Foreign Naval Construction Syndicate.‟ This was in 
response to invitations from the Portuguese Government to re-equip their Navy. 
The group would consist of Brown, Cammell, COW, Fairfields, Palmer‟s 
Shipbuilding and Iron Co, and John I Thornycroft & Co.56 It was suggested that: 
it would be in the interests of J Brown & Co, and of those other firms who 
are naturally desirous of securing at least a share of foreign government 
work, which Vickers-Armstrong group have almost entirely monopolised 
for so many years past.57 
The aim was to attempt to gain a share of the foreign work which Vickers and 
Armstrong had for so long dominated, and Brown predicted that this would open 
serious competition with their two competitors „in every country of the world.‟ 
The proposal for the syndicate was that it would be launched with a capital of 
£1million, establish a head office in London and divide all required work for 
foreign governments equally between the constituent companies. The idea was 
presented to Brown‟s board in early August 1911, and by the end of the month 
a provisional working arrangement had been made between the six companies 
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which stated that only COW guns and mountings would be offered in Portugal.58 
The British and Foreign Naval Construction Syndicate went no further than 
working on Portuguese Naval orders, and no formal office was ever established 
in London. In 1913, with competition from a Vickers-Armstrong-Yarrow 
Shipbuilding Co group, the syndicate emerged victorious and secured orders for 
12 vessels, including two cruisers for the Portuguese Navy.59 Political issues in 
Portugal hampered progress being made, and no orders were placed before the 
Great War.60 Other than this order, there were other attempts to pool resources 
for the international market by Brown. In November 1913 COW and the allied 
firms agreed to „work together in respect of Naval or Military proposals in 
Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania [sic] and Brazil,‟ though the group failed to gain 
any orders.61 Overall, with collaborative international orders Brown were a 
member of two groups of armourers, yet not fully incorporated or utilised in 
either. This had a serious effect on the company‟s ability to supplement their 
British Admiralty orders with financially rewarding foreign work, which could 
keep their armour plant going in times of slack demand. Away from 
collaboration with foreign orders, all the companies in the Sheffield armaments 
industry individually looked to the international market to further defend against 
the uncertainty of the arms industry.  
 
Individual Approaches to International Markets 
Collaboration was not always the most suitable approach to selling armaments 
in the international market. While the armour producers had experience of 
working collectively, both Brown and Cammell also worked independently to 
market armour and warships in the overseas market but achieved 
predominantly negative results. With projectiles, acting independently was a 
successful strategy for gaining lucrative orders from foreign governments, as 
will be demonstrated with the examples of Firth and Hadfields. Ultimately, the 
different fortunes of the Sheffield armaments industry in the international market 
varied with the two different products.    
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Armour was a product rarely sold without being fixed to a new capital 
ship. Prior to the merger movement between 1897 to 1903 during which four 
previously independent shipbuilders became part of armaments companies, 
Vickers with the Barrow Shipbuilding Co, Armstrong with Joseph Whitworth, 
Brown with the Clydebank Shipbuilding Co and Cammell with Laird Brothers, 
foreign governments would choose a shipyard to build their new vessel, and a 
steel company to manufacture their armour. This process of vertical integration 
changed how armaments companies approached the sale of armour to foreign 
governments. Thereafter, armour had to be sold as part of a package which 
resulted in a finished vessel. In this regard, ship purchases were capital 
expenditures, a large one off cost for a product which all governments expected 
to be the most advanced possible at the time of purchase. 
In the decade before 1903, Brown had amassed an impressive list of 
international customers, having supplied armour to Japan, Russia, Spain, 
Norway, Sweden and Holland.62 The company also produced test plates for the 
Chilean government in 1902.63 However, after amalgamation with the 
Clydebank Shipbuilding Co, the main constraint to Brown‟s sales of armour with 
foreign governments was a lack of warship contracts for their shipbuilding yards 
in the years before the Great War.64 One area where Brown did extend their 
international links was through supplying ship designs and technical information 
to the Russian Baltic Shipbuilding Company in 1908. Three years later the 
company supplied an unknown Russian company technical assistance with the 
construction of two new battleships for the Black Sea Fleet.65 While this was an 
important link, it was based on marine engineering technology, not armaments.  
 Undeterred, Brown continued to seek international customers, and in 
1911 their Works Committee speculated over the possibility of receiving a 
number of foreign orders, including from Chile and China.66 Expectations of 
orders in these markets had led management to invest in the expansion of the 
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armour department at the Atlas Works, but the result was that neither country 
placed orders. In Chile the company had been working with Fairfield for the 
proposed construction of two battleships to utilise COW guns. They had been 
close to success, though the order was ultimately placed with Armstrong. The 
frustration of loosing the contract was reflected when one Brown director wrote:  
Our unfortunate experience in Chili [sic] shows that our agents may be 
duped and flattered up to the very last moment, when a more powerful 
influence comes in behind the scenes and deprives us of the expected 
results.67 
However, at the Chilean Navy‟s request the battleship engines were supplied by 
Brown.68 The company had a similar experience in China, where Brown had 
been working with Palmer‟s Shipbuilding Company to supply the ships ordered 
from their two shipbuilder yards, with armour from the Atlas Works and guns 
from COW, though the resulting order was placed with Vickers.69 Also 
disappointing were attempts to open discussions for orders from Japan, 
Canada, Greece and Denmark in August 1911, but eventually no order was 
received from any of them. By 1913 the prospects for orders from foreign 
markets had evaporated, and Brown was focusing on their arrangements with 
other armaments companies.70  
Cammell also struggled to gain foreign orders. The company never sold 
their projectiles outside of Britain, and international armour customers were 
small in number. They did secure an order from the Swedish admiralty for 722 
tons of armour in 1900 at £110 per ton, but this turned out to be the last 
business in the country.71 After amalgamating with Laird Brothers in 1903, 
Cammell took an ambitious approach to selling their ships in the international 
market. Vessels would be built without a firm order from a customer, and once 
construction entered the final stages the company would market the possibility 
of acquiring the vessel without the long wait for it to be assembled. The 
approach was entirely ineffective. In 1905 when two torpedo boat destroyers 
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were nearing completion, Cammell contacted one of their European agents, Dr 
Adolf Rosendorff, to enter into negotiations with the Norwegian Government for 
their sale. The attempt proved futile, the Destroyers eventually sold to the 
British Navy. Rosendorff had been appointed by Cammell to explore the 
possibility of Russian orders, though his failure in Sweden led to his eventual 
dismissal.72 The use of agents was a common approach in the industry, the 
most famous example being Sir Basil Zarharoff at Vickers. In 1904 Cammell 
attempted to use flattery with an intermediary from the Chilean Government 
when tenders had been invited for three armoured vessels. J.M. Laird contacted 
Jose Onofre Bunster, the Chilean representative in Liverpool, to ask him to take 
some sketches to Chile rather than post them. In a letter to Bunster, Laird 
wrote, „as you know we for many years have had important and pleasant 
dealings with your Government and we are naturally desirous of continuing if 
possible on a larger scale with your Country.‟73 This approach, which placed an 
excessive emphasis on loyalty over technological prowess, also proved 
unsuccessful as no orders were received from Chile.   
 In 1906-7 tenders were explored for Portuguese gunboats and a 
Swedish battleship, though no orders were placed with the company.74 
Cammell‟s dismissal from the War Office and Admiralty lists in 1907 also had a 
disastrous effect on their ability to market their armaments to potential 
international customers. An enquiry from the Uruguayan Navy for a gunboat in 
November 1907 was certainly not finalised due to this. In requesting a return to 
the lists in 1908, new company chairman Sir Francis Elgar noted that „foreign 
governments would not give them any work until they were rehabilitated.‟75 
From this we can see that in lieu of advanced technology, marketing prowess or 
the use of an able team of overseas agents and salesmen, the major 
requirement for any foreign buyer was an assurance that the British 
Government was also a purchaser of the company‟s products. In essence, 
being on the lists of contractors in Whitehall was the key which opened the door 
to the international armaments market.  
 After Cammell returned to the British procurement lists, there were some 
attempts to re-enter the international market. Tenders were looked into for an 
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Argentine Battleship and Danish Torpedo Boat in 1909, though no orders were 
forthcoming. In the case of Argentina, only a pencil note appears in the 
Cammell Tender Book for the period, with none of the usual details such as 
speed, number of boilers and length present.76 An agent was appointed by 
Cammell for Portuguese Navy orders in 1910, which gave the agent a 1% 
commission on battleships and cruisers, and 2.5% on destroyers and gunboats, 
all exclusive of armament.77 Essentially, the agent would only gain a 
commission on the boat hulls, not the financially more lucrative armour, guns or 
gun mountings. Cammell may have needed the agents to help broker foreign 
orders, but they were not prepared to excessively reward them financially for 
their sale of these high-capital products. A collusive arrangement was also 
explored with Vickers in an attempt to almost force the Italian Government into 
placing an order with Cammell. Vickers had agreed to quote higher than 
Cammell, stating they were „very pleased in this instance to assist you get 
Italian Contract.‟ Their instructions to Cammell were:  
When making up your price, please include £1,000 for us which you will 
pay to us in the event of the order being placed with you…When your 
price is made up, please send it on to us, and we will take good care to 
quote a price in excess, so that so far as our competition is concerned, 
you need have nothing to fear.78 
No further record of this transaction has been found, suggesting that Cammell 
were unsuccessful with the Italian Government. However, the suggestion that 
Vickers would purposely sabotage their ability to profit from another foreign 
customer in order to help re-habilitate a home competitor into the international 
market demonstrates one aspect of the collaboration Sheffield armourers had. 
The only successful international order undertaken by Cammell in this period 
was for four torpedo boat destroyers for the Argentine Navy. Ordered in 1910, 
the Argentine programme was for 12 destroyers in total, four were ordered from 
two German companies, four from two French companies, and the final four 
from Cammell. By the time of their delivery in 1913, the Argentine contract had 
been annulled and the vessels Cammell had built were sold to the Greek 
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Navy.79 Aside from arrangements with other armaments Companies for 
supplying the Portuguese Navy, Cammell failed to attract any other foreign 
orders before the Great War. The variety of approaches to securing overseas 
orders highlights the value the company saw in foreign business, with ultimately 
little reward.   
In contrast to armour, the selling of projectiles to international customers 
was more successful. These were a product with elastic demand, used for 
training in peacetime and required in greater numbers with every new capital 
ship. Once rendered obsolete by technological advances, they could be 
replaced by an updated design, resulting in more orders for the projectile 
manufacturers. Replacing the armour on a ship would be nigh on impossible if a 
new method of production was introduced. Buying a new ship was the usual 
option rather than a vast overhaul. The standardisation of armour production to 
Krupp Cemented (KC) plates, facilitated by the Harvey United Steel Company, 
also aided the marketing of projectiles in the international field. As the majority 
of the world‟s navies purchased ships built with KC armour after its introduction, 
conformity in the ability of the armour made selling the capability of a projectile 
to defeat the most common type of armour a key marketing point. Any projectile 
which could perforate KC armour could defeat any navy in the world. The use of 
brand names like Heclon and Rendable made differentiation between Hadfields 
and Firth products simpler, as the performance of the two companies AP 
projectiles was comparable. To aid marketing projectiles to international 
customers, both also entered into agreements with cordite firms specifically for 
overseas business, and Firth had commenced the manufacture of their Hoyle 
and Strange fuzes to offer a complete package. As their marketing materials 
pronounced, Firth were able to supply „Projectiles charged and ready to fire‟, to 
a foreign customer. Once the British Navy introduced the new AP projectiles, 
both companies were predominantly reliant on the Admiralty for orders at home. 
The Army ordered far fewer projectiles than the Navy, and as will be 
demonstrated, for Firth and Hadfields the increase in their international 
customers from 1906 would be more lucrative for them than those for the British 
Army. 
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At Firth, the company was able to attract a number of international 
customers between 1906 and 1913, and the comparison with orders for the 
British Army is shown in Table 4.2. The Greek Government placed orders with 
Firth annually between 1911 and 1913, and the Danish Government placed 
their single order in 1910.80 Orders received from the Spanish Government had 
been agreed by Charles Ellis as part of the SECN with Vickers and Armstrong, 
Firth receiving orders for one third of the projectiles required.81 No details of the 
financial value of the Spanish orders are available. However, these ordered 
were on the whole small compared to Firth‟s pre-eminent foreign customer, the 
Italian Government, which requires further exploration.  
 
Table 4.2: Firth’s Foreign Customers 
for Projectiles 1906-1913 
Customer Value (£) 
Italian Government 504,116 
Greek Government 106,000 
Danish Government 17,000 
Spanish Government Unknown 
British Army 6,625 
Source: Calculated from Firth‟s Directors Records, Firth‟s Reports to Brown‟s Board, 1906-1913 
 
After submitting projectiles to a firing test in 1906, Firth received a 
contract from the Italian Government, which stipulated that a major portion of 
the order had to be fulfilled in Italy.82 In order to complete the order, Firth were 
faced with the decision to either establish their own overseas works in the 
country, which would have been in addition to their already established shell 
manufacturing in America and Russia, or go into partnership with another 
company. Given the quick delivery required for the order, Firth chose the latter, 
working with Armstrong to utilise the Armstrong Pozzuoli Works which had been 
established in the 1890s.83 From the arrangement, Armstrong would be paid 
one third of the overall value of the order of £130,000, Firth receiving the 
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balance of two thirds. This initial order initiated the beginning of a relationship 
with the Italian Government which helped supplement Firth‟s shell output until 
the Great War. At the end of 1906, Firth‟s Gun Works had £155,000 of orders 
on their books, of which £113,000 was for Italian projectiles. In other words, 
almost three quarters of the work the Gun Works had in hand was for a foreign 
customer. This clearly demonstrates the value of overseas customers to Firth, 
especially with an absence of British orders in 1906 and 1907 as discussed in 
the previous chapter.  
 
Table 4.3: Firth’s Italian Shell 
Orders, 1906-1913 
Year Total Orders 
Received (£,000s) 
1906 130 
1907 No orders 
1908 18 
1909 71 
1910 No orders 
1911 222 
1912 14 
1913 9 
Source: Firth Records, Firth‟s Reports to Brown‟s Board, 1906-1913 
 
The first order from Italy was followed by a string of orders over the next 
seven years, as shown in Table 4.3. All of these were for six to 13.5 inch AP 
projectiles, allowing Firth to utilise their advanced armaments technology and 
further profit from their research commitment. Overall, Italian shell requirements 
helped to maintain the Gun Works in production and allowed Firth to maintain 
their skilled staff. The orders received from the Italian Government in 1911 were 
more than double those received from the British Government in the same year, 
and were expected to yield a 20% profit.84 International customers, especially 
the Italian Government, were central to Firth‟s ability to keep their shell plant 
running in the decade before the Great War. Additionally, the Italian 
Government were also open to the use of new projectile technologies 
developed at the company. For example, a small order placed in 1913 was for 
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Firth‟s new type of oblique caps to replace older designs already fitted to 
projectiles supplied to the Italian Government. These oblique caps underwent 
testing and entered service in Italy during 1915, ahead of the British 
Government‟s utilisation of the technology.85 
Connections to the Italian market were obviously important to the 
company, but Firth also attempted to sell its projectile technology and 
productive expertise in other overseas markets before the Great War, with less 
success. In 1907, Hoyle endeavoured to gain an order for AP projectiles in 
Japan in 1907, but the order was lost to Hadfields.86 In 1911 Firth received 
enquiries from a Hungarian company regarding licensing their process of 
projectile manufacture, which proceeded no further.87 A suggestion was also put 
forward at the end of 1913 by Major Strange regarding a proposal to form an 
Ordnance Company for the Balkan States, which also did not come to fruition.88 
Firth had also explored a „worldwide arrangement on projectile matters‟ with 
Hadfields at the suggestion of Robert Abbott Hadfield in 1911, but no further 
negotiations took place.89 With each case Firth were searching for further ways 
to financially benefit from their commitment to armaments research, in addition 
to their lucrative orders from the Italian Government. The negotiations for 
foreign orders were difficult and yielded little success with new customers, but 
when important connections were made these could continue to pay dividends, 
as Hadfields also found with their business in Japan.  
Hadfields, who had also experienced difficulties in dealing with a 
monopsonist buyer between 1907 and 1911, knew they also could no longer 
rely on the Government for sufficient orders to maintain projectile production 
and retain their skilled labour force. Following the collapse of Army orders, as a 
means of supplementing the firm‟s work for the Navy and to keep their 
productive facilities working, from 1908 Robert Hadfield began actively seeking 
foreign orders for his projectiles. The company had produced projectiles for the 
United States government in the 1890s, and foreign orders had been placed 
from 1904 onwards, but these had mostly been small orders. By 1912, 
Hadfields‟ list of international customers included the United States 
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Government, Japan, Italy, France, Russia, Spain, the Argentine Republic, Chile 
and Brazil.90 Despite this impressive list of customers, lucrative orders were not 
regularly received from foreign governments, with some customers only placing 
one order with the company. For instance, the Spanish Government ordered 
1,000 armour piercing projectiles between 1904 and 1906 totalling over £9,000, 
with no further orders placed.91 The Italian Government ordered a total of 32 
Heclon and Eron shells in 1906 worth £372,92 and the French Government 
ordered in 1912 just 10 six inch Heclon projectiles valued at £70.93 Not all 
orders were for the most technologically advanced shells either; the Argentine 
Navy ordered 11,100 practice shells between 1909 and 1912, worth around £1 
per shell,94 and the Greek Government ordered 600 larger calibre practice 
projectiles in 1914 worth £1,649.95 This impressive list of international 
customers for projectiles and war materials, in conjunction with being a supplier 
for the British Government, were important selling points for the majority of 
these products in new foreign markets. In many of Hadfields‟ overseas markets 
the company recorded only small and irregular orders, but in the lucrative 
American and Japanese markets the company could command more profitable 
and regular sales for its products. Of key importance here were the US Navy 
and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) requirements after 1909, detailed in Table 
4.4.  
In July 1911 Hadfield welcomed Admiral Togo and representatives of the 
Japanese Government for a tour of the East Hecla Works, and in the same year 
he also personally negotiated contracts with US Army and Navy.96 Rather than 
utilise overseas agents or instruct his directors to travel across the Atlantic to 
deal with these orders, Hadfield wanted to receive the adulation for his 
achievements first hand. Not only could he show off his projectiles, he would be 
able to personally negotiate the contracts and as a result take pleasure in the 
esteem associated with signing such an order with the US Government. The US 
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Army and Navy ordered their first Heclon AP shells in 1909, a total of just 41 
between the two services for testing and evaluation.97 The first major order, 
negotiated personally by Hadfield in the US, came in 1911 for 100 14 inch 
Heclon AP shells, worth just over £9,000 for the US Army, followed in 1912 by 
an order for 500 12 inch Heclon AP shells for the US Navy, worth £19,000.98  
 
Table 4.4: Hadfields’ Foreign Projectile Orders 1909-August 1914 
Customer Total Order Value 
Imperial Japanese Navy £476,146 
United States Government £34,90399 
British Army £31,291 
Argentine Navy £10,786 
Greek Government £1,649 
French Navy £70 
Source: SA, Hadfields Projectile Orders No.1, Volume 151, and Hadfields Projectile Order No.2, 
Volume 152. 
 
In comparison to the US Government, the IJN would place far more 
extensive orders. After their initial order in 1909 for 800 12 inch and 800 10 inch 
Heclon AP shells worth £40,000, the IJN continued to order from Hadfields year 
on year with a string of lucrative orders, shown in Table 4.5. These orders were 
predominantly for the Heclon AP projectile, supplemented with the Eron after 
the IJN introduced the projectile in 1912. After two years of successful orders, in 
1911 Hadfields and the IJN entered into an agreement which, in contrast to their 
agreements with the British Government, promised a minimum order value over 
the course of the following four years. The Japanese agreement promised 
Hadfields orders for projectiles valued at £320,000 over four years from March 
1911, with the added clause that both orders and deliveries totalled £75,000 to 
£85,000 per year. Additionally, the agreement only covered the Heclon and 
Eron projectiles.100 The contract was a much more stable one than those with 
the British Government, whose promise of a proportion of orders could result in 
few being placed in time of slack demand, as Hadfields had found in the years 
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since their agreement had been signed with the Admiralty and War Office in 
1905. Through this agreement Hadfield had secured his own „irreducible 
minimum‟, albeit from a foreign government, which ensured that the Hecla 
Works and workmen would be kept active at a minimum level for the following 
four years, independent of orders from the British Government. As a result of 
this series of large orders, by the time of the Great War the IJN had become a 
larger customer for Hadfields than the British Army.  
 
Table 4.5: Hadfields’ Imperial Japanese 
Navy Orders 1909-August 1914 
Year Total Orders 
Received 
1909 £40,000 
1910 £62,191 
1911 £87,274 
1912 £114,153 
1913 £79,664 
1914 (To August) £92,864 
Source: SA, Hadfields Projectile Orders No.1, Volume 151, and Hadfields Projectile Order No.2, 
Volume 152. 
 
 The Ottoman Empire was also considered a potential major customer for 
Hadfields from 1913. Their first order had come via Armstrong, who in 
collaboration with Vickers had been tasked with equipping the Ottoman 
battleship Reshadieh, which was nearing completion at Vickers‟ Barrow 
shipyard. The order was for 650 13.5 inch Heclon AP shells, worth £45,000. 
This was followed by an order to Hadfields direct from the Ottoman Empire in 
April 1914 for 2,353 projectiles worth £39,700 to equip another naval ship.101 
Due to the outbreak of the Great War, only the initial order would be fulfilled with 
no work undertaken on the latter.102 Had the second order been fulfilled, and 
followed by further orders, then the Ottoman Government could have been 
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second to the Imperial Japanese Navy of Hadfields‟ most lucrative foreign 
customers.  
 By the outbreak of the Great War, Hadfields were making substantial 
returns on their investment in developing projectile technologies, and had been 
for the prior four years. Through agreements with the British Navy and IJN, 
along with their extensive list of overseas customers, the company had become 
perhaps the most prominent supplier of projectiles anywhere in the world. 
 
Conclusion: The Sheffield Armaments Industry in 1914 
The defensive measures Brown, Cammell, Firth and Hadfields engaged in were 
a common factor of the Sheffield armaments industry before the Great War, as 
each attempted to counter the uncertainty of British Government demand for 
their core armaments products. The establishment of the COW and its inter-
company management structure created a network of directors and productive 
capabilities, and facilitated the sharing of knowledge and risks related to 
technology. The Coventry network also provided an opportunity for the 
companies involved to engage in the international armaments market as a 
group, though with limited reward. The only successful, though strained, 
collaborative arrangement in the international market was that of Brown with 
Vickers and Armstrong. Elsewhere, each armament company individually 
looked at the international market as a lucrative outlet for their products, and as 
a means of countering inconsistent Government demands. However, selling 
armaments to foreign governments proved as difficult as selling in their home 
market, with no guarantee of success. Individually, the projectile manufacturers 
fared better than their armour producing counterparts. Firth had managed to 
capture the Italian market, though Hadfield‟s relationship with the Imperial 
Japanese Navy was the most secure armaments supply arrangement made by 
any company before the Great War.  
These collaborative and international activities were part of a vast web of 
arrangements made by the Sheffield armaments industry by the outbreak of the 
Great War. All of these technological, business and international arrangements 
are show as they existed in 1914 in Figure 4.2. When hostilities began, the 
Sheffield armaments industry was at its zenith. As Tweedale has rightly 
highlighted, „On the eve of the First World War, the leading European arms 
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makers…had largely been surpassed by Sheffield.‟103 The complex and 
overlapping arrangements developed by the participants since 1900 had made 
Sheffield the world centre of armaments and metallurgical developments. 
Additionally, it was one of the most important areas of projectile and armour 
production, supplying British and foreign governments. On the eve of War, 
Sheffield was undoubtedly the „Arsenal of the World.‟ However, the Great War 
affected the nature of the armaments industry, especially with regards to the 
development and protection of the technology involved. This change and its 
repercussions through to the end of the 1920s, including the emergence of the 
special steel industry in Sheffield, are explored in the following chapter. 
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Figure 4.2: The Sheffield Armaments Industry in 1914 
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Chapter 5: Technological Development in War and Peace 1914-1930 
 
Before 1914, the armaments industry‟s output was primarily focused on 
supplying the British Admiralty as part of a vast naval-industrial complex, the 
paradox being that the Great War would be dominated by supplying the Army 
as part of a European land war.1 Even with the need for increased volumes of 
war material and a change in procurement strategy following the formation of 
the Ministry of Munitions in 1915, the armaments companies remained 
defensive of their position as custodians of the knowledge they had developed 
and financially invested in. Examining the development of armaments 
technology during the Great War and the 1920s, this chapter will examine three 
key areas. Firstly, there will be an exploration of the technological activities of 
the armament companies during the Great War. This will focus on three areas 
of investigation; the expansion of productive capabilities and the creation of a 
collaborative network for utilising the machinery available to them; the albeit 
reluctant collaborations with local manufacturers and the training provided in the 
production of shells; and finally the innovative developments made with 
armaments technology in wartime. Each of these will be considered as a new 
form of defensive mechanism, different to those implemented prior to the Great 
War. The new defensive measures executed during the conflict were a means 
of protecting each company‟s status as an armaments producer in a period of 
unparalleled demand and general industrial mobilisation. The second section of 
the chapter will explore the development of AP projectiles following the Battle of 
Jutland, and the research arrangements made between Firth and Hadfields in 
seeking progressively more practical than metallurgical solutions. Finally, the 
chapter will consider the evolving relationship between armaments development 
and metallurgy during and after the Great War, and the rise of the alloy steel 
industry in Sheffield.  
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Armaments Technology and the Great War: Production, Training and 
Innovation 
The Great War by 1915 was a „war of machinery‟, requiring the mobilisation of 
vast amounts of British industrial capacity for munitions production to supply an 
ever increasing demand for artillery shell.2 As the British Army grew from 30 
divisions in August 1914 to 70 by the summer of 1915, the Government‟s 
solution was to „simply increase the volume of its contracts, reproducing the 
„unruly torrent‟ of orders that had crashed down on the private armouries in 
1899.‟3 On 17 September 1914 alone Hadfields received 20 separate orders for 
106,000 shells and projectiles.4 The Boer War had demonstrated that „the 
private armourers tended to produce both extravagant promises and inadequate 
deliveries early in the war and then to improve their performance as it 
progressed.‟5 This was certainly the case as projectile manufacturers in 
Sheffield took on orders far beyond their productive capabilities from August 
1914. For their part, the private manufacturers operated under the notion of 
„business as usual‟ and failed to anticipate the scale of the conflict to come.6 
Before the War, the armaments manufacturers had acted defensively in order to 
protect their status in the industry, and to secure international customers as 
orders from the British services were not sufficient to keep their plant running. 
As orders flooded in they had a new and unknown issue; what to do with too 
many orders. By mid-1915 with the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions 
and a change in procurement strategies, the armourers again acted defensively 
to maintain their position as the core of the industry and as the technological 
custodians of the industry once peace came.  
As demand outstripped capacity, the projectile manufactures frantically 
increased their productive capabilities. Firth began to expand their shell 
capacity from September 1914, and by December had been asked to modify 
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their Tinsley Works for the manufacture of shell for Army requirements.7 Three 
shell plants were installed, for 5 inch, 7.5 inch and 9.2 inch high explosive 
projectiles.8 New machinery was also installed at the Gun Works in early 1915 
for 60 pounder and 8 inch high explosive shell for the Army, and 6 inch high 
explosive shell for the Admiralty.9 Cammell over the course of the war 
expanded their shell shops from 30,000 to 200,000 square feet of floor space, 
and increased their workforce from 160 to over 3,000.10 By September 1915 
Hadfields had installed new plant for the production of 9.2 inch, 4.5 inch, 60 
pounder and 18 pounder high explosive shells for the Army, 15 inch and 9.2 
inch high explosive and 6 pounder anti-aircraft shell for the Navy, and expanded 
their AP projectile plant.11 The War also provided an opportunity to further profit 
from projectile technology. In September 1914 Firth licensed their hollow cap 
patents to Vickers in return for small royalties and the condition that all caps 
were stamped „Firths Patent‟.12 The same technology was licensed to the Italian 
Breda Company in December 1914, requiring two payments of £2,000 to be 
paid in addition to royalties.13 Hostilities failed to change the core aspect of 
international technological exchange in the armaments industry.  
Despite expanding production, Admiralty and War Office targets failed to 
be met. By May 1915 Hadfields had delivered 20,000 shells out of 32,000 
promised, a shortfall of 27 percent. Firth, even with their expanded capacity, 
faired even worse. The company had delivered 17,450 out of 71,300 promised 
by May 1915, a little over a quarter of the total.14 These figures would be a 
prelude to the Shell Crisis in the spring of 1915 and the formation of the Ministry 
of Munitions, whose principal aim would be to utilise the whole of Britain‟s 
industrial capacity for the production of the full range of supplies for the British 
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Army.15 Against this backdrop, the armaments companies in Britain collaborated 
with the Ministry where possible, but were acutely aware of the need to defend 
their position as armaments manufacturers and the skills and knowledge they 
had developed before the War. The three projectile manufacturers all undertook 
the running of National Projectile Factories from late 1915, Cammell 
establishing a works at Nottingham, Firth at Templeborough, and Hadfields 
within the East Hecla Works in Sheffield, all of which drew on newly mobilised 
female labour.16 Robert Abbott Hadfield, while accommodating, requested the 
Government keep a distance from their developments, asking in October 1915 
that „may we beg that as little red-tape and routine work be imposed upon us as 
possible‟ and stating to the Ministry of Munitions that:  
Both I and Mr Jack have trained up our people in our own way, and we 
venture to think the results have not been unsatisfactory for the Army 
and Navy Services. To interfere with us at the present time is surely not a 
good policy. We will give you what you want, that is an immense supply 
of shell, only do not let us be worried too much. Our past records show 
what we have accomplished.17  
It was a simple message; Hadfield and his company would co-operate, so long 
as interference from the government was avoided. They were the experts in the 
field, not the Ministry of Munitions. In this regard the Ministry would benefit from 
the „development work of the experts within the private armaments firms.‟18  
 As Hadfields, Firth and Cammell all increased production of shells, a 
product which they were all familiar with, Brown diversified into projectile 
manufacture for the first time by utilising their productive facilities in a more 
                                            
15
 On the Ministry of Munitions, see R.J.Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the 
Ministry of Munitions 1915-1916 (London, Cassell, 1978); C. Wrigley, „The Ministry of Munitions: 
an Innovatory Department‟ in K. Burk, War and the State: The Transformation of British 
Government, 1914-1919 (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982); R. Lloyd-Jones and M.J. 
Lewis, Arming the Western Front: War, Business and the State in Britain 1900-1920  (London, 
Routledge, 2016); and the 12 volume Official History of the Ministry of Munitions. 
16
 S. Pollard, A History of Labour in Sheffield (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1959), 
p.271. Female workers were introduced to armaments work in Sheffield under the „Shells and 
Fuzes‟ agreement of 4 March 1915 which permitted women and youths work on repetitive jobs 
and to substitute some men on semi-skilled jobs. On the origins of the National Projectile 
Factory scheme, see R.J.Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of 
Munitions 1915-1916 (London, Cassell, 1978), pp.68-9.  
17
 TNA, MUN 4/83, Sir Robert Abbott Hadfield to Sir Frederick Black, 8 October 1915. Emphasis 
in original document.  
18
 Adams, Arms and the Wizard, p.148. 
 173 
dynamic way.19 Production commenced with an order for 2,000 15 inch howitzer 
shells for the Coventry Ordnance Works in September 1914. The order had 
initially been placed with Firth, who could not accommodate it due to increased 
demand from the War Office.20 During the same month, Brown had explored 
using the same facilities for producing 12 inch and 15 inch common shell.21 Any 
possible expansion of armaments production was considered, the opinion of 
Brown‟s Works Committee being that „the Company should hold itself at the 
service of the Government, providing satisfactory financial terms were 
arranged.‟22 One enquiry received in late 1914 from the War Office asked 
Brown to begin production of high explosive shell. While considered desirable 
by Brown‟s directors, the estimated £100,000 required for establishing a shell 
shop meant the scheme was ultimately rejected, another productive option 
proving more suitable and less financially draining.23  
 Shortly after the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions, Bernard Firth 
highlighted to his fellow Brown‟s directors that „the crux of the difficulty in the 
supply of shells would rather be in the supply of suitable steel for shells than in 
the manufacture or machining‟ and strongly suggested that the company would 
be better equipped in this area instead of machining shell.24 Negotiations with 
the Ministry of Munitions commenced in December, and Brown agreed to 
convert their armour plate mill for the production of large shell bars with an 
estimated output of 300 tons per week, the alterations and additions costing 
£15,000.25 Work on converting the works began in November 1915 with 
production beginning six months later for 12 inch and 15 inch shell bars.26 The 
bars were supplied to four companies for shell manufacture; Walter Somers and 
Co Ltd near Birmingham, the Darlington Forge Co, the Earl of Dudley‟s works, 
and to Hadfields who specialised in producing 15 inch high explosive shell.27 
The conversion caused issues for Brown when new armour orders were placed 
in August 1916. Their entire Siemens furnace output was for the production of 
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shell steel, and problems were foreseen in reducing the output with the Ministry 
of Munitions.28 An arrangement was made with Cammell for them to roll 
Brown‟s armour output should the armour mill be occupied for shell steel.29 
Overall Brown‟s armour mill produced 18,381 tons of shell bars between May 
1916 and June 1917, after which the mill was converted back to armour 
production.30 With shell steel still in demand, a second conversion was agreed 
in November 1917 and completed six months later.31 Production restarted in 
July 1918 for six months, producing a further 4,034 tons of shell bars, after 
which the plant was converted permanently to its original purpose.32 The record 
of Brown‟s expansion during the war highlights that, despite being 
predominantly used for the production of armour, some of the plant installed at 
armourers‟ works could be utilised for other armaments output. However, the 
vast demands for shell steel were unique to wartime production as in peacetime 
the projectile manufacturers were able to supply all the steel required from their 
own works.  
 As has been demonstrated, in addition to extending their own 
manufacturing capabilities and exploring new product areas, the Sheffield 
armaments manufacturers utilised a network of facilities in order to fully exploit 
their productive capabilities. This collusive action was a defensive manoeuvre in 
order to avoid new entrants to the industry, and blurred the boundaries between 
those involved.33 With the small number of companies in the Sheffield 
armaments industry, it can be described as a „capsule‟ network, one which is 
„relatively small in membership, self-contained and impermeable.‟34 The sharing 
of technological knowledge among the Sheffield armourers in the years prior to 
the Great War created a high-trust network through the licensing and business 
connections developed. Popp and Wilson have suggested that such high-trust 
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networking „could shade into collusive behaviours.‟35 While this was the case 
from the examples presented, the armament companies were also involved in 
expanding the capabilities for munitions production with other companies in 
Sheffield and further afield.  
 In May 1915 the Ministry of Munitions was created and with it the 
establishment of local munitions committees. Consequently the Sheffield 
Committee on Munitions of War (SCMW) was formed which sought the 
armaments companies‟ advice on which of their sub-contractors they could 
approach to expand the local production of shells.36 Sub-contracting was 
common in the armaments industry and by the end of 1914 Cammell had 
entrusted the Sheffield Simplex Motor Works with the production of finished 12 
and 14 pound shell, and 2.75 inch shrapnel shell.37 The order was placed with 
the company in September 1914, with the first deliveries expected at the end of 
the month. When no deliveries were made by November, the experiment was 
deemed a failure and the shells were finished at Cammell‟s own works.38 By 
July 1915, for shell work Firth were sub-contracting with three companies for 
steel, two for punching and drawing steel, 17 for machining, eight for copper 
bands and tubes, five for nose bushes, and 13 for shrapnel components.39 After 
an initial meeting between the SCMW and representatives of Brown, Cammell, 
Firth, Hadfields and Vickers in June 1915, by July the armourers were looking to 
protect their own interests and refused to divulge any information. Augustus 
Clerke, representing Hadfields at the meeting, suggested that „the practical 
demonstration of the manufacture of shells and the rapid training of unskilled 
labour to be drafted into the shops of the armament firms‟ was the best course 
of action.40 The two sides had reached an impasse, the armourers looking to 
protect their interests and keep their technical information secret, and the 
SCMW not willing to be subservient to the established companies. After further 
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negotiations, training was ultimately provided by the armourers to assist firms 
who had not previously manufactured shell. At Cammell, their training scheme 
was focused on providing guidance and instruction to their own sub-contractors 
who had not produced shell before.41 Hadfields were involved with the training 
of a large number of companies in the production of high explosive shell, and by 
March 1918 the list included 58 „competitive engineering firms‟, of which 9 were 
in Sheffield, and included Somers Co and the Darlington Forge Co which 
received Brown‟s shell bars; 6 „projectile manufacturers‟ in Beardmore, 
Cammell, Firth, Harper Bean and Co of Dudley, and Vickers at Barrow and 
Sheffield; 13 corporation munitions committees, including the one established in 
Sheffield; 13 national projectile factories; and a further 7 companies and 
departments in the US, France, Russia and Australia.42 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
was keen to demonstrate how his company was assisting the war effort, and in 
October 1915 wrote to the Ministry of Munitions about their training program:  
Vickers consider they know a good deal about armaments production, 
but they came down specially to see our works and methods, and are, 
we understand, adopting our ideas. Sir Vincent Calliard [of Vickers] 
himself saw and wrote me, and although in ordinary times we should not 
of course have agreed to show our improvements to competitors, in this 
time of war and stress we are only too glad to do anything we can to help 
the nation.43 
The sharing of Hadfields‟ „improvements‟ continued throughout the War. In early 
1915 Hadfield with A.G.M. Jack introduced their „Patent Blank‟ method of shell 
production. This was a relatively simple process and involved the casting of a 
shell „blank‟ into an ingot, before being pressed to shape ready for machining 
into a finished shell. By producing shells in this way, any need for hammering, 
rolling or forging was eliminated, avoiding unnecessary and time consuming 
additional stages in shell production. In wartime, projectile companies were 
looking for any means of simplifying the manufacture of shell to keep up with 
demand. Hadfields used this method of production for high explosive shells 
from 6 to 15 inch in size, and claimed to have obtained a saving for the 
Government of around £400,000 by installing the method of production at 
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Hadfields and their National Projectile Factory in Tinsley.44 The patent and 
method were also licensed, free of charge, to the Ministry of Munitions in 1916, 
with the Ministry commending the „patriotic spirit‟ in which the offer was made.45  
As part of their training program, Hadfields also taught Beardmore of 
Glasgow, Taylor Brothers and Co of Manchester, and Vickers in Sheffield and 
Barrow on casting blanks, in addition to Schneider in France and Tochinesky of 
Russia.46 Hadfield also refined the process of producing high explosive shells 
with a new heat treatment and the addition of 2% nickel and 2% chromium to 
the steel to be used.47 This was the same composition used in the production of 
the original Heclon AP projectile in 1904, and demonstrates how the 
metallurgical techniques developed at Hadfields could be adapted for new 
purposes. When Hadfields‟ National Projectile Factory ceased production of 
shells in early 1918 and moved onto the repair and manufacture of howitzer 
guns, the patent blank method was modified to produce gun barrels, again 
without the need for hammering, rolling or forging. The patent for the new gun 
manufacture technique suggested that the method „…enabled engineering 
works unprovided [sic] with plant of the kind referred to, to be quickly adapted 
for the manufacture of such gun tubes, features of great practical and national 
importance under present war conditions.‟48 Through their training program, 
Patent Blank innovation and further developments with high explosive shell and 
gun barrels, Hadfield was effectively protecting his company‟s investment in 
armaments technology from before and during the War. Furthermore, their 
provision of training to other companies provided Hadfield with a means of 
emphasising and controlling their contribution to the War effort. Much like the 
use of the „Hadfield System‟ of AP projectile production before the Great War, 
training provided Hadfields with a means of controlling their knowledge leaving 
the firm, and principally stifling the possibility of a new competitor entering the 
market. The Great War showed above all else that the production of high 
explosive shell extended to a wider range of companies than just the 
armaments manufacturers, while the production of armour piercing projectiles 
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remained „one of the most exacting and difficult metallurgical feats.‟49 Hadfields, 
along with Firth, Cammell and Brown, all positioned themselves to remain key 
elements of the British armaments industry for supply to the Admiralty once 
peace arrived. They were keenly aware of the need to position themselves to 
meet the challenges of the post-War competitive environment.  
Hadfield‟s metallurgical knowledge influenced other aspects of innovation 
at the company during the Great War. Use was found for Hadfield‟s „Era‟ 
manganese steel in helmets and body armour for soldiers. Spurred on by the 
use of his material, Hadfield turned his inventive mind to refining their designs. 
His first development involved creating an improved means of adjusting the 
fitting of the helmet for the wearer.50 The second involved an improved means 
of manufacturing manganese steel sheets for conversion into helmets or body 
armour, and involved casting the material into „perfectly sound ingots.‟51 From 
1916 to August 1918, Hadfields produced over 1,500 tons of „Era‟ Manganese 
steel for helmets and body armour.52 The use of steel helmets was a „retro-
innovation‟, an older piece of protection from the history of warfare updated for 
the modern soldier, though „a process of innovation was also occurring in terms 
of how it was manufactured and in its physical and chemical make-up‟ to make 
it appropriate to warfare on the Western Front.53 Innovation also occurred with 
other armaments technology at the company. In 1917 Hadfield experimented 
with the use of armour piercing projectile technology with the manufacture of 
bullets,54 and also explored the production of bullet proof steel, using an alloy 
composed of 0.7 to 2% silicon, 1.5 to 3% chromium and 2.5 to 5.5% nickel. 
Utilising the metallurgical knowledge created during the previous decade, 
Hadfield claimed that the material could withstand armour piercing projectiles 
and bullets.55 Elsewhere, other armament companies were utilising their prior 
research and knowledge to respond to the practical issues of using their 
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products in wartime. At Firth the research team of James Rossiter Hoyle and 
Harry Bland Strang (who reverted from Strange to the traditional Scottish 
spelling of his surname during the War) continued to explore the development 
of specialised projectile fuzes. In 1916 they patented two new designs, one 
capable of detonation after hitting the fabric of an aeroplane or water, an 
updated design based on their previous work.56 The development of these two 
fuzes was directly related to feedback from the experiences of soldiers using 
them, and older designs were not working as efficiently as expected. Another 
new area of manufacture from 1915 was material for the production of tanks. In 
Sheffield, Vickers, Cammell and Edgar Allen were all involved with the 
manufacture of tank armour, and Hadfields supplied caterpillar tracks for the 
new fighting machines.57 
 Armour technology was also advanced during the War, and Captain 
Tolmie John Tresidder at Brown produced an updated treatment for carburising 
the face of an armour plate in order to avoid altering the composition of the 
steel.58 In 1916 at Brown vanadium was introduced into alloy steels for shield 
roof plates, and remained in use for armour production at the company into the 
1920s.59 However, it was in the continued development of practical solutions to 
defeat capped AP projectiles which Tresidder had his greatest success. 
Tresidder was well aware that even by 1917 guns still held a „superiority of 
attack over defence.‟ The inability of armour to withstand the impact of shell was 
„largely due to the protection conferred upon the point of the shell by the cap 
attached to it for that purpose, and all attempts hitherto made to cause the cap 
to function prematurely by placing plates, or the like, in front of the armour have 
failed.‟60  
Building on his previous work in this area, Tresidder developed a 
„Decapping Device‟ which involved building a mesh net consisting of wire, rods 
or strips over a ship‟s armour to prevent the cap of an AP projectile enabling the 
perforation of the armour plate (See Figure 5.1).61 A second design was also 
                                            
56
 British Patent 124,826/1916, 126,048/1916. 
57
 J. Singleton, „The Tank Producers: British Mechanical Engineering in the Great War‟, Journal 
of Industrial History, Vol.1, No.1 (1998), pp.92-3. 
58
 British Patent 3,423/1915. 
59
 SA, X308/1/2/1/3/12, Brown‟s Managing Directors Report 30 August 1916.  
60
 British Patent 127,660/1917, pp.1-2. 
61
 British Patent 127,660/1917, p.2. 
 180 
introduced to protect the roofs of gun turrets on ships from attack.62 Tresidder‟s 
Decapping Device entered production in mid-1918 after successful trials and an 
order for the device to be fitted to all of the Royal Navy Grand Fleet‟s capital 
ships was recorded from the Admiralty.63 Manufacture took place in Sheffield at 
Brown‟s Atlas Works, while the device was fitted to ships docked for overhaul at 
the Coventry Ordnance Works‟ Scotstoun Works in Glasgow.64 Such was the 
urgent requirement from the British Admiralty for Decapping Devices, and with a 
shortage of labour at Brown, their managing director William Ellis approached 
James McNeill Allan of Cammell for the assistance of „a few gangs of fitters‟ to 
assist, which Allan was „pleased to supply.‟65 The production of the Decapping 
Device once again demonstrates the collaborative nature of armaments 
companies‟ relationships during the War, as each was open to assisting their 
fellow armaments companies when required. In all of these cases innovation 
occurred in response to practical wartime use of the armaments companies 
products. These designs and improvements were built on knowledge and 
research developed prior to the war, and in each case demonstrates the path-
dependent evolution of armaments, using incremental improvements and sub-
innovations to refine their performance.66 
During the Great War the armaments companies sought to protect their 
own interests and capabilities in a collusive manner. Through three main areas 
of development, expanding their capabilities and the establishment of a 
productive network, collaboration and education of other companies and 
through experimentation and innovation they acted in a defensive manner and 
sought to maintain their position as the key armaments companies in Britain 
once the war was over. This was predominantly facilitated by building on the 
links the company‟s had built up in the decade before the War began. However, 
in one area more innovation and collaboration took place; the development of 
armour piercing projectiles for oblique attack.  
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Figure 5.1: Example of Tresidder‟s Decapping Device, taken from US Patent 1,385,987, 
identical to the British Patent. 
 
The Lessons of Jutland: Armour Piercing Projectile Developments 1916-
1930 
The Battle of Jutland, from 31 May to 1 June 1916, was the largest encounter 
between surface ships of modern times.67 The Royal Navy‟s Grand Fleet, under 
the command of Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, had 151 ships at its 
disposal, including 28 dreadnoughts and nine battle cruisers. In contrast, the 
German High Seas Fleet, commanded by Reinhard Scheer and Franz Hipper, 
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had a total of 99 ships at sea, including 16 dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers, 
and six pre-dreadnought battleships. As submarines played no part in the battle, 
and aircraft only a marginal role, it was principally a one-dimensional combat 
between a combined fleet of 250 surface ships in the North Sea near the 
Jutland peninsular.68 After an initial encounter between the battle cruisers of 
Beatty and a scouting force under the command of Hipper on the afternoon of 
31 May 1916, the full fleet action began in the early evening. After two major 
encounters between the capital ships of Jellicoe and Scheer, the fighting 
continued into the night. By sunrise on 1 June 1916, Scheer and his High Seas 
Fleet had withdrawn to German waters, bringing the battle to an end.69 In total, 
the Grand Fleet lost fourteen ships, including three battle cruisers, along with 
6,768 men killed or wounded. The German High Seas Fleet fared better, 
loosing eleven ships, including one battle cruiser and one pre-dreadnought 
battleship, with 3,058 men killed or wounded. While Scheer and the 
contemporary German press presented the battle as a victory based solely on 
the number of ships sunk and seamen killed or wounded, Massie has 
suggested that superiority remained with the British based on the number of 
ships available after the battle.70 Regardless of outcome, the Battle of Jutland 
highlighted some serious technological flaws with British armour piercing 
projectiles.71 In battle conditions where the angle of impact between the 
projectile and armour varied greatly from the „normal‟ line of attack (a right angle 
to the plate), many of the projectiles fired failed to perforate the armour and 
detonate inside the ship they were launched against.  
The Great War was a laboratory for experimentation in the art of modern 
industrial warfare, and at Jutland it brought home to the Admiralty the deficiency 
in the capability of projectile attack to overcome armour defence. Yet prior to the 
war, at both Hadfields and Firth, the problem of oblique attack had been known 
and largely overcome. Both companies had patented cap designs for oblique 
attack and sold projectiles fitted with the updated caps to foreign governments. 
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Seven years before Jutland, in 1909 Firth had supplied the Russian 
Government with projectiles capable of an attack at 20 degrees to the normal, 
and had sold to the Italian Government in 1915 their latest shell caps for oblique 
attack.72 Hadfields‟ projectiles supplied to the US Navy in 1909 and 1912 were 
also tested for attack at 10 degrees to the normal.73 As Brasseys Naval Annual 
recounted after the War:  
In following the developments of the soft-steel [pre-War] cap, it must 
always be remembered that the British proof conditions called for the 
attack of plates at the normal, with the natural result that both shell and 
cap gradually became specialised instruments for this purpose, and little 
to no encouragement was given to manufacturers [by the Admiralty] to 
progress in knowledge of oblique attack.74 
Jutland was a hard learning curve for the Admiralty, and new AP projectiles 
which could perforate armour at oblique angles were requested soon after. For 
this they were reliant on Hadfields and Firth, undoubtedly two of the most 
advanced projectile manufacturers in the world at the time, to assist in their 
development.  
 The initial focus of research at both companies was to redesign the cap 
and head of the projectile, switching from soft to hardened steel and drawing on 
their metallurgical knowledge. Robert Abbott Hadfield‟s first attempt at a refined 
cap in late 1916 utilised a 4% nickel and 2% chromium steel with a new 
treatment process.75 Firth‟s research team of Harry Bland Strang and James 
Rossiter Hoyle began exploring new head designs for armour piercing 
projectiles in July 1917, with a design incorporating a head more adept at biting 
into the surface of an armour plate at oblique angles. The patent also referred to 
utilising Firth‟s pre-War cap designs in conjunction with the improvement.76 In 
each case, the two companies looked to further develop and improve the 
projectile designs they had been using for over a decade with new sub-
innovations, though progress was slow and working alone did not produce 
adequate results. Closer collaboration between the two companies was 
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suggested, and in September 1917 Hadfields and Firth signed a new 
agreement for the sharing of technological information and resources. The 
arrangement was for a „mutual interchange‟ regarding shells and projectiles „of 
knowledge between the technical officials of the respective staffs [and] the joint 
use of certain of each others shell patents.‟ Firth also gained access to 
Hadfield‟s testing range at the East Hecla Works.77 Terminable on six months 
notice from either side, the agreement was set to last until the end of the War, 
but remained in force until the 1930s. The purpose of the arrangement was 
collusive; by pooling their resources the two companies could potentially find a 
solution to oblique attack sooner than working in isolation. Commenting on a 
similar arrangement between Vickers and Armstrong in 1902 over the sharing of 
knowledge relating to gun mountings, Singleton has suggested that the two 
created a „duopoly in technical competence.‟78 With their agreement, Hadfields 
and Firth created a duopoly of projectile technical competence. As a 
consequence of the new agreement, in 1918 Firth updated their arrangement 
with Harry Bland Strang to pay him 25 per cent of all funds received from 
Hadfields for the use of their patents.79 The management of Firth was clearly 
aware of the importance of Strang to the advancement of the company‟s 
technological reputation, and chose to continually reward him for his 
contribution. 
 Research continued unabated at the two companies into various new 
designs. Hadfield and Alexander Jack in 1918 designed a cap with a series of 
sharp indentations on the surface to bite into the armour.80 At Firth, Strang and 
Hoyle patented two designs which separated the head of the projectile from the 
rest of the body, with the head held in place with one of Firth‟s previous cap 
designs.81 A similar „divided head‟ design was also developed at Hadfields.82 
The sharing of experimental data and collaboration between the two companies 
resulted in a jointly patented cap design, nine months after the signing of their 
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September 1917 agreement.83 It was the only patent ever to be issues jointly by 
two Sheffield armament companies. The cap design utilised an alloy comprised 
of 2-4% nickel and 1.5-3% chromium, treated to provide a hardened point and 
successively softer layers behind it. This „hardened cap‟ design was a departure 
from the pre-War „soft cap‟ designs used for the Heclon and Rendable AP 
projectiles. In the specification the only suggestion for the shape of the cap was 
that they „have a rounded or blunt end portion or head capable of striking a hard 
faced armour plate over a small localised area.‟84 From here the two company‟s 
designs for AP projectile caps diverged, as Firth would design a blunted cap, 
known as the „Knob Cap‟, while Hadfields continued with a „Rounded Cap‟ 
design.  
 Developed alongside these new designs was an updated treatment 
processes for the body of the projectile. In early tests, new caps fitted to old 
projectile bodies proved ineffective, as during oblique perforation the body of 
the projectile was subjected to stresses unknown during normal attack 
conditions which could cause the projectile to crack and fail to detonate.85 
Research into updating the treatment of the body of the projectile had begun in 
1915 at Hadfields, with a method of creating a hardened head portion of the 
projectile, and a progressively softer body.86 This method of treatment 
continued to be researched, and in 1916 a means of toughening the hardened 
projectiles had been devised.87 In steel production, hardening refers to treating 
steel to increase the amount of force which can be exerted upon it, or in the 
case of projectiles it upon armour, without causing the material to distort or 
fracture. Toughness is the amount of strain or force which can be exerted upon 
the material without causing cracks or breakage. With projectiles this invention 
countered the stresses experienced while perforating armour. A final revision of 
the hardening process further treated the projectile head to aid in oblique 
perforation and „bite‟ into the surface of the armour.88 Also developed was an 
extrusion process for shaping the walls and cavity of the shell, derived from 
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Hadfield‟s work with „Patent Banks‟ discussed above.89 Though these 
developments were solely the work of Hadfields, the 1917 agreement meant 
these production methods had to be shared with Firth. As a result, by February 
1918 Firth were operating a shell hardening and tempering plant identical to the 
one at Hadfields.90 Firth benefited from the arrangement with Hadfields far more 
than their research partner, as more technical knowledge and patent rights 
passed from their collaborator than they returned.  
 The result of these developments was a projectile which could perforate 
armour at oblique angles. This swift development was followed by rapid 
production and delivery to the Navy. In early 1917 the Admiralty had ordered all 
older defective shell off ships, yet it was not until April 1918 that sufficient 
numbers of new projectiles began to arrive. Jellicoe claimed that their design 
„certainly doubled‟ the offensive power of the Navy‟s heavy guns. By the end of 
the Great War 12,000 new armour piercing projectiles of 12 inch calibre and 
above had been delivered, though none of them would be fired in wartime.91 
The new projectiles were based on a series of sub-innovations to solve the 
problem of oblique attack, continuing the path-dependent research at both 
Hadfields and Firth. 
 After the Armistice in November 1918 developments with AP projectiles 
continued in Sheffield, as Hadfields and Firth experimented with updating the 
shape of the head of their projectile designs to aid in oblique attack, using a 
measurement derived from the calibre of the shell.92 Hadfields also updated 
their Rounded Cap design to increase their size from 75 percent to 98 percent 
of the calibre of the projectile, as testing had revealed this would aid oblique 
perforation.93 In each case the refinements were related to the optimum size 
and shape of the projectile, rather than metallurgical composition and treatment. 
This suggests that, as had been the case with armour, practical updates and 
observations were required for future development. Elsewhere Cammell, who 
                                            
89
 British Patent 142,148/1918. 
90
 SA, X306/1/2/3/2/169, Firth‟s Directors Meeting Agendas and Papers 26 February 1918; SA, 
Hadfields Box 64, Robert Abbott Hadfield to Major A.B.H. Clerke, 18 February 1924.  
91
 Marder, Dreadnought, p.216. 
92
 SA, X306/1/2/3/2/184, Firth‟s Board Meeting Agendas and Papers 29 April 1919, SA, 
Hadfields Box 53, Draft memorandum on the history of armour piercing projectiles, 16 January 
1934. This design utilised a calibre radius head measurement, which is a curve derived from the 
size of projectile with which it would be utilised. Experiments at Hadfields explored a 1.64 
calibre radius head, Firth a 1.6 calibre radius head, before both settled on a 1.4 calibre radius 
head.  
93
 British Patent 164,056/ 1919, p.3. 
 187 
where not involved in any AP projectile developments, continued producing and 
testing their „Allan‟ cap into 1918, and continued to manufacture Firth‟s Hollow 
Caps.94 In 1920, production of all projectiles ceased at Cammell, their shell 
shops thereafter converted for the production of light forgings.95 Vickers also 
ceased shell production, suggesting that the ease with which civilian producers 
could commence manufacture meant their production was „inappropriate for a 
thoroughbred armaments firm.‟96 By 1920, Firth and Hadfields were the only 
remaining private producers of projectiles in Sheffield. The role of armaments 
companies as suppliers may have become defunct by the end of 1918 due to 
the changing international environment, yet their role as designers of weapons 
continued.97 
 In the 1920s research at the two companies focused on refining the base 
of the projectile. When perforating armour at an oblique angle, the base was 
liable to break, in some cases fracturing the charge chamber and preventing 
detonation. Hadfields‟ first design, an „Annular Base Groove‟ was patented in 
1922.98 Though initially successful with 20 degree attack, the design proved 
ineffective once the testing for oblique attack increased to 30 degrees. A new 
design was developed by Hadfield and Augustus Clerke in 1930 which mounted 
the charge chamber further into the projectile than previous specifications, 
leaving a hollow area in the bottom of the projectile. This was where cracking 
due to oblique attack occurred, without damaging the charge and allowed 
successful detonation.99 Patented as the Hadfield-Clerke „Relief Base‟, the 
design would remain in use until after the Second World War as standard for all 
AP projectiles (see the example in Figure 5.2).100 Firth‟s projectile developments 
also refined the base of the projectile, though the company were blocked from 
taking out a patent for a shell adaptor in 1927, a consequence of a new 
agreement with the Admiralty with strict secrecy stipulations.101 It is likely this 
was not an isolated case, and far more research could have taken place in the 
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1920s with projectile designs than is reflected in the patent record. With 
experimental and testing reports no longer in existence, if they were recorded at 
all, it is impossible to know for sure. When two patents appeared from Strang 
and Firth in 1929, it was their first related to armaments developments since 
1918, and were entirely dedicated to practical solutions to prevent the base of 
the projectile breaking during oblique perforation.102 During the 1920s, research 
and development at both companies took place against a backdrop of declining 
demand for projectiles from the British Government. Much like the technological 
activities of the Sheffield armourers in the Great War, their dedication to 
continuing to develop projectile sub-innovations must be seen as a defensive 
decision in order to maintain their position as technologically advanced 
producers. They needed to be prepared with the most advanced projectile 
design should demand return in the future, as it did in the mid 1930s.  
 By 1930, the AP projectile designs of the two companies represented 
over three decades of dedication to continued technological development and 
refinement. Beginning with two major innovations, cast steel for projectiles at 
Hadfields, forged steel at Firth, both companies developed numerous sub-
innovations which progressively advanced and refined the performance of their 
projectiles, building two distinct, path-dependent bodies of research. Their 
designs and approaches varied, Firth utilising more practical solutions and 
designs in contrast to the predominantly metallurgical solutions favoured by 
Hadfields. In this regard, Robert Abbott Hadfield‟s work with armour piercing 
projectiles reflects a life‟s dedication to their improvement. He consistently 
adapted and developed a design based on a major innovation in response to 
changing Government requirement, drawing extensively from his metallurgical 
knowledge and utilising fellow board member‟s experience when required. 
While Hadfield is rightly remembered as a genius of the Sheffield steel industry, 
his work with projectiles is predominantly overlooked.103 In this field, though an 
adjunct of his metallurgical research, he should equally be regarded as a 
genius.  
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Figure 5.2: Hadfields‟ Advert from 1934, showing the relief base design. Taken from „Note on 
the New Armour Piercing Projectile‟, reprinted from Brassey‟s Naval and Shipping Annual 1934. 
  
Overall, the development of AP projectiles during and after the Great 
War highlights that the application of metallurgical knowledge ceased to provide 
any further improvements after 1918. Solely practical solutions were required to 
refine the performance of projectiles, and in turn no information would be 
provided for exploitation in civilian metallurgical developments. Nevertheless, 
for around two decades from the late 1890s to 1918, armaments technology 
and metallurgy developed and matured in tandem; armaments an industry 
which had the potential to benefit from alloy steel development, treatment and 
production techniques, metallurgy in need of an industry where systematic 
research and development would serve to advance the field beyond the 
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activities of enthusiastic individuals such as Hadfield. At the end of the Great 
War, the potential for utilising alloy steels in a wide range of applications had 
been realised. For the civilian metallurgist after the War, the spin-off from the 
development of armaments was a vast knowledge base of research into the 
application of various elements to alloy steels, treatments and productive 
techniques. As the two industries research trajectories began to take different 
paths, the metallurgical information available was ripe for exploitation.  
 
Armaments and Metallurgical Developments 1914-30 
In 1914 it was acknowledged that some of the finest achievements in metallurgy 
in the 50 years prior had been initiated by the development of the battleship.104 
This was reiterated in 1925 when Hadfield discussed the development of alloy 
steels in his book Metallurgy and its Influence on Modern Progress:  
Just as modern civilisation could not be carried on without the use of 
alloy steels, so warfare could not be conducted without them in the 
scientific manner and on the gigantic scale with which we are unhappily 
too familiar. War, with all its attendant horrors, is not to be counted 
amongst the blessings of civilisation; but in this instance, at any rate, 
some good has been derived from evil, because the development of alloy 
steels for the purposes of peace has been largely assisted by their 
application to war material.105 
The work of the Sheffield armaments industry stood at the centre of this 
advance, their work on armour and AP projectiles contributing exponentially to 
the pool of information developed on the effect of various elements in alloy 
steels, treatments and production techniques available to the industry. As 
Sayers has suggested, „it is difficult to overestimate the importance, to the 
whole metallurgical field, of the work done by a handful of men in the private 
research establishments of the Sheffield steelmakers.‟106 Tweedale has also 
suggested that „the First World War saw no interruption in the development of 
the practical application of scientific techniques. Indeed, it accelerated it. Not 
coincidentally, many of the most scientifically advanced steelmaking firms, both 
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in Sheffield and abroad, were armaments producers.‟107 Advances in the 
application of science, the erosion of rule of thumb methods, and the expanding 
use of alloy steels in the Sheffield steel industry was principally advanced by 
private armaments companies, most of whom were not averse to reminding the 
world of their contributions, their annual meetings used for social reporting. 
Brown‟s chairman Baron Aberconway said in 1915 that if anyone examined „the 
development of all naval and military appliances during the last 50 years they 
would find that a large proportion had been due to the skill and enterprise and 
the inventive capacity of private firms,‟ before highlighting that: 
Developments and improvements in high-class steel, in armour-plate, 
and in marine engineering in all its branches…were nearly all based on 
metallurgical discoveries, and the patient investigation and experiment by 
which the country benefited had been carried on at the expense of such 
firms and their shareholders.108  
Robert Abbott Hadfield, never one to play down his own or his company‟s 
achievements, gleefully told his shareholders in 1915 that „important 
developments which have originated from Hadfields [are] a result of careful and 
painstaking research, and for which world-recognition has been credited to 
us…Remember, my firm does not copy, we originate, and lead the way.‟109 
Hadfield also suggested that, „in the metallurgy of iron and steel Sheffield has 
not the slightest reason to feel she is in any other position than that of leading 
the world in the development of special steels of the highest quality.‟110 This 
lead in special steel development was enabled by armaments research prior to 
the Great War, but was then utilised in the context of an industrial war. These 
developments were part of a long-established continuum between armaments-
based and commercial-based metallurgical developments in Sheffield, the two 
areas consistently influencing developments in each other. 
 The pool of metallurgical knowledge spun-off from armaments 
technological developments included the use of manganese, nickel, chromium, 
tungsten, molybdenum, boron, vanadium, and tantalum, and their effect on the 
performance of alloy steels. This knowledge was utilised by the companies 
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which were part of the armaments-metallurgical-steel innovation system which 
emerged with its centre in Sheffield prior to the Great War.111 Furthermore, 
though impossible to substantiate, some metallurgical knowledge derived from 
armaments undoubtedly spread to the wider Sheffield steel industry, 
communicated through informal networks of metallurgists and professionals 
with links to educational institutions, the University and other social groupings. 
Building on this pool of knowledge, in Sheffield from 1914 the main areas of 
research and development in metallurgy were with heat and stain resisting 
steels. The key elements used in these materials were nickel and chromium, 
not coincidentally the main elements used in Krupp Cemented armour and AP 
projectiles produced by the Sheffield armaments industry. Adding other 
elements to what are known as „nickel-chromium class‟ steels was the basis of 
all the knowledge spun-off from armaments developments, and at the core of 
developing new specialist steels. The use of nickel-chromium steels can be 
seen as a type of common knowledge to the companies in the armaments-
metallurgy-steel innovation system, subsequently increasing their capacity to 
absorb new knowledge related to future developments with versions of the 
material and increasing the likelihood of new metallurgical knowledge to be 
transferred between them.112 No where was this more apparent than in the 
development of stain resisting steels.  
 Following Harry Brearley‟s successful discovery and development of 
stainless steel, Firth received their first orders for the material in February 
1915.113 The same year, Brown, Hadfields, Vickers, Brown Bayley and 
Sanderson Brothers all commenced stainless steel manufacture, all similar in 
composition to that discovered by Brearley in the Sheffield area, making 
patenting the material in Britain impossible.114 Brearley subsequently patented 
stainless steel in the US, the patent application helped by the advice of Robert 
Abbott Hadfield who had a „near-miss‟ with the material when experimenting 
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with nickel and chromium steels in 1892.115 Wartime developments with 
stainless steel were halted when production was restricted to divert chromium 
supplies to the manufacture of munitions in 1917.116 The armistice „permitted 
resumption of the research into the properties of new alloys which had been 
interrupted,‟ ushering in a new era of metallurgical developments in the 
Sheffield area.117 From 1919 onwards, armaments research was no longer the 
driving force behind the discovery of new knowledge related to metallurgy. 
Instead, commercial considerations for specialist steels took precedence in the 
research facilities maintained by all of the armament manufacturers in Sheffield.  
By investigating the patent records of the companies in this study it is 
possible to provide examples of metallurgical knowledge spun-off from 
armaments developments being utilised in alloy steels in the 1920s. At the 
Brown-Firth Research Laboratory work continued with stainless steel under the 
guidance of William Herbert Hatfield, who took over from Brearley during the 
War after a dispute with Firth over the commercial use of the material resulted 
in his resignation. A type of acid resisting steel was patented by Hatfield in 1922 
which contained 18-24% nickel and 2-5% chromium, and claimed to be „very 
suitable for use in the manufacture of pipes, vessels and other apparatus used 
in chemical and industrial engineering and parts of devices which are required 
to be non-corrodible.‟118 Undoubtedly an attempt to re-build pre-War networks, 
in 1923 Firth and Krupp arranged an exchange of their stainless steel 
knowledge and expertise, Brearley‟s original martensitic version of the material 
swapped for Eduard Maurer and Benno Strauss‟ austenitic stainless steel. The 
agreement was clearly formulated on older mentalities related to armaments 
and the use of home markets, with each company agreeing to remain outside of 
the other‟s country while dividing up the rest of the world‟s markets between 
them.119 Building on this new information, in 1924 Hatfield developed 18/8 
stainless steel, using 18% chromium and 8% nickel and marketed as 
„Staybrite‟.120 After the introduction of Staybrite stainless steel in 1923, 
experiments continued at the Brown-Firth Research Laboratory, including 
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adjusting the content of nickel and chromium, and the addition of molybdenum 
and tungsten to develop new stain and heat resisting steels.121 Another version 
of stainless steel came in 1928 from Hatfield which contained 18% nickel, 8% 
chromium and 0.6% tungsten, a material used in armour alloys by Brown from 
the 1890s.122 The use of tungsten in alloy steels was part of the knowledge 
inherited by the Brown-Firth Research Laboratory from its inception, and 
allowed the material to be welded unlike Staybrite steel. During the 1920s 
Hatfield also worked on updated heat treatments for stainless steels in addition 
to developing the material, including one which allowed Staybrite steel to be 
polished.123 Reflecting in 1936, a publication on the Brown-Firth Research 
Laboratory rightly claimed that „the laboratories may justly claim a share in the 
metallurgical developments of the last few decades.‟124 Against this backdrop, 
former armaments experts at Brown and Firth declined in importance with the 
development of new alloy steels. In the 1920s long time armour expert 
Tresidder turned his attention to the development of micrometers and angle 
measuring devices.125 Elsewhere, innovations inspired by armour production 
continued to take place.  
Cammell‟s research in the 1920s focused on developing steel 
carburisation methods similar to those used with KC armour under the guidance 
of James McNeal Allen. The company had experience with several types of 
carburisation, but as their patent highlighted, „it is well known that whichever 
process be adopted very erratic and irregular results…occur too frequently.‟126 
This built on Cammell‟s knowledge of the process, and suggested using a salt 
bath, gasses and other chemicals to carburise steels.127 Intriguingly, the patent 
does not mention the use of the method with armour. In contrast to their 
contemporaries who principally worked on the development of new alloy steels, 
this was an attempt to update a previously un-controllable and somewhat un-
scientific treatment process. Cammell also researched nickel-chromium steels, 
one suggestion including 26-30% nickel and 16-22% chromium, building on 
their knowledge of utilising the two elements in armour steels. The resultant 
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steel combined the two properties most desired in alloy steels of the time, being 
both heat and stain resisting128  
Robert Abbott Hadfield, viewed as the initiator of the „age of alloy steels‟ 
due to his pioneering work with manganese and silicon steels in the 1880s, was 
also active in the development of new alloy steels during the war and into the 
1920s.129 At the 1919 AGM Hadfield drew attention to the special steel products 
originating from work carried out in their research department. In addition to 
Heclon and Eron projectiles and ERA steel armour were ERA manganese steel, 
ERA non-magnetic steel, Hecla NK steel for aeroplanes and automobiles, 
Heclon and Heclon superior high speed steels, Galahad rustless steel 
(Hadfields‟ first stainless steel), and a number of types for permanent magnets 
and electrical work.130 Recounting Hadfields‟ technological capabilities and 
giving an insight into his thoughts on running the company, Hadfield also drew 
attention to the near 400 patents held by him and his directors across the world. 
„In other words…‟ he concluded, „…our profits are made, not merely by the 
handicraft of our Workers, but largely by the brains of the Management.‟131 
Technological advance with alloy steels for any application was central to the 
business strategy adopted by Hadfield.  
The development of Hadfields‟ heat and stain resisting steels in the 
1920s were grouped under the „ERA‟ name used by the company for alloy 
steels since the 1890s. These were profiled by The Engineer in 1926, which 
stressed that „the precise composition of these steels is, obviously, not 
disclosed by the makers, but it may be said that they are based on the nickel-
chromium class.‟132 All patented by Hadfield, the first to appear was ERA ATV 
steel, containing 1.3-8% silicon, 8-40% chromium and 1-10% tungsten, boasting 
heat and stain resisting properties and could be used in internal combustion 
engines.133 This was followed by ERA LN, which claimed to incorporate heat 
and stain resistance „in an enhanced degree‟ with the addition of manganese 
and nickel to the alloy steel‟s silicon, chromium and tungsten content.134 A third 
variation, ERA CR2, improved the ductility and strength of the previous two 
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ERA steels with 2-20% nickel, 5-30% chromium, 1-10% tungsten and the 
addition of up to 5% copper.135 These materials found use with steam and gas 
turbines, and built on the vast pool of knowledge developed by Hadfield from 
metallurgical and armaments experimentation.136 
 
 
Figure 5.3: „Our Motto Is Research‟ Hadfields‟ Advert 1927, Taken from the cover of their 1927 
AGM Report. 
 
In 1927, Hadfield‟s AGM brochure proudly displayed on the cover an 
image stating „Our Motto is Research‟ (See Figure 5.3), and highlighted their 
new ERA HR heat resisting, and ERA CR non-corroding steels. Somewhat 
arrogantly in his speech Hadfield stated that „inventors and discoverers of the 
first rank cannot be made…their genius is born in them and flourishes best 
when free from all restraint.‟137 A year later, Hadfield stated that  
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The value of research is nowhere more clearly evidenced than in the field 
of metallurgy, and nowhere more highly appreciated than in the City of 
Sheffield, aided as it so ably is by the University. The work done by 
[Hadfields] research laboratories, and my colleagues working there, is an 
indication of the importance which we attach to this question, and a 
convincing example of the high level attained by industrial research in 
this City.138 
While the University was an element of the armaments-metallurgy-steel 
innovation system centred on Sheffield before the Great War, as the 1920s 
progressed the system declined. The connections between people and 
institutions disappeared as patent agreements for armour and projectiles across 
the globe lapsed, and armaments-focused metallurgy was replaced by 
metallurgy which focused on peacetime products as the driving force behind 
innovation in the steel industry. The Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate, 
important for continued supplies of nickel to support armaments production 
expelled its German members in 1918, and transitioned to supporting the 
development of special steels.139 Principally the trans-national links in the 
system disappeared, evolving into a more localised innovation system 
connecting people, companies and trade associations linked to special steels in 
the Sheffield area. Armaments remained a part of this, yet their relative 
importance declined across the 1920s.   
While there was a progressive decline in armaments utilising 
metallurgical research and development in the 1920s, the two fields could still 
draw upon each other for their mutual benefit when required. One design for 
armour from Hadfield in 1930 demonstrates this, drawing on his metallurgical 
knowledge dating back to the 1880s. His suggestion for the material 
incorporated 4% or less of manganese, 3% or less of silicon, and 2% or less of 
molybdenum to create a material suitable to defend against rifle bullets or for 
the protection of tanks.140 The patent outline also suggests that molybdenum 
could be replaced with tungsten.141 In this case, as with the others discussed 
here, their development and designs drew upon knowledge spun-off from 
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armaments research prior to the Great War. While the productive value of 
armaments declined throughout the 1920s, with practical developments 
explored and limited spin-off with AP projectiles and armour, the contribution of 
knowledge derived from using metallurgy to advance armaments technology 
assisted in the development of the next generation of special steels in 
Sheffield,. This was part of a continuum between metallurgical research and 
civilian and armaments applications for special steels which stretched back 
decades.  
The limited spin-off from armaments developments in the 1920s has 
been suggested as a consequence of the „follow-on imperative‟ in contrast to a 
longer period of „breakthroughs‟ from the 1890s to the Great War. The criticism 
of follow-on developments in this period is that, while utilising sub-innovations, 
the lessons which can be passed onto the wider industry had diminished, 
leading to innovation solely for the refinement of armaments.142 This is certainly 
the case with armaments and metallurgy as they took two different 
developmental paths. Work with AP projectiles refined their performance in the 
1920s while the wider steel industry built on the pool of metallurgical knowledge 
passed down before the Great War. The next period of breakthroughs in 
armaments came between 1940 and 1965, with the development of jet aircraft, 
radar, atomic weapons, guided missiles, and the introduction of new 
electronics.143 Arguably many of these innovations would have been impossible 
without the use of metallurgical knowledge in the development of alloys for 
specialised purposes, such as for stain and heat resistance. It is also important 
to not overlook the influence new metallurgical developments had on other 
industries outside of steel and armaments, Sayers in particular highlighting 
chemical engineering, the mining industry and the automobile industry.144 This 
is not the limits of uses found for alloy steels in the inter-war years, for the 
railway and power-generating industries use was found for alloy steels in high-
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pressure boilers; for car manufacture heat and stain resisting alloys were used 
to improve the performance of crankshafts, camshafts and valves; and in the 
expanding aviation industry alloys with chromium, nickel and molybdenum were 
used to increase airflow to aircraft engines, and found use in the development 
of the first jet engines. Use was also found in the construction industry, stainless 
steel used for widespread fabrication work.145 Hadfields attempted to diversify 
into car production as an outlet for their special steel capacity, with generally 
negative results.146 In the 1920s, a decade in which breakthroughs with heat 
and stain resisting steels took place in Sheffield, commercial-focused 
metallurgical research replaced armaments-focused metallurgical research as 
the core area of investigation for the laboratories involved, utilising knowledge 
generated from successes and dead-ends explored in armaments 
developments.  
 
Conclusion 
During the Great War, the companies in the Sheffield armaments industry 
developed a number of collaborative defensive measures to maintain their 
position as custodians of the armaments knowledge they had developed in the 
two decades before the conflict. The use of pre-existing connections to develop 
a number of productive relationships, the development of training programs to 
induce further industrial capacity required for munitions, and innovations in 
response to productive issues or practical failures of their products used for 
warfare all served to help the companies remain an important part of the 
industry. Following the Battle of Jutland, the AP projectiles manufactured by 
Hadfields and Firth required further development to perfect their ability to 
perforate armour at an oblique angle. Each company embarked on further 
research, with collaborative developments required to produce a successful 
product. Beyond the War, work continued with limited spin-off of metallurgical 
knowledge, as more practical solutions were required for projectiles for oblique 
attack. Away from armaments, the metallurgical spin-off from research and 
development efforts in the industry resulted in a broad knowledge base which 
was utilised with heat and stain resisting steel experiments, continuing a long 
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established practice of both armaments-based and commercial-based 
developments influencing each other. As the relative importance to the industry 
of armaments declined, so too did the armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation 
system, evolving into one more focused on the special steel industry in the 
Sheffield area. Technological developments remained an important part of the 
industry in the 1920s, even with the decreasing demand for their products in the 
home and international market. The final chapter now turns to an exploration of 
the business and management of armaments during this period. 
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Chapter 6: The Business and Management of Armaments 1914-1930 
 
As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, the individual and combined 
efforts of the armaments companies to protect against the uncertainty of 
government procurement patterns and to maintain their position as custodians 
of the technology involved were key elements of the armaments industry prior to 
and during the Great War. These efforts were predominantly proved effective 
when enacted during times of high demand from both home and overseas 
customers. However, the Great War and its aftermath in the 1920s 
fundamentally changed the nature of the armaments business, rendering most 
of the industry‟s defensive measures inadequate and ineffective. As Hornby has 
suggested, „generally after 1918, it may be said, that with the loss of home and 
overseas demand, the armament industry reached the verge of extinction.‟1 The 
armaments industry had, in the view of Packard, an identity crisis after the 
Great War.2 The armaments producers also suffered a double blow due to a 
tandem decline in the steel industry. As Pollard highlights:  
The iron and steel industry was another of the basic staple trades which 
suffered a decline in exports. Moreover, the war had created a large 
surplus capacity and the post-war boom of 1919-20 burdened it with 
much watered capital, and this hung like a millstone around its neck until 
the re-armament of the late 1930s.3 
Examining the business and management of the armaments industry from the 
Great War to 1930, this chapter will examine three key areas. Firstly, there will 
be an examination of the decline and death of special relationships with the 
Government in this period, and the connections armaments companies had with 
the Admiralty. Secondly, the chapter will explore the declining business of the 
armaments companies during the 1920s, and their limited successes in the 
international market. Finally, an investigation into the changing structure of the 
industry through to 1930, and the managerial stagnation of the companies 
involved.  
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The Death of Special Relationships: Armourers and the British 
Government 1914-1930 
At the commencement of the Great War, there was a general failure of industrial 
mobilisation in Britain due to a reliance on the companies featured on the War 
Office and Admiralty procurement lists.4 In this regard, the special relationships 
of the pre-War period were tested, with disastrous consequences. Adams has 
criticised the supply ministries for a „failure of imagination, an inability to 
conceive of the problem which faced them, outside of the narrow framework of 
tradition and precedent to which they bound themselves.‟5 There was also 
criticism levelled at previous government policy by the companies involved. 
Robert Abbott Hadfield used his company AGM in March 1915 to attack Richard 
Haldane, the former Secretary of State for War, and the lack of capacity to 
produce Army shells. He drew attention to the dismantling of their shrapnel shell 
shop during Haldane‟s tenure which could have been expanded to produce 1 
million rounds per year at the start of the conflict.6 The shell scandal in May of 
the same year led to the formation of the Ministry of Munitions and a change in 
procurement strategy for army materials.7 During the conflict, the Navy retained 
control of their own supplies. The Ministry of Munitions was, in the words of 
David Lloyd-George, a businessman‟s organisation, with many men of „push 
and go‟ recruited from private industry and remaining on their company‟s 
payroll, limiting the control Whitehall had over them.8 From John Brown, 
Charles Ellis „relieved Eric Geddes of responsibility for the provision of guns and 
gun equipment‟ in 1916 and remained with the Ministry until the end of the 
War.9 Major Harry Strange of Firth was also used by the Ministry as Director of 
Gun Ammunition Filling from July 1915 to February 1916.10 Cammell‟s chairman 
William Lionel Hichens visited Canada on behalf of the Ministry of Munitions in 
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late 1915.11 While looking to utilise as much of Britain‟s industrial capacity as 
possible, the specialist armaments producers‟ knowledge and experience was 
still required to assist in training and mobilisation.  
Prices for shells were reconsidered by the Ministry of Munitions in 
December 1915, and several contracts for continuous supply were terminated. 
Investigations at Armstrong, Vickers, Firth, Hadfields and the Projectile 
Company highlighted differences in the prices charged per shell, after which 
standard prices for each product were introduced.12 This standardisation of 
prices coupled with the vast demands for war materials swept away any 
hierarchy of special relationships in the armaments industry, with all capacity 
needed in full production to meet requirements. While important for the most 
highly specialised products, principally armour and armour piercing projectiles, 
private industry was not well equipped to deal with the deluge of orders for 
general shells. In this regard, the special relationships of the pre-War period 
were relied upon too well in the early months of the conflict. Over the next 
decade, the nature of state-armaments industry relations continued to evolve.  
As peace came many orders were cancelled, and in the winter of 1918-
19, large stockpiles of military stores of all kinds were available.13. At Brown, it 
was reported that „we have large numbers of gun forgings and considerable 
weight of shell material cancelled and it is somewhat difficult to find work for 
departments which were handling these orders.‟14 At their shipyards, Brown 
also had contracts for five destroyers cancelled in 1919, their last orders for 
British Navy vessels for a decade.15 At Cammell, one battlecruiser, nine 
submarines, two flotilla leaders and four submarine engines were all cancelled 
at the end of the War. Some of the orders had been in an advanced state of 
construction, and had to be scrapped on their slipways.16 Reflecting on the 
industrial nature of the War in early 1919, The Engineer noted that „The whole 
area of Sheffield and neighbouring works has been one great arsenal 
throughout the war, pouring out day and night almost every kind of munitions 
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required.‟17 Against this backdrop, the relative position of the Sheffield 
armaments industry was in serious doubt in the future peace, a situation not lost 
on the companies involved.  
As soon as the conflict ceased, the armaments companies began 
pressing for answers about the future of the industry. William Lionel Hichens, 
chairman of Cammell, wrote to the Government in December 1918, calling for 
the need to retain the Coventry Ordnance Works (COW) as a nucleus factory 
for future armaments needs, and that most of the works could be utilised for 
peace products. He urgently pressed for a response; highlighting that is was 
increasingly difficult to retain their skilled staff which years of training had 
produced with an empty order book, most of their work having been cancelled 
at the time of the armistice. Reminding the Government of their use of COW 
during the War, Hichens suggested that:  
It would be grossly unjust if, after having taken every advantage of the 
organisation and facilities possessed by the Coventry Ordnance Works, 
the Government were to throw them on the rubbish heap like a sucked 
orange.18  
Hichens also used the company OGM in April 1919 to attack the Government‟s 
lack of direction for the industry:  
We are wholly in the dark as to what the future policy of the Government 
in regards to private armament firms is to be…My point is, at the 
moment, that the Government ought not to keep us dangling indefinitely 
at the end of a string…they ought to make up their minds promptly, on 
the policy they intend to adopt. And meanwhile we may at least fairly 
claim I think, that if they cannot give us work for those parts of our 
factories which are exclusively equipped for armaments production and 
which must be retained until some policy has been decided upon by the 
Government, they should enable us to maintain a nucleus organisation.19 
He also stressed that, given much of Sheffield had converted back to 
commercial production, „it is only in the highly specialised armament shops that 
we are paralysed by the indecision of the Government.‟20 In March 1919 
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Brown‟s Works Committee suggested there was a „necessity of paying special 
attention to our general trades now that armour cannot be reckoned on.‟21 The 
situation with projectiles was the same. Robert Abbott Hadfield had been 
providing agitation to the British Navy from mid-January 1919 for some 
assurance to the future demands for armour piercing (AP) projectiles. In writing 
to the Director of Navy Contracts, he remarked:  
We called your attention to our letter…of January 16th, in which we 
pointed out that this manufacture represents a highly complex and 
specialised art…There is probably no more difficult process in the 
Metallurgical Art than that of hardening an Armour-Piercing Shell, the 
complete manufacture of which involves a series of operations from the 
making of the Special Steel onwards, representing the accumulated 
experience derived from thirty years of research and experiment.22 
The Admiralty‟s response came in October 1919, regarding the possibility of 
paying subsidies to Hadfields for the maintenance of their plant. A resultant 
meeting between Hadfields, Firth and the Admiralty at the end of the month 
centred on what terms the two companies could maintain their projectile plant, 
with Hadfields suggesting a subsidy of £50,000 per annum, or an agreement to 
keep 20% of their projectile capacity in production.23 Despite the discussion, no 
new or revised agreement was forthcoming. Instead, former agreements 
continued to be extended. Hadfields‟ last agreement with the Admiralty had 
been signed in January 1913 for a period of three years, and had been 
extended in December 1915 through to January 1919 under the same 
conditions.24 The 1913 agreement promised Hadfields half of all the orders to 
the Trade for larger calibre AP and common pointed capped (CPC) projectiles.25 
Given the general uncertainty from the Admiralty regarding their future 
requirements for AP projectiles, the contract was extended for six months in 
January 1919, while in correspondence the Admiralty highlighted that:  
In view of the uncertain position at present existing as to the types and 
descriptions of Naval Shell which will be required in the future, it is not 
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possible to consider at the moment the question of entering into a fresh 
agreement with you.26  
The contract was further extended in July 1919 for six months, February 1920 
for six months, July 1920 for one year, and in August 1921 for a final six 
months.27 After the agreement lapsed in 1922, it was not renewed.  
Despite this agitation from private industry, the government knew the 
value of maintaining their sources of supply. As the Admiralty recorded in March 
1919, „The retention of naval supply under Admiralty control [is] an essential 
part of naval strategy.‟28 However, there were limitations placed on their ability 
to procure weapons in the future. The ten year rule, implemented from 15 
August 1919 instructed the service departments to plan their budgets on there 
being no wars for the next ten years.29 Furthermore, Sir Eustace Tennyson 
d‟Eyncourt, then Director of Naval Construction, highlighted the need to retain 
the capacity of the armaments companies for armour, and wrote in 1919 of the 
product that it was:  
„An article which is required solely for war purposes and requires the 
greatest skill, not only of the chemist and the metallurgist but also in the 
actual manipulation by the skilled workers…if provision…is not made, we 
shall get left behind.‟30 
Davenport-Hines highlights that „The history of the next decade and a half is 
that of these recommendations being ignored.‟31 This may, in part, be 
accounted for by the various approaches to procurement that were attempted in 
the early 1920s.32  
By August 1920, the prospects for the armaments industry appeared 
favourable. The Director of Naval Construction invited Vickers, Armstrong, 
Cammell and Brown to discuss the manufacture of machinery, guns, armour 
and hulls of four new 45,000 ton battlecrusiers. The armour production would be 
split between the four, and as Vickers could not construct vessels of the size 
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required, each of the other three would be invited to construct at least one of the 
new generation of ships. The armour orders for the four ships were issued to 
the trade in October 1921, but were quickly cancelled due to changes in the 
international theatre.33 
 
Table 6.1: Admiralty Expenditure on Armaments 1920-1930, and 
Proportion to Trade (£m) 
Year Government Factories Trade Percent to Trade 
1920-1921 1.8 4.2 70 
1921-1922 1.7 2.3 57 
1922-1923 1.3 1.1 47 
1923-1924 1.3 1.4 51 
1924-1925 1.4 1.2 46 
1925-1926 1.5 1.2 44 
1926 1.1 1.1 50 
1927 1.4 1.7 58 
1928 1.7 1.2 42 
1929 1.6 1.0 40 
1930 1.5 0.8 36 
Source: Adapted from Davenport-Hines, British Marketing of Armaments, p.148. 
 
The Washington Naval Treaty severely restricted the Navy‟s 
procurement plans, and most contracts where rapidly put on hold and then 
cancelled. While in the early 1920s there were efforts by the League of Nations 
towards universal disarmament, the Washington Naval Treaty was the only 
successful agreement to restrict the construction of weapons.34 Signed on 6 
February 1922, the Treaty between Britain, the United States, Japan, France 
and Italy agreed to limit their capital ships in their fleets to the ratio of 
5:5:3:1.75:1.75, limit the size of vessels to no more than 35,000 tons, and 
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implement a ten year break on new ship construction.35 As shown in Table 6.1, 
this saw a reduction in Admiralty expenditure to private trade until 1930, and 
severely damaged the prospects for private manufacturers of armaments. 
Vickers‟ official historian has summarised the situation for the company after 
Washington remarkably well:  
For Vickers the Washington Treaty marked the final termination of an 
era. It had for some time hardly been realistic to keep on the large expert 
staff, the whole great apparatus of research and development upon 
which armament capacity so depended: now it became impossible. 
When every possible transfer of skilled men to non-armament work had 
been made, there were still dismissals – „a very large reduction‟ – and 
large as it was, it was worse still in that it meant the breaking up of an 
organisation, and worst of all because it brought home to everyone in the 
company an anxiety which up to now had been confined to the board 
room and its annexes – a chronic anxiety about the basic conditions of 
survival. Nothing like this had every happened before.36  
It was certainly the beginning of the end for some armaments companies. 
Bastable has suggested that neither Vickers nor Armstrong „could survive the 
post-1918 context. No entrepreneurial skill could save them, and by 1926 both 
were bankrupt.‟37 Elsewhere in the industry, order cancellations were common. 
At Beardmore, of the £4.2million of orders received by November 1921, only 
£11,000 was executed owing to the signing of the Washington Treaty.38 The 
Treaty also stifled expansion plans for the armour producers in Sheffield once 
their orders were cancelled.  
In 1920, Brown commenced a reconstruction programme, and their 
Works Committee suggested that the armour plant should be capable of 
producing 5,000 to 7,000 tons of armour per year.39 The following April, the 
Works Committee recorded their anticipation that new armour orders would be 
forthcoming, which „it was quite hoped would improve matters and stimulate 
business.‟40 Once details of the potential armour orders were known, £25,000 
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was approved to be spent on Brown‟s armour department to make them 
capable of producing the size and weight of plates required.41 When the orders 
were finally received in October 1921 for 9,700 tons of armour, the work was 
anticipated to keep their armour plant in operation for the next two years. One of 
the four new battleships to be built was also ordered from Brown‟s Clydebank 
shipyard.42 Their adulation was short-lived as the orders were suspended in 
November, Brown recording that they „might or might not end in cancelment 
[sic], but had for the present very disastrous results on the operation of the 
company.‟43 The stoppage on work for the four battlecruisers after the 
Washington Treaty was described in 1922 by Brown‟s chairman Lord 
Aberconway as „a serious matter, not only for John Brown and Co, but for 
Sheffield.‟44 The following year at their AGM, Aberconway dismally proclaimed 
that „the city was practically abandoned by the Government owing to the 
consequences of the Treaty of Washington.‟45 
An unknown Brown‟s director produced a memorandum in 1922 in which 
issues for the future of business in Sheffield were highlighted. It opened by 
stressing that:   
the effects are undoubtedly most serious at Sheffield, since Sheffield has 
always been the chief centre for the manufacture of the armour, guns, 
heavy steel forgings of all kinds, [and] shell for warships.46 
At the time of the new naval orders being placed, unemployment in Sheffield 
was the worst in living memory, with around 40,000 men out of work. It had 
been hoped that the new orders would give many of them employment.47 The 
memorandum also stated that „the placing of the orders for the four new 
warships removed a load of anxiety from the minds of the Sheffield 
manufacturers, and was received with satisfaction and delight by all classes of 
the workmen.48 The unknown author stresses that the suspension of naval work 
should be reversed and work allowed to continue „without prejudice to any 
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ultimate decision that may be reached on the completion of the ships‟ as similar 
steps had taken place in America and Japan.49 It was stated that „it has taken 
years to train the officials and men to carry out the highly skilled metallurgical 
and mechanical operations required‟ and that the plant cannot „be used for work 
other than that for which it was designed.‟50 Despite the hope of the director to 
resume work and keep the plant in operation, no changes were forthcoming. 
The cancellations also had an effect on Cammell‟s armour plant expansion and 
production. 
At a board meeting in November 1921, Cammell proposed a scheme to 
bring their armour department up to date at a total cost of £250,000, ultimately 
cancelled the following month „in consequence of work on the armour order 
being in abeyance.‟51 Hichens announced his disdain at the situation at the 
company OGM in 1922. It was believed that the orders received in late 1921 
would keep their armour plant in operation for two years, „but the Washington 
Conference has dashed our hopes to the ground, and now the most we can 
expect is that orders will be placed for two much smaller ships, after which there 
will be a naval holiday until 1932.‟52 The company could not maintain their 
armour shops idle for ten years, and Hichens in his closing remarks called on a 
government subsidy during the naval holiday.53 The lack of subsidies continued 
into 1925, when Hichens again attacked the government, stating at their OGM 
that „The time has I think come when the Government should decide upon a 
policy in respect of the armour plate makers.‟54 In 1925 Admiral Sir Emle 
Chatfield, Controller of the Navy, gave a speech at Cutlers Hall in Sheffield, 
highlighting that „It would be a bad day for the Empire if the plant and the skilled 
men who designed it, who brought it into existence, and who used it, were 
allowed to decay.‟55  
An agreement between the Admiralty and the armour manufacturers to 
protect the armour business was ultimately signed the same year with the 
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armour manufacturers to last for one year, and was renewed annually into the 
1930s. The companies involved promised to maintain their plant and skilled 
staff ready to produce a minimum specified quantity of armour per year, and 
continue to be available for development and experimental work. In return, the 
Admiralty promised to only order from them, so long as the companies could 
meet the requirements satisfactorily regarding price, quality, and delivery.56 That 
year, subsidies were paid to the armour manufacturers, with £41,365 for 
Cammell, £49,078 for Brown, and £86,000 each for Vickers and Armstrong.57 
The links between manufacturers were no longer characterised by special 
relationships; as the armour agreement demonstrated, in order to protect 
capacity the links between the state and private industry were more „necessary‟ 
than anything extraordinary. 
 In projectiles, arrangements were also made to protect capacity for any 
future requirements from 1922. Changes in the industry, with former producers 
closing or abandoning manufacture had left just Hadfields and Firth in a position 
to manufacture large calibre AP projectiles. Furthermore, the plant involved was 
highly specialised and not easily adaptable to commercial work. The plant 
Hadfields maintained included units and machines which had been specially 
developed for projectile production and represented a capital outlay of some 
£500,000. The company continually stressed the specialty of their plant, and 
emphasised that none of the machinery could be adapted for commercial 
purposes. At Firth‟s Gun Works, principally based on forging technology, 
commercial products had re-entered production in 1919.58 Following a 
conference between the Admiralty, Hadfields and Firth in March 1922, a new 
collaborative arrangement was signed between the three parties. Each agreed 
to maintain their productive capacity and trained staff for AP projectiles until the 
end of 1925, with minimum requirements for weekly output and skilled 
personnel working double shifts also imposed (See Table 6.2). In addition to the 
maintenance of the two companies‟ projectile plants, Hadfields would receive 
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5/8ths and Firth 3/8ths of the orders forthcoming for the Navy.59 The agreement 
was renewed in January 1926 for a further five years.60 As part of the renewal, 
the companies had to allow free entrance of Government inspectors to their 
hardening and treatment shops. Both were adverse to the request, but 
reluctantly allowed their admission.61 Reflecting after the start of rearmament in 
1936, Clerke remarked of their relationship with the Admiralty: „when the time 
came to renew these agreements…we had of course to accept it “faute de 
mieux” [for lack of something better].‟62 Once again, the government‟s 
relationship with the projectile manufacturers was no longer characterised by 
specialty, but by the necessary retention of capacity. This necessity was 
replicated in other industries which had declining membership. In optical 
munitions, Sambrook has demonstrated how the number of producers in the 
industry had shrunk to just one by 1923, and the industry entered into a period 
of „hibernation during which the ability to produce all kinds of optical munitions 
would be sustained, even though output remained at a low level for the 
remainder of the 1930s.‟63  
 
Table 6.2: Capacity to be Retained for Weekly Projectile Production at 
Hadfields and Firth, 1922-1930 
Hadfields Firth 
250 - 15 inch or 16 inch, or 500 - 8 
inch 
150 - 15 inch or 16 inch 
500 - 6 inch 350 - 8 inch 
1000 - 4 inch 270 - 7.5inch, or 400 - 6 inch, or 500 - 
4.7 inch, or 500 - 4 inch 
Source: SA, Box 103, A.B.H. Clerke to Secretary Of The Admiralty, 21 July 1925; Box 103, 
Shell Agreement January 1926 to December 1930.  
 
For the companies involved, the tumultuous changes in the environment 
in which they operated meant their pre-war approach to armaments, in which 
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research and development was funded in-house from profits made from 
armament sales, was completely untenable. In order to maintain capacity for 
both experimentation and production, the government was forced to pay the 
armaments companies and fundamentally change their relationship fostered 
over the past two decades. Several interpretations of this advancing state-
industrial relationship have been put forward. Davenport-Hines has extended 
the use of the special relationships paradigm into the 1930s, highlighting that 
the Great War was a watershed in the industry, and that „the „special 
relationship‟ which had evolved in 1888-1914 was shattered…and the informal 
personal contacts on which the relationship had relied were forced into a more 
impersonal institutional framework.‟64 He also suggests that these blows to the 
special relationship caused the exit of several specialist armaments companies 
in the following decade.65 However, Davenport-Hines still maintains the „special 
relationships‟ badge for what he observed. More recently, Edgerton has rightly 
suggested that revisions need to be made to the view of inter-war armaments.66 
He has also advanced that „the navy declined relative to the forces as a whole, 
and the naval-industrial complex declined faster relative to the arms industry as 
a whole.‟67 Packard has suggested the system of closeness and cooperation 
before the Great War between the Government and private industry was 
replaced by one characterised by „struggle and stagnation‟ from 1918 to the 
start of rearmament in the 1930s.68 He also advances that the Government 
favoured their relationships with Vickers and Armstrong over other smaller 
producers, somewhat overlooking the projectile agreement discussed above.69 
Packard has highlighted that:  
The Admiralty clearly wished to help its main suppliers and continued to 
place a large amount of trust in the private armaments industry or, at 
least, certain key firms. To some extent, this demonstrated the 
endurance, or even a strengthening, of the naval-industrial complex in 
the inter-war years.70 
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Overall, the suggestion that the government retained a special relationship with 
the trade regarding armaments procurement in the 1920s is difficult to 
substantiate. While the industry provided important productive facilities, 
technical advice and advancement, and key armaments experts to the Ministry 
of Munitions during the Great War, the cracks were starting to show at the end 
of the conflict, exacerbated by the industry‟s failure to manufacture what was 
ordered in the early months of war. The government struggled to work out what 
to do with armaments once peace arrived, and somewhat more tentative, 
uncertain special relationships continued before the agreeing to pay subsidies 
to protect the capacity of private industry. Once the Washington Naval Treaty 
was signed, the special relationships which had been a characteristic of the 
industry since the 1880s died, in its place grew what is best described as a 
„necessary relationship‟ in which capacity was supported while orders 
evaporated. This had a serious effect on the business of all the armaments 
producers in Sheffield, which the following section will explore. 
 
The Decline of Armaments Business 1914-1930 
The deluge of orders during the Great War provided high profits for all the 
armaments industry, though these were not as high as they could have been 
due to the introduction of the Munitions Levy and Excess Profit Duty during the 
conflict. Introduced in 1915, this was initially set at 50 per cent of any amount 
over the average profits made in two of the last three years before the War. The 
rate was increased to 60 per cent in 1916, and 80 per cent in 1917. It was 
reduced to 40 per cent in 1919 and finally abandoned in 1921 against the 
backdrop of declining economic conditions.71 The 1920s were a difficult decade 
for all the armaments companies, the profits of the Great War a distant memory 
once orders disappeared. An analysis of the profits of Vickers and Armstrong 
between 1914 and 1924 using return on capital employed as a measure instead 
of published profitability also demonstrates a decline in profitability after the end 
of the conflict, something reflected across the industry.72 Vickers‟ armaments 
business declined during the 1920s, last paying a dividend in 1923, while 
Armstrong paid no dividends from 1925, and Beardmore paid none for 10 years 
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after 1921.73 The Sheffield steel industry as a whole may have been in an even 
worse position than it found itself were it not for the rise in stainless steel 
production, a legacy of the research and development commitment of the 
armaments industry before the Great War.74 Nevertheless, the 1920s were 
difficult for all companies, especially the armour producers.   
 
Table 6.3: Brown’s Atlas Works Invoiced Output, Profit and Dividends 
1914-1930 
 Atlas Works (£,000s) All Brown’s Business 
 Commercial 
(Percentage) 
Armour 
(Percentage) 
Profit (£) Ordinary 
Dividend (%) 
1914-1915 791 (47) 905 (53) 521,007 12½  
1915-1916 1,160 (76) 375 (24) 485,120 12½ 
1916-1917 1,874 (77) 570 (23) 494,029 12½ 
1917-1918 2,238 (98) 44 (2) 453,317 12½ 
1918-1919 2,292 (100) 0 (0) 467,171 12½ 
1919-1920 1,901 (87) 282 (13) 378,808 12½ 
1920-1921 2,431 (97) 71 (3) 331,920 10 
1921-1922 821 (94) 56 (6) 210,407 5 
1922-1923 658 (85) 115 (15) 212,294 5 
1923-1924 881 (93) 65 (7) 212,230 5 
1924-1925 961 (79) 257 (21) 211,233 5 
1925-1926 No data 437 (-) 91,419 Nil 
1926-1927 No data 81 (-) 6,589 Nil 
1927-1928 No data 88 (-) 67,389 Nil 
1928-1929 No data 43 (-) 87,262 Nil 
1929-1930 No data 1 (-) 24,184 Nil 
Sources: SA, John Brown‟s Managing Directors Reports 1914-1925; Firth-Brown Armaments 
Production Records 1915-1945. Brown‟s profit figures were very kindly provided from Geoffrey 
Tweedale‟s private collection. 
 
Brown‟s record from 1914 to 1930 reflects the difficulties of being an 
armour producer at the time (See Table 6.3). The high point of armour output 
was in 1914-15, after which their production never reached the same proportion 
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and value again. By focusing on a single product, the company was hit hard 
after the Washington Treaty, the only brief revival occurring in the mid-1920s 
with the construction of two new capital ships. The official history of John Brown 
observed that in the 1920s, „The Atlas Works produced some heavy armour for 
H.M.S. Rodney, but there was nothing else of much importance to record.‟75 
When Brown passed their annual dividend in 1926 it was the first time they had 
done so for 50 years.76  
This decline in fortunes was not unexpected at the company. Brown‟s 
chairman, Baron Aberconway, understood the issues the armaments firms 
would face once the peace came, predicting in early 1915 that: 
when the war was over it might be years before any of the armament 
firms got an order for battleships, guns, armour plates, or many of the 
things which they now produced in such large numbers. They might find 
that after a short period in which they would make a little money they 
might practically be without profits at all.77 
Not that orders for armour were easy to come by during the Great War, a 
principally land based conflict. The air of uncertainty around future demand was 
summed up in a Brown‟s report in August 1916 which stated „Armour orders 
may come forward at any time.78 Some orders were placed with all the armour 
manufacturers in March 1917 for HMS Hood being built at Clydebank, sharing 
1,100 tons between the five armour producers.79 Once the War was over, the 
future of armour orders was even more uncertain. Charles Ellis reported in 
October 1919 that „it was a great misfortune that orders for armour had not 
been forthcoming, especially as the armour department was a very big one.‟80 
By 1920 the company had „no further use for the armour department‟ and had 
placed the plant at the disposal of the government should they require it for 
future armour production.81  
An examination of the orders received for armour at Brown between 
1915 and 1924 demonstrates the uncertainty of demand from the Admiralty. 
The company received an order for 3,500 tons of armour in late 1922 „which 
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would much improve operations during the [new] year‟82 However, this was the 
only order of any significance at Brown during the entire period, slumping to just 
67 tons of armour ordered during 1924. Three years before, the company had 
proposed a plant capable of a minimum production of 7,000 tons a year. The 
peak of production for the armour plant would be between 1924 and 1925, 
though this small increase did little to alleviate the general decline of armour 
production (See Table 6.5). In September 1925 at Brown all of their armour 
treatment facilities had been shut down for the month, with little further armour 
work available.83 There would be scarce armour for the rest of the decade.   
 
Table 6.4: Summary of Brown’s Armour Orders 1915-1924 
Year Total Armour 
Orders (£) 
Largest 
Month Total 
(£) 
Average 
Monthly 
Total (£) 
Number Of 
Months With 
Orders Over 
£10,000 
1915 352,887 217,511 29,407 3 
1916 5,407 4,212 451 0 
1917 188,658 108,480 15,722 4 
1918 80,829 61,944 6,736 2 
1919 25,175 14,825 2,098 1 
1920 120,196 86,273 10,016 3 
1921 51,852 26,980 4,321 2 
1922 570,463 565,135 47,539 1 
1923 53,386 47,626 4,449 1 
1924 67 67 6 0 
Source: SA, Brown‟s Managing Directors Reports 1915-1925 
 
At the end of the Great War there were also some issues with the prices 
paid for armour. The figures provided for 1918-1919 and 1919-1920 were 
misleading, as in the monthly managing directors reports at Brown at the end of 
the company‟s financial year in March 1919 the decision was made not to 
invoice any armour orders to gain a better price on their production (See Table 
6.5). Discussions took place in early 1919 with the admiralty regarding the 
prices paid for armour plates, to be retrospective over 1917 and 1918.84 
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Consequently, the figures for 1919-1920 represent two years output, a figure of 
£230,000 proposed for 1918-1919 in the records.85 Brown were certainly 
looking for the best return on what they had produced, their chairman having 
already predicted a difficult time to come.  
 
Table 6.5: Brown’s Armour Sales and Production 1915-1930 
Year Total Armour Sales (£,000s) 
Tons of Armour 
Produced 
Average Price 
per ton 
1915-1916 375 3,594 104 
1916-1917 570 5,859 97 
1917-1918 44 543 81 
1918-1919 0 0 - 
1919-1920 282 2,190 129 
1920-1921 71 348 204 
1921-1922 56 283 198 
1922-1923 115 841 137 
1923-1924 65 477 136 
1924-1925 257 1,836 140 
1925-1926 437 2,334 187 
1926-1927 81 478 169 
1927-1928 88 466 189 
1928-1929 43 162 265 
1929-1930 1 3 333 
Source: SA, Firth-Brown Armaments Output Records, 1915-1945. 
 
By 1930, the gloomy trading situation for the armourers was publicly 
commented on by Brown‟s chairman Baron Aberconway, who noted that:  
The consequences of all this have been felt quite keenly at our steel 
works in Sheffield owing to the diminution of orders for armour plate, gun 
forgings, and all the other high-class steel forgings and castings that 
were required for warships and big passenger liners, and their machinery 
and equipment. The quantity of armour required in recent years has been 
very small, and last year less than 50 tons were ordered by the 
Admiralty. It is obvious that this costly and most efficient plant can only 
be said to have value so far as it can produce work, but if you are faced 
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with an almost total cessation of orders you may consider this value to be 
comparatively small.86 
Not that Brown were alone in suffering from a lack of armour orders, Cammell‟s 
business also declined and dividends were passed from 1923 (See Table 6.6).  
 
Table 6.6: Cammell’s Sheffield Works (Cyclops, Grimesthorpe, 
Penistone) Invoiced Output, Profit and Dividends 1914-1928 
 Sheffield Works (£,000s) All Cammell Business 
 
Commercial 
(Percentage) 
Armaments 
(Percentage) 
Profit or 
Loss (£) 
Ordinary 
Dividend (%) 
1914 1,197 (64) 669 (36) 237,829 7½  
1915 1,686 (68) 793 (32) 303,841 10 
1916 2,627 (70) 1,117 (30) 321,372 10 
1917 2,901 (76) 902 (24) 308,122 10 
1918 2,936 (75) 966 (25) 282,094 10 
1919 2,724 (88) 365 (12) 303,005 10 
1920 3,606 (91) 340 (9) 260,632 7½  
1921 2,427 (98) 61 (2) 170,487 5 
1922 1,187 (90) 135 (10) 145,906 5 
1923 1,748 (99) 24 (1) 70,053 Nil 
1924 1,621 (92) 138 (8) 70,894 Nil 
1925 1,371 (73) 495 (27) -36,381 Nil 
1926 916 (81) 216 (19) -73,575 Nil 
1927 1,633 (93) 126 (7) -112,046 Nil 
1928 1,421 (96) 60 (4) -80,694 Nil 
Source: WA, ZCL/5/43, Cammell Laird Board Meeting Minute Book No.10; ZCL/5/44, Cammell 
Laird Board Meeting Minute Book No.11 
 
While Brown remained in profit, Cammell began making losses in 1925. 
To mitigate their issues, £300,000 was transferred from company reserves 
between 1925 and 1928, entirely eliminating what had been put aside from 
Great War profits.87 Though Cammell‟s commercial output was greater than 
Brown, their armour orders also diminished following the Great War. The 
company approached the Admiralty regarding the future use of their armour 
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department after the stoppage of orders in early 1919. It was recorded that „if 
the department is to be kept open for foreseeable future work the Admiralty 
should pay the expense or take the cost into account in the price of any orders 
for armour plate.‟88 In 1920 Hichens highlighted the poor trading conditions for 
the armaments companies, noting that „it is unlikely that the armament firms will 
find any outlet for their special experience in the near future.‟89 He went on to 
note that „We have been manufacturers of armour in Sheffield since 1863, and 
the costly equipment of our armour department is useless for any other 
purpose…If we cease to be manufacturers of armour we must scrap the whole 
of this plant and start afresh.‟90 Even when Cammell secured the order for HMS 
Rodney in 1922, Hichens remarked to the company OGM the next year „I think 
you will wish me to say something about the battleship order we were fortunate 
– or unfortunate – enough to secure last November,‟ going on to suggest the 
work was worth having at a certain price, and it would boost the fortunes of their 
Birkenhead shipyard.91 Armour production, and consequently its profitability, 
had been stifled at the end of the conflict, production dropping to just hundreds 
rather than thousands of tons per year, revived only with production for HMS 
Rodney (See Table 6.7) Once those orders for armour were completed, the 
prospects for future orders were depleted. From May to December 1926 
Cammell‟s works in Sheffield and Penistone were entirely shut down.92 The 
poor results for 1927 were blamed on an absence of armour orders, suggesting 
that despite plans for a broadening of trade for the company before the Great 
War, Cammell were still reliant on armour for their financial vitality.93 The 
company could not fall back on other armaments products either, their shell 
shops closing in 1921 and converted to the production of small forgings. While 
the plant was heavily used in the Great War (See Table 6.8), after the conflict 
the decision was made to discontinue projectile production. Overall, in the wake 
of the Washington Treaty, the business of the two Sheffield armour producers 
collapsed, causing both Brown and Cammell to pass their dividends over 
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several years. With projectiles, the fortunes were similar with declining profits at 
both Firth and Hadfields by 1930. 
 
Table 6.7: Cammell’s Production and Profits on Armour Sales at Cyclops 
Works West Forge 1914-1928 
Year 
Armour 
Sales 
(£,000s) 
Tons 
Produced 
Armour 
Profit (Loss) 
(£,000s) 
Rate of 
Profit (Loss) 
(%) 
1914 606 7412 173 29 
1915 571 6262 213 37 
1916 238 2231 (47) (20) 
1917 230 1957 36 16 
1918 258 2394 (5) (2) 
1919 174 230 (21) (12) 
1920 123 128 (30) (24) 
1921 38 118 (27) (71) 
1922 135 746 14 10 
1923 24 141 1 3 
1924 138 744 88 64 
1925 495 3003 114 23 
1926 216 1192 43 20 
1927 126 727 4 3 
1928 60 137 - - 
Source: SA, ESC Box 192, Cammell‟s Sheffield Plant Sales and Details 1911-1927 
 
Table 6.8: Cammell’s Production and Profits on Shell Sales at 
Grimesthorpe Works 1914-1921 
Year Shell Sales (£,000s) 
Number 
Produced 
Shell Profit 
(£,000s) 
Rate of 
Profit (%) 
1914 63 23,350 6 9 
1915 222 163,827 4 2 
1916 879 751,099 25 3 
1917 72 404,074 6 1 
1918 708 374,634 32 5 
1919 191 78,184 58 31 
1920 217 1,542 79 36 
1921 23 0 23 100 
Source: SA, ESC Box 192, Cammell‟s Sheffield Plant Sales and Details 1911-1927 
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Table 6.9: Firth’s Sales, Profit and Dividends 1914-1930 
 Total Sales to 
1918, 
Commercial 
only 1919-30  
(£,000) 
(Percentage) 
Shell 
Deliveries 
(£,000s)  
(Percentage) 
Profit (£) Ordinary Dividend (%) 
1914 1,192 No data 339,246 25 
1915 2,601 No data 265,639 25 
1916 4,916 No data 401,266 25 
1917 4,733 No data 206,659 20 
1918 4,853 No data 178,650 15 
1919 1,898 (80) 469 (20) 179,236 7½  
1920 No data 158 (-) 157,507 6¼  
1921 946 (90) 100 (10) No data 5 
1922 No data 161 (-) 42,872 5 
1923 922 (84) 180 (16) 8,750 Nil 
1924 1,008 (87) 152 (13) 79,980 Nil 
1925 1,149 (97) 33 (3) 70,299 Nil 
1926 966 (87) 140 (13) 27,818 Nil 
1927 1,212 (84) 225 (16) 122,000 3¾  
1928 1,296 (85) 227 (15) 133,214 5 
1929 1,447 (90) 169 (10) 166,090 6½  
1930 1,217 (94) 72 (6) 27,652 Nil 
Source: SA, Firth Records 
 
An examination of Firth‟s business performance before and after the 
Great War also highlights the difficult trading environment (See Table 6.9). 
When several contracts were cancelled in November 1918, 95% of Firth‟s 
annual production had been for the war effort.94 While incomplete data is 
available, the drastic decline in the output of the company in the early 1920s is 
apparent. In October 1920, Firth‟s shell shops were shut down due to a lack of 
orders.95 Conditions changed and by the end of 1921 the company had 
£200,000 of shell orders on hand from the Government, but the infrequency of 
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demand had an effect on their profitability.96 In 1923, the dividend was passed 
for the first time, the downturn in their fortunes exacerbated by the difficult 
trading environment and a lack of government orders. Their ordnance output for 
1925 had fallen to just 3% of their total deliveries for the year. Unlike their 
contemporaries in Brown and Cammell the company was able to resurrect their 
fortunes in the late 1920s thanks to a brief resurgence of demand for projectiles, 
but by 1930 demand had once again disappeared. Their ordnance output 
shrunk, and with a lack of commercial work to take up the shortfall the dividend 
was passed once again.  
 
Table 6.10: Hadfields’ Invoiced Output, Profits and Dividends 1915-1930 
 Commercial 
(£,000s) 
(Percentage) 
Ordnance 
(£,000s) 
(Percentage) 
Profit (£) Ordinary 
dividend 
(%) 
1915 816 (31) 1,811 (69) 265,403 25 
1916 1,359 (27) 3,594 (73) 252,166 30 
1917 1,260 (22) 4,443 (78) 257,509 30 
1918 1,798 (34) 3,535 (66) 202,895 30 
1919 1,623 (48) 1,768 (52) 203,154 10 
1920 2,354 (75) 803 (25) 107,856 5 
1921 2,097 (79) 567 (21) 158,157 5 
1922 1,348 (66) 684 (34) 187,250 5 
1923 1,555 (79) 403 (21) 106,510 4 
1924 1,682 (89) 200 (11) 80,621 2½ 
1925 1,549 (86) 253 (14) 117,660 3 
1926 1,372 (84) 263 (16) 68,875 2½ 
1927 1,702 (79) 454 (21) 187,223 5 
1928 1,585 (76) 497 (24) 112,053 2½ 
1929 1,593 (83) 336 (17) 112,992 2½ 
1930 1,302 (89) 162 (11) 42,995 Nil 
Source: Hadfields Box 63, Hadfields Invoiced Output 1910-1935, Volume 7 and Volume 8. 
 
More data is available for Hadfields across the period, further 
demonstrating the drastic change in fortunes for the armament companies once 
the War was over (See Table 6.10). Ordnance output had been between half 
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and three quarters of Hadfields‟ annual output through to the end of 1919, after 
which demand declined into the 1920s. Armour piercing projectiles, the pinnacle 
of Hadfields‟ technological capabilities, had their greatest value of orders in 
1915, after which demand declined for the company (See Table 6.11). After the 
conflict, the total shell orders at Hadfields and Firth would never reach these 
highs again.  
 
Table 6.11: Hadfields’ 
Armour Piercing Projectile 
Orders 1912-1917 
Year Value (£,000s) 
1912 143 
1913 260 
1914 1,032 
1915 2,230 
1916 501 
1917 434 
Source: SA, Hadfields Box 114, Hadfields Armour Piercing Projectile Orders 1905-1917 
 
Table 6.12: Summary of Projectile Orders to Hadfields and Firth 1920-30 
Year Hadfields Navy Orders 
Hadfields 
Army Orders 
Hadfields 
Total British 
Government 
Orders 
Firth Total 
British 
Government 
Orders 
1920 153 93 246 151 
1921 348 0 348 212 
1922 123 0 123 53 
1923 254 0 254 143 
1924 206 24 230 140 
1925 236 16 252 142 
1926 321 5 326 177 
1927 380 0 380 201 
1928 283 2 285 121 
1929 98 6 104 39 
1930 113 0 113 37 
Source: Calculated from Hadfields Projectile Order Books No.4 and No.5.; Firth Armaments 
Production Records 1914-1939. 
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By examining the British Government‟s projectile orders from 1920 to 
1930 (See Table 6.12), it is apparent that the main home buyer for Hadfields 
was the Navy, with Army orders small after 1920 as had been the case before 
the Great War. While figures for Firth are not available for each service, the 
smaller output of the company is apparent as outlined in their joint agreement 
with the Admiralty for supply from 1922. While somewhat more consistent than 
armour orders, the Washington Treaty still had a negative effect on the rate of 
production at each company. In 1931, Hadfield drew attention to the continued 
depression in trade, adding that „A further handicap has been imposed upon 
some of our special lines of work by the general policy of Naval Disarmament.‟97 
Other efforts to profit from armaments technology were utilised in the 
1920s to varying levels of success. With international subsidiaries the two 
projectile manufacturers had different approaches to their business activities. 
Firth‟s Riga works were evacuated in 1916 due to the advance of the German 
army and never reopened.98 In the same year, the company unsuccessfully 
attempted to sell their holding in the Washington Steel and Ordnance 
Company.99 The Washington Company was voluntarily liquidated „owing to the 
uncertain future of American Government projectile needs‟ in 1922 after the 
Washington Conference, and was ultimately sold to the US Government in 
1930.100 Firth were clearly looking to reduce their international business, while 
Hadfields was looking to extend theirs after licensing their projectile production 
methods to Hadfield-Penfield. Formerly known as the American Clay Machinery 
Company based in Ohio, in 1919 the company acquired the sole rights to the 
entire Hadfield System of armaments production in the US, and changed their 
name to reflect this new direction.101 An initial US Navy order for 3,500 16 inch 
AP projectiles was agreed to be manufactured in Sheffield, with final assembly 
in Ohio. In 1920 and 1921 Hadfields received orders for all of the shell bodies, 
to be supplied in a hardened and rough machined form, along with the finished 
caps for all the shell. With a total order value of £378,000 ($1,617,000), these 
orders helped to maintain Hadfields‟ large calibre shell plant in operation after 
the Great War. After final assembly, Hadfield-Penfield sold the projectiles to the 
                                            
97
 SA, Hadfields Volume 8, Ordinary General Meeting Report 1930, 9 April 1931, pp.40-42.  
98
 SA, X306/1/2/2/1/1, Firth‟s General Meeting Minute Book No.1, 9 December 1916, p.232. 
99
 SA, X308/1/2/1/4/11, Firth‟s Report to Brown‟s Board, 1 June 1916, 3 August 1916. 
100
 SA, X306/1/2/2/1/1, Firth‟s General Meeting Minute Book No.1, 11 April 1922, p.276; 
X308/1/2/1/4/25, Firth‟s Report to Brown‟s Board, 26 July 1930.  
101
 SA, Hadfields Box 7, The Hadfields System in the USA, 1922, p.2. 
 226 
US Navy for $3,288,000.102 After years of sustaining losses and no new orders 
for projectiles materialising, Hadfield-Penfield ceased production in 1927.103 The 
lack of demand for war materials also extended to the international business of 
the Sheffield armourers.  
Foreign orders, a key part of the armaments business before the Great 
War and one of the most utilised methods of defending against the uncertainty 
of British orders, predominantly failed to materialise in the 1920s. Government 
consent was required for all foreign sales of armaments from 1921, though with 
a lack of home orders no requests from the Sheffield companies were 
rejected.104 The most successful in the international field during and after the 
Great War was Hadfields, building on previous productive links developed 
before the conflict. In 1916, the company took on a large order for 5,000 14 inch 
AP projectiles for the US Navy, later described as „a feat not without value as 
evidence of the resources of this country‟ during wartime105 The order had 
caused some controversy at the Ministry of Munitions regarding the use of the 
same plant for British shell requirements and the large quantity of steel 
required, though Hadfields were ultimately allowed to proceed with the order.106 
The War interrupted Hadfields‟ production for the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (IJN), though permission was received from the Government to supply a 
small number of 12 inch Heclon projectiles designed for oblique attack in 
October 1916.107 In 1919 Hadfields restarted supplying the IJN, initially 
manufacturing projectiles ordered and suspended in 1914 and supplemented 
with two orders placed in 1920 and 1921. With the decreasing demand for AP 
projectiles in Britain, in 1923 Hadfields sought a new guaranteed supply 
agreement with the IJN. After a long process of negotiation a new contract was 
signed in 1924 worth £350,000 for AP projectiles capable of oblique attack, 
averaging £50,000 per year until 1930. Hadfields also granted a licence to the 
IJN for the use of all of their patents in Japan for AP projectiles, and for any new 
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patents granted during the agreement.108 Somewhat reluctantly, Hadfields also 
agreed to the training of a limited number of Japanese students in the 
manufacture of AP projectiles at their works in Sheffield, after which they would 
be employed at Kure Arsenal in Japan, where a projectile manufacture had 
been established in 1911 using Hadfields‟ licences. Writing to the Admiralty on 
the new agreement, Hadfields‟ director Augustus Clerke remarked that „we were 
reluctant to accept such a condition in our Contract, but during the long course 
of negotiation became convinced that under no other condition could we obtain 
the work which is so badly required.„109 Summing up their position Clerke wrote:  
You are already aware of the difficulty which we are experiencing in 
maintaining the efficiency of our plant under your present reduced 
requirements, and that some additional work is essential in order to 
maintain the technical skill of our employees.110 
The Admiralty permitted the signing of the agreement, as it reduced their 
burden to provide Hadfields with orders to keep their large calibre plant 
operational. By 1930, Hadfields had supplied £356,000 of 14 inch AP 
projectiles, including the supply of unfinished shell for final assembly at the Kure 
Arsenal in 1929 and 1930 (See Table 6.13).  
Table 6.13: Hadfields’ 
Imperial Japanese Navy 
Orders 1920-1930 
Year Value 
1920 £36,192 
1921 £62,750 
1924 £49,950 
1925 £49,950 
1926 £47,250 
1927 £47,250 
1928 £53,176 
1929 £50,700 
1930 £57,714 
Source: Hadfields Projectile Order Books 
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In comparison to Hadfields, Firth fared worse with international orders. 
The company undertook some shell trials in Italy during 1926, but no major 
orders were placed with the company.111 The only orders received were for a 
total of 24 shells in 1927.112 In 1921 Hadfields and Firth came to a market and 
royalty sharing agreement for foreign sales. For any orders outside of the British 
Dominions and the USA, the company which received the order would pay the 
other 10% of the total invoiced price, and each agreed not to tender in their 
established markets, Hadfields with Japan and Firth with Italy.113 This was later 
reduced to 5% in 1924, after which Hadfield wrote to his fellow director 
Augustus Clerke that 
Personally I have always thought that it would have been fairer to say 
that Hadfields should be entirely free for Japan, and that Firths should be 
entirely free for Italy, that is, as regards making profit by executing 
orders…in either of those Countries…why not let us say to them “You 
can be free for Italy and we can be free for Japan without payments on 
either side.”114 
With scarce orders from Italy for Firth, Hadfield saw the agreement as favouring 
their collaborator rather than being remunerative for them. From 1923 the two 
companies also collaborated on tenders for orders from Brazil and Argentina in 
an effort to remain competitive against the expanding American armaments 
industry. In writing to Hadfield on the matter, fellow director Peter Boswell 
Brown remarked that „without such a combination it would appear that our 
American competitors, assisted by the influence of their Government, are 
certain to obtain what few orders may be placed.‟115 Only one unsuccessful 
tender was submitted in March 1924 for 800-1,000 12 inch practice projectiles 
for the Brazilian Navy.116   
 With armour orders, Cammell‟s only warship building program of the 
1920s was HMS Rodney, the company recording no foreign orders at all. A 
tender for Chilean submarines in 1927 failed to bring orders to the company.117 
Cammell also arranged with a group called „The Pioneer‟ in 1919 to represent 
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the company in the „Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slavenes‟ to sell 
warships and submarines, which generated no orders.118 Eastern Europe 
looked to be an outlet for armaments capacity in the 1920s after the formation 
of a number of new nation states at the conclusion of the Great War, though 
Vickers‟ experiences in Romania demonstrate the difficulties of obtaining orders 
from these new customers.119 Elsewhere, collaboration remained between 
Vickers and Armstrong, who came to a market sharing agreement for orders in 
South America, China, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey in 1924.120 
During 1927, the armaments business of both companies merged to form 
Vickers-Armstrongs, with Vickers continuing as the parent company of the new 
group.121  
In May 1928 enquiries were received at Hadfields and Firth for the 
production of finished 14 inch and 11 inch projectiles for the Chilean Navy. 
Before the Great War both companies had maintained business connections to 
produce finished projectiles filled with explosives and fitted with fuzes, neither 
could complete the order to the required specifications without some outside 
collaboration. Agreeing to work together to produce the projectile bodies, 
Hadfields and Firth called a meeting with Vickers-Armstrongs to discuss the 
possibility of working as a British group for the enquiry. At the meeting Hadfields 
and Firth proposed to manufacture the empty projectiles, after which Vickers-
Armstrongs would fill them, add their fuzes, and undertake any required testing. 
Hadfields and Firth also suggested that Vickers-Armstrong be the main 
contractor for any future orders due to their increased name value in the 
international market. The arrangement was agreed to, with the normal prices 
charged for projectiles by Hadfields and Firth discounted by 15 per cent to 
Vickers-Armstrongs to provide them with extra profit on the order. At the end of 
the meeting it was suggested to extend the arrangement to all future foreign 
orders, thus creating „a powerful combination with resources exceeding those of 
any Continental or USA firms.‟122 The arrangement for Chile also led to the 
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three companies formalising an agreement with the British Government to 
provide the required secrecy when quoting for any future foreign orders.123 The 
companies knew their future bargaining power with the British Government was 
greater as a group than if any of them left the industry. Group action with foreign 
orders such as the one proposed for Chile demonstrates how competition 
among armaments producers had disappeared in the international market in the 
1920s, collaborative defensive measures required by the members of the 
industry in a bid to keep it alive against the backdrop of scarce orders at home 
and increasing opposition from abroad. The business of the companies involved 
was only one facet of the decline of the industry in the 1920s, the management 
and structure of the armaments business also had a key role in its downturn.  
 
Stagnation and Disintegration: Management and Industry Structure 1914-
1930 
After the Washington Naval Treaty in 1921, with the market for armaments in 
Britain declining and with it any need to continue to maintain close and special 
relationships with the supply ministries washed away, the management at each 
company in the Sheffield armaments industry stagnated. Each board of 
directors aged along with the companies they managed. Dominated by pre-war 
appointments, each retained older mentalities about what the armaments 
industry was, clinging to the belief that the vitality the industry enjoyed before 
the Great War would return. It has been claimed that after the War the 
armaments industry fell back on what they knew before the conflict, 
concentrating on close links with the admiralty and naval production.124 This 
may suggest that the armaments companies brought in new external 
appointments to further build their links with the supply ministries, but as will be 
demonstrated this was not the case.  
At Hadfields, Robert Abbott Hadfield remained chairman of the company, 
with management required to adapt to his personal style of leadership. During 
the War, Hadfield relocated to his London home at 22 Carlton House Terrace, 
which became the temporary head office of the company for the remainder of 
the conflict with all issues related to government orders passed though the 
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house. Fellow directors Alexander Jack, Peter Brown and Augustus Clerke all 
moved to London to assist with the running of the company as all of their board 
meetings took place at the property, and up to four or five daily directors‟ 
conferences.125 With Hadfields‟ board of directors, there were a number of 
appointments during the conflict, and once two of the oldest serving directors 
retired in 1920 the final addition of the period was made in 1921 (See Table 
6.14). During the 1920s the board shrank in size due to deaths, yet these were 
not replaced. Before the War, Hadfields had expanded their directorship with a 
number of ex-government and military members, rapidly replacing any which 
retired or died. With limited need to retain close connections with the supply 
ministries, this approach was not replicated in the 1920s.  
 
Table 6.14: Hadfields’ Directors 1915-1930, and directors who continued 
1930 
 
Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Robert Abbott Hadfield 1888 Chairman and managing 
director from 1888 
Continued 
Alexander G.M. Jack 1897 Director, MD from 1905 Retired 1920 
Henry Cooper 1905 Director Retired 1920 
Lord Claude John Hamilton 1909 Director Died 1925 
Peter Boswell Brown 1910 Director Continued 
Major Augustus Basil Holt 
Clerke 
1913 Director Continued 
Issiah Milne 1914 Director – head metallurgist Died 1926 
J.P. Crosbie 1915 Director Continued 
W.B. Pickering 1915 Director Continued 
J.T. Middleham 1916 Director and Secretary Died 1922 
Commander E.H.M. 
Nicholson 
1917 Director Continued 
W.J. Dawson 1919 Director Continued 
Henry B. Sandford 1921 Director Died 1930 
Source: SA, Hadfields Annual Reports 1888-1930. 
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Table 6.15: Brown’s Directors 1915-1930, and directors who continued 
1930 
 Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Baron Aberconway 1883 Deputy chairman from 1897, 
chairman from 1906 
Continued 
Charles Edward Ellis 1884 (1st) 
1919 (2nd)  
MD from 1892-1915, and 
1919-1928, with Ministry of 
Munitions 1915-1919 
1915 (1st)  
Continued (2nd) 
Captain Tolmie John 
Tresidder 
1891 Director Retired 1930 
L-Col J.G.S. Davies 1896 Director Retired 1922 
Bernard A. Firth 1903 Deputy chairman from 1906 Died 1929 
John Sampson 1904 Director Died 1925 
William H. Ellis 1906 Managing director from 
1919 
Continued 
Thomas Bell 1907 (1st) 
1919 (2nd)  
Managing director from 
1920, with Admiralty 1917-
1919 
1917 (1st) 
Continued (2nd) 
Lord Pirrie 1915 Director Died 1924 
Alan John Grant 1919 Managing director from 
1928 
Continued 
Henry D. McLaren 1925 Director Continued 
Captain T.E. Crease 1928 Director Continued 
Source: Grant, Steel and Ships 
  
Brown‟s board demonstrates a similar pattern to Hadfields, with one new 
appointment during the conflict following the recruitment of their managing 
director Charles Ellis to the Ministry of Munitions in 1915 (See Table 6.15). After 
the War, one new appointment was made in Alan Grant who took over from 
Ellis as managing director in Sheffield. The retirement and death of a number of 
board members in the 1920s was not followed by their replacement, nor the 
addition of members with governmental links following the death of Lieutenant-
Colonel Davis. A family appointment was made in 1925, Baron Aberconway‟s 
son Henry McLaren joining the board, followed by Captain Crease who had 
been employed by the company on armament matters since 1922. 
Consequently, Crease is the only appointment by any of the four companies 
examined to have prior military or governmental links during the 1920s. While 
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this had been common before the Great War, with the limited demands for 
armaments after the conflict Crease is an exception.  
 
Table 6.16: Firth’s Directors 1915-1930, and directors who continued 
with Firth-Brown 
 Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Bernard A. Firth 1888 MD from 1900, chairman from 
1903 
Died 1929 
E. Willoughby Firth 1893 Director Continued 
James Rossiter Hoyle 1893 MD from 1903 to 1922 Died 1926 
John Sampson 1899 Director Died 1925 
Charles E. Ellis 1903 (1st) 
1919 (2nd) 
Director, with Ministry of 
Munitions 1915-1919 
1915 (1st) 
Continued (2nd)  
Baron Aberconway 1903 Director Continued 
Frederick C. Fairholme 1909 Assistant MD from 1910, 
managing director from 1921 
Continued 
Major Harry Bland Strang 1909 Director Resigned 1930 
Edward Dixon 1921 Director Continued 
Percy William Fawcett 1922 Director Continued 
John Charles Bradley Firth 1927 Director Continued 
Allan John Grant 1930 Director Continued 
Henry D McLaren 1930 Director Continued 
Sources: SA, X306/1/2/2/1/1, Firth‟s General Meeting Minute Book. Note, Strange changed the 
spelling of his surname to Strang during the Great War 
 
 At Firth, management remained static during the Great War (See Table 
6.16). An example from the conflict demonstrates the insularity of management 
in the industry. In 1915 Arthur Daulby Wedgwood, a director of Cammell until 
1913, was appointed General Manager of Firth‟‟s National Projectile Factory.126 
When Wedgewood resigned from the position due to ill health in 1916, Bernard 
Firth drew attention to „the difficulty of appointing a stranger to the position‟ and 
after some discussion Frederick Fairholme took up the role.127 Recruitment from 
within the industry was clearly the preference for the company. Two new 
appointments were made in the early 1920s, with an addition made after the 
death of two long-serving directors which fell back on older family links with the 
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enrolment of John Charles Bradley Firth. The two appointments in 1930 of 
members of Brown‟s board foreshadowed the merger between the two 
companies, as discussed below. Major Strang resigned from Firth‟s board in 
March 1930, but was retained by the company as a technical consultant with 
armaments work, paying him £500 per year.128 Even with a decade of limited 
orders, Firth still saw themselves as an armament company, and aimed to 
retain the skilled connections they had developed over the previous decades, 
yet did not recruit any new directors with military or governmental links during 
the 1920s. Finally, Cammell too demonstrates a lack of change in their board of 
directors, the only new appointments in the 1920s to managing director 
positions for their three works in Birkenhead, Sheffield and Nottingham (their 
former National Projectile Factory, converted to produce rolling stock). 
Retirements and deaths reduced the size of the board, with long-time 
connections to the Government in Samuel Roberts MP and Major Handley not 
replaced (See Table 6.17). 
The management of the Sheffield armaments industry corroborates 
Wilson‟s observation that continuity was a major feature of British business from 
1914 through to the 1940s, as it had been from the 1870s to the start of the 
Great War, with attitudes and the practice of management changing very 
little.129 The combined directorships of the four companies reflect this continuity. 
Up to 1928, the combined experience of the board of Cammell was 113 years, 
Hadfields 126 years, Firth 173 years, and at Brown a total of 200 years, with six 
directors having served over 35 years as a board member. E. Willoughby Firth 
(35 years), Tolmie John Tresidder (37 years), Bernard Firth (40 years at Firth), 
Charles Ellis (40 years at Brown, excluding time at the Ministry of Munitions), 
Robert Abbott Hadfield (40 years) and Baron Aberconway (45 years at Brown) 
reflect the stagnation of management and leadership in the armaments industry 
during the 1920s. At a time when new blood and ideas were needed, the 
companies stuck to what they knew best. If continuity was the common feature 
of management in the industry, conversely change in its structure characterised 
the post-Great War environment. 
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Table 6.17: Cammell’s Directors 1915-1928, and directors who continued 
1928 
 Appointed 
to Board 
Office Left Board 
Colonel William 
Sidebottom 
1896 Deputy chairman from 1901, 
chairman 1904-5, 1909-10 
Retired 1918 
Samuel Roberts MP 1896 Director Died 1926 
Robert Whitehead 1901 Director Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
Herbert Edward Wilson 1904 Director Retired 1924 
Alexander Gracie 1905 Director Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
Major Arthur Handley 1908 Director Died 1927 
Henry Westlake 1908 Director Resigned 1915 
William Lionel Hichens 1911 Chairman from 1911 Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
George John Carter 1912 Managing director at 
Birkenhead from 1912 
Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
James McNeil Allan 1913 Managing director at Sheffield 
and Penistone from 1913 
Retired 1928 
George Turner 1919 Director Retired 1922 
Robert Stuart Johnson 1920 Managing director at 
Birkenhead from 1922 
Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
Arthur Stowey Bailey 1921 Managing director at 
Nottingham from 1922 
Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
Charles Lyall Mason 1928 Managing director at Sheffield 
from 1928 
Director at time 
of ESC Merger 
Sources: WA, ZCL/5/171, Cammell-Laird Register of Directors 1901-1913, ZCL/5/62, Cammell-
Laird Register of Directors 1914-1924. 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the Coventry Ordnance Works (COW) was 
established as a defensive measure for the companies involved to counter 
uncertainty in their home market. Its establishment and ownership pattern with 
Brown, Cammell and shipbuilder Fairfield created a knowledge and risk sharing 
network with COW at its centre, the point at which communication for the group 
took place. Armaments orders to the company had drastically increased during 
the Great War, but its position in the post-War world was a cause of anxiety for 
those involved. Hichens had been appointed chairman of COW before the War, 
and as early as 1917 he foresaw future issues for the company. He suggested 
that COW:  
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Was an Imperial asset as a national arsenal of the first importance, and 
he could not believe that the Government would adopt a policy of using it 
to the full in time of need and then throwing it away like a sucked 
orange…it was fair to say that our unpreparedness for the war had 
taught us a lesson, and that the maintenance of our military equipment 
would not be left in future to – he might almost say – private charity, for 
the Coventry Works were run at a heavy and continuous loss before the 
war.130 
Hichens understood that there would be limited armaments work for some time 
to come after the end of the War, and suggested that „an exclusively armament 
firm, like the Coventry Ordnance Works, would shrink to almost nothing or close 
down altogether unless it found some other outlet for its activities.‟131 
Discussions regarding the post-war position of COW had occupied the 
Cammell‟s board before the end of the war, with the production of electrical 
goods a likely possibility.132 Hichens made several requests to government 
departments regarding the future of COW. He finally gained a response from 
David Lloyd George in his role as Prime Minister in January 1919, who said that 
the works would not be required by the Government thereafter. In 1919, while 
discussing the COW Charles Ellis highlighted that he had „always been one of 
those who believed that a war would be the ruin of armament companies, and 
he did not think he was very far wrong.‟133 At the end of 1918, COW became 
part of the newly formed English Electric Company. Tresidder and Carter, who 
represented Brown and Cammell on the COW board, resigned in December 
1918.134 The English Electric Company prospectus in 1919 listed as its directors 
Charles Ellis, Bernard Firth, Lionel Hichens, John Sampson and Alexander 
Gracie, and was financed with an initial share capital of £3.5million in £1 
shares.135 There were connections to armaments companies included as part of 
the new board, but the production of war materials was not on the agenda for 
the new company. The COW works closed in 1922 and went into voluntary 
liquidation in 1925.136  
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Before this closure, there had been a suggestion to keep COW in 
operation for foreign gun orders marketed by the Coventry Syndicate.137 The 
Coventry Syndicate had been established in October 1913 to co-ordinate the 
efforts of Brown, Cammell, Fairfield and COW in the international market, under 
the guidance of managing director Captain T.E. Crease. A former Naval 
Assistant to Admiral Jackie Fisher, Crease was also appointed a local director 
of Cammell and COW and a special director of Brown in November 1919.138 
With a lack of government orders following the Great War, the Coventry 
Syndicate increased in importance and from 1919 the group searched for 
foreign markets. A representative was sent to Japan in December 1920 to work 
on sales of armour and shells, and in 1921 a test plate for the Dutch Navy had 
been ordered, manufactured from stock at Brown.139 However, the transition of 
COW to the ownership of English Electric and the downturn in armaments 
demand affected their prospects. Fairfield resigned from the Coventry Syndicate 
in October 1919, and as a consequence of English Electric abandoning the 
manufacture of armaments the group was wound up in June 1921 having had 
their ability to sell finished guns stifled. At their final meeting „it was pointed out 
that one of the primary causes of the dissolution of the Syndicate is the action of 
the English Electric Company in regard to the sale of Scotstoun and the 
abandonment of armament manufacture generally.‟140 The COW‟s Scotstoun 
works had been the only facility open to the group for the fitting of gun 
mountings to battleships. With the Coventry Syndicate wound up, Brown offered 
Crease employment as a special director for foreign work with Brown and Firth, 
and he became a director of the company in 1928.141 With COW and the 
Coventry Syndicate closed, the armaments network constructed by the 
companies involved in the grouping was shattered, their previous collaborative 
defence against uncertainty in their home market disintegrated. Other 
connections built by the armaments industry before the Great War were also 
severed after the end of the conflict. Cammell looked to sell their 12,500 shares 
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in Fairfields in June 1919, relinquishing them two months later at £37 each.142 In 
1926, Vickers disposed of their 845,000 shares in Beardmore to Lady Invernairn 
for £75,000.143 In the wake of these closures and sales, the only connection 
which remained was the one between Brown and Firth, which also experienced 
some strains during and after the conflict.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: „The Milk Brown Cow‟ from X308/1/2/1/4/11, Firth‟s Reports to Brown‟s Board, filed 
between reports for 1 June and 27 June 1916. 
 
 In 1916, an unknown director at Brown sketched a picture titled „The Milk 
Brown Cow‟ which remains in a collection of reports Firth sent to Brown each 
month (See Figure 6.1). The image depicts a cow, presumed to represent the 
company, feeding from a trough labelled „Patent Cattle Food‟ with the names of 
several banks listed with it. Beneath the cow are three milking stools, one 
labelled Firths, one Coventry, and one Dalton (Brown‟s colliery). Given their 
ownership of half the shares in COW, and 7/8ths of Firth, Brown clearly felt that 
their subsidiaries were excessively using them for financial assistance. This 
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situation changed in 1917 when Firth agreed to loan Brown £100,000.144 Only 
half was repaid by 1928, after which a further £100,000 was loaned to their 
parent company the following year.145 The finances of the two companies had 
become increasingly intermingled since the Great War, and rationalisation of 
the two looked increasingly likely.146 
After long discussions, in December 1930 the amalgamation of Firth and 
Brown was completed, Firth taking over all of the steel making capacity of 
Brown in Sheffield and Scunthorpe under the new name of Firth-Brown. John 
Brown remained a shipbuilding company, controlling the share capital of Firth-
Brown.147 This was not the first grouping among armaments companies in 
Sheffield. After incurring losses for several years, Cammell joined discussions 
regarding the amalgamation of their steel works with those of Vickers and 
Vickers-Armstrongs, and from 1929, Cammell became part of the English Steel 
Corporation.148 Hichens spoke at length at Cammell‟s OGM in 1929 after the 
ESC amalgamation about the depressed state of the armaments industry and 
its effect on his company. His words deserve full repetition:  
The armour trade, which in pre-war days was our principal activity, has 
completely collapsed. In pre-war days our shipyard was seldom without 
either a battleship or one or two cruisers or several destroyers; to-day we 
have one submarine on the stocks and have just received an order for 
another. We used to consider our armour shops empty if we had not 
6,000 tons or so of armour passing through them each year; to-day we 
have, perhaps, a couple of hundred tons. Our trade in big armour 
piercing shell is gone altogether, as has our trade in guns and gun-
mountings which was carried on at the Coventry Ordnance Works. We 
were left with a wreck in a raging sea, and it is small wonder that some of 
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the spars and rigging have been carried away. We are lucky to have 
escaped shipwreck.149  
The 1920s had been a difficult decade for the Sheffield armaments industry, 
and as 1931 commenced its structure in the city had drastically changed. The 
five companies which produced arms had been reduced to three though 
mergers, the vertical links so characteristic of the Edwardian period replaced by 
horizontal combinations, with only Hadfields emerging unaffected. The 
depressed state of the industry would remain until the rearmament programme 
commenced in 1936.  
 
Conclusion – The Sheffield Armaments Industry in 1930 
If the Sheffield armaments industry had been at its zenith in 1914, it was at its 
nadir in 1930. Management of the industry had stagnated, the inter-company 
arrangements central to the industry before the Great War had been swept 
away, general profitability had been replaced by persistent losses, and any 
semblance of a special relationship with the industry had died once the 
Washington Naval Treaty had been signed. In its place, „necessary 
relationships‟ took over, designed to protect capacity at a time when there were 
no orders. The industry in 1930 was a pale comparison to how it was in 1914 
(See Figure 6.1). In Sheffield, the five companies had become three following 
mergers, with the former armour producers all leaving the city by name, 
retaining only ownership connections. Technology links, the core of the industry 
in the Edwardian period, had all lapsed and disappeared, the only remaining 
arrangement between Hadfields and Firth signed in 1917. The sole national 
links were with the government to protect capacity, and internationally all that 
remained was membership of the Steel Manufacturers Nickel Syndicate, no 
longer key to armaments production but to increasing manufacture of specialist 
alloy steels. Consequently, armaments were no longer central to the Sheffield 
steel industry in 1930.  
The reduction in the number of companies also led to a reduction in the 
productive facilities available for armaments. The loss of capacity in the industry 
was regrettable to the Government, and „it was the dispersal of research, 
development and production specialists within the companies, and the loss of 
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their records and traditions, that caused the keenest anxiety to procurement 
officers.‟150 It was this skill, knowledge and expertise of the directors, managers, 
research staff and workers that the industry was built on. Collaboratively, they 
had made Sheffield the centre of world armaments production and technology, 
and created the knowledge base upon which the special steels of the 1920s 
would develop. By 1930, the industry was on its knees, never to return to its 
technological and productive glories.   
 
 
Figure 6.2: The Sheffield Armaments Industry in 1930 
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Conclusion 
 
This study has explored the business and technology of the Sheffield 
armaments industry through the use of four in-depth case studies of Brown, 
Cammell, Firth and Hadfields, and provides revisions to our understanding of 
the armaments business in Sheffield, Britain and the wider world. Examining a 
longer period of time, exploring the development of armaments technology, 
placing the focus on companies other than Vickers and Armstrong, and moving 
the focus away from shipbuilding to steel, this conclusion provides an overview 
of the observations and revisions this study has made.  
 The Sheffield armaments industry provides an example of a sector which 
required the application of science, in this case metallurgy, for its continued 
technological vitality. From 1900 developments with projectiles and armour had 
reached the limits of rule of thumb methods, and required more scientific 
approaches for their advancement. Metallurgical knowledge and techniques, 
such as the role of specific elements in the manufacture of steel, forging and 
casting, were incorporated from off the shelf methods, while exploring new 
elements for alloy steels. These experiments were part of a long continuum in 
which armaments-based and commercial-based metallurgy had a reciprocal 
influential relationship, each drawing from the other when required. By the 
outbreak of the Great War, a wide range of compositions and treatments had 
been developed from refining the performance of projectiles and armour plate, 
with several research dead-ends reached in addition to successes. This 
provided a broad knowledge base for utilisation by the civilian metallurgical 
industry, some of which was derived from research dead-ends. One innovation 
before the war, stainless steel, demonstrated how armaments research could 
be rapidly utilised for civilian products. Furthermore, research and development 
in the armaments industry involved path-dependent technological evolution. 
Starting with several major innovations, bulk steel, forging and casting 
production techniques, the teams involved in armaments development utilised 
sub-innovations to refine their performance, a series of incremental 
improvements which individually were of little consequence but cumulatively 
created advanced armaments products. The continued success of a company 
to innovate in the industry was based on the maintenance of the same research 
team involved, the technological path dependence at each company 
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idiosyncratic with the staff involved in the research laboratory. The development 
of armour piercing projectiles also highlights how different companies innovate 
in different ways, Hadfields and Firth utilising different major innovations for 
their research yet ultimately solving the same problems at almost the same 
time. Importantly, this research has made some key observations regarding the 
process of innovation at armaments companies. Considerations as to the typical 
inputs available to companies, the importance of path-dependent research, the 
role of knowledge, the opportunities for spin-off, and the connections to wider 
innovation were all highlighted as important aspects of armaments technological 
development.   
 From this study three key revisions to Trebilcock‟s notion of spin-off in 
the armaments industry can be presented. Firstly, it is possible to demonstrate 
that a two-way interaction between metallurgy and armaments occurred in the 
industry, armaments drawing on established methods and adding new 
experimental ideas, before passing down new knowledge to commercial 
industry. Secondly, the spin-off of knowledge was a key element of the spin-off 
paradigm, developed from both successes and research dead-ends in the 
industry. This knowledge was also maintained by the teams working in research 
laboratories, allowing for its swift utilisation for future armaments and 
commercial research. Finally, it has been shown that spin-off from armaments 
to commercial developments did occur between departments at armaments 
companies, with refinements to established products such as rock and ore 
crushing machinery possible. From the early 1900s, a mix of armaments-
focused and commercially-focused research were driving product developments 
at the companies involved. As the data on armaments research is limited solely 
to patent records, it is only possible to speculate as to the full extent of 
metallurgical knowledge developed by armaments research and passed on to 
civilian industry. 
In the course of armaments technical development, knowledge was an 
important factor and consequently resource to the research teams involved. 
From the investigations undertaken to refine the performance of armaments 
products, companies were able to create and retain knowledge related to both 
armaments and metallurgy within their research laboratories. In cases where 
this tacit knowledge became codified and part of patent records, this allowed for 
the licensing and transmission of technology. Reciprocal licensing 
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arrangements, whereby any advances made were reported back to the original 
inventor by anyone using the technology, were central to the armaments 
industry‟s technological profile. This research has also uncovered the use of 
marketing materials for the sale of systems of armaments manufacture used by 
both Firth and Hadfields for projectiles. Nevertheless, patent records are 
problematic. They only uncover what has been written down, not the vast 
experimentation and potentially exponential knowledge retained by a research 
team and subsequently lost to history. For the receiver, a patent only informed 
them of how to produce a product, not why it was produced the way it was. In 
this regard, patents were useful for licensing and making a return on 
technology, while also being a defence against any new entrants to the market.  
The use and transmission of knowledge highlights how Sheffield made 
important connections through licensing agreements to other companies in the 
sector across the world in an armaments-metallurgy-steel innovation system. In 
this regard, the connections between actors involved in armaments innovation 
are emphasized between the companies, technocrats, and universities 
connected to the industry. By demonstrating the evolution of the system over 
time, the research has highlighted how Sheffield remained at the centre of the 
world armaments industry, with technological, productive and supply 
agreements across the Globe from 1900 to 1930. The growth of the industry 
and its consolidation in 1914 was a high point, its decline in the 1920s 
demonstrating how many of these links disappeared by the end of the decade 
and armaments-focused metallurgy was replaced by metallurgy that focused on 
peacetime manufactures. More research is required into the evolution of the 
system in the 1920s, as it is unknown if the movement from armaments 
research to civilian metallurgical research was replicated in the links companies 
made to trade associations and with alloy steel licensing agreements.  
The Great War was a turning point in the technical development of the 
industry. Metallurgical research and armaments research diverged, armaments 
seeking more practical refinements for their products while metallurgy inherited 
a vast pool of knowledge created from armaments developments. The effect of 
various elements on the performance of steel, treatment and production 
techniques were all utilised by research teams at the armaments companies to 
advance the special steel industry in Sheffield in the 1920s. Stain and heat 
resisting steels were central to their developments, and an analysis of the 
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patent records of the companies involved demonstrated the influence 
armaments research had on their new designs and innovations. Nevertheless, 
when required armaments could still draw on metallurgy to continue to develop 
new products, as was demonstrated at the start of the 1930s. The metallurgical 
knowledge created, and its legacy with the development of stain and heat 
resisting steels, were key determinants of the evolution of the next generation of 
armaments products, including the aircraft and motor vehicles. In this regard, 
more research is needed to chart the evolution of the special steel industry and 
its links to these new war materials to find the true extent of the Sheffield 
armaments industry‟s technological legacy.  
Putting Sheffield at the centre of an armaments-metallurgy-steel 
innovation system also advances the notion of industrial districts. Sheffield was 
the centre of the industry, and the small number of companies involved allows 
the advancement of a capsule network. As has been highlighted, the small 
membership led to collusive behaviour and unresponsiveness once the 
demands of the Great War were apparent in late 1914. However, by focusing on 
a capsule network with a small number of companies involved overlooked the 
rest of the Sheffield steel industry and the other links made between armaments 
and non-armaments companies in the city. Further investigation may reveal a 
greater number of connections between actors in the city involved with research 
and metallurgy, broadening the influence of the armaments sector in the wider 
steel industry.  
By investigating the special relationships paradigm advanced by 
Trebilcock, the research has further explored the connections between the state 
and private industry and provides some key revisions to the work of Trebilcock, 
and Davenport-Hines. It has been advanced that prior to the Great War, there 
was a hierarchy of special relationships in the industry, with some companies 
seen as more favoured than others. This is replicated in the membership of 
each company‟s directorships, the guaranteed supply arrangements entered 
into, and the case of Cammell‟s dismissal from procurement lists. The extent to 
which hierarchies of special relationships are replicated in other sectors of the 
armaments business, such as small arms, cordite and shipbuilding, requires 
further investigation. The Great War changed the perception of special 
relationships, the hierarchy collapsing as all industrial capacity was required for 
the conflict. With the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1921, the 
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outlook for the industry looked bleak, the demand for armaments disappearing 
overnight. Against this backdrop, the government scrambled to retain capacity 
should they require any armaments products in the future. Signing agreements 
for both armour and projectiles to ensure companies retained their capacity, the 
notion of special relationships was washed away, and in its place a series of 
„necessary relationships‟ to ensure the business did not disappear were 
implemented. Overall, before the Great War the armaments companies were 
able to fund their research and development activities in-house, the demand for 
armaments from their home governmental buyers meaning profits could be re-
invested in the constant cycle of experimentation in the industry. After the War, 
this approach was ultimately unviable, the government forced to pay the 
companies in the industry to maintain their research and productive capabilities 
in place should demand arise again.  
The exploration of special relationships also highlights the management 
of the industry and the need to recruit ex-military and governmental personnel 
to the directorships of each company. These directors brought with them 
important connections to the supply ministries and Whitehall, and in many 
cases technical information to supplement and advance the research of the 
company. The research has also highlighted the response of management to 
the uncertainty of the armaments market through the implementation of a 
number of defensive measures. The establishment of the Coventry Ordnance 
Works exemplifies this, a collaborative business venture designed to counter 
uncertainty in the market, and through the establishment of a director network, 
the sharing of both risks and knowledge. International business, both 
individually and collaboratively were also used to defend against uncertainty, 
maximise output and profits, and continue to employ and make a return from 
their works and research efforts. Prior to the Great War individual approaches to 
international markets were the most successful, yet in the 1920s collaboration 
was a more desirable approach due to increasing competition from overseas 
armaments producers.  
Overall, management was highly entrepreneurial, seeking new ways to 
exploit markets for armaments, promoting their products to their home buyer, 
controlling knowledge about future demands and inter-company actions, while 
supporting, and in some cases aiding, in the technological prowess of their 
company. Where criticism can be levelled against management was in their 
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static response to the decline in the armaments business of the 1920s, all 
sticking to what they knew best and aging along with their companies when they 
required an influx of new ideas. The end point of 1930 highlighted a change in 
the structure of the industry, the number of companies involved in Sheffield 
reduced from five to three through mergers and rationalisation. The story of the 
industry in the 1930s, through rearmament programs and the Second World 
War, is worthy of future investigation.  
Overall the armaments industry provides an example counter to general 
notions of British industrial decline. It was the first scientific, high technology 
industry, one in which the increasingly exacting requirements of their products 
boosted investment into research and development. In turn, the industry utilised 
dedicated production facilities, using bespoke machinery so specialised in most 
cases it was useless for anything other than the batch production runs required 
for the goods ordered by the governments of the world. It eschewed mass 
production as it was not needed, even in wartime. Managerially before the 
Great War each company employed experts to expand their research and 
development capabilities and build closer links with their home monopsonist 
buyer. General ideas regarding marketing do not apply given the very limited 
number of customers available for armaments, instead negotiations and close 
relationships with home and foreign governments were required. Marketing 
between companies was also achieved in the licensing of technology, putting 
Sheffield at the centre of an international network of armaments producers.  
By 1914 no other industrial centre could rival the technological expertise 
of the Sheffield armaments industry. The technocrats involved expertly used 
systematic research to refine armaments products, their work strongly 
influenced by metallurgy. Consequently, much of the knowledge derived from 
their experimental work provided a strong influence on the next generation of 
developments with metallurgy. Coupled with important productive facilities, the 
city had customers across the Globe for their output of war material. While the 
industry declined after the Great War, for several decades Sheffield truly was 
the „Arsenal of the World‟. 
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Appendix A: List Of Patents used in the Study 
 
Section 1: British Patents (95 Total) 
 
Year 
Patent 
Number 
Inventor(s) and Company Title Of Patent 
1894 8,971 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Projectiles 
1895 24,453 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Cast Steel Hollow Projectiles, and 
Means for Carrying same into Effect 
1896 12,782 Alexander Wilson and Frederic 
Stubbs (Cammell) 
Improvements in Carbonising Iron and 
Steel 
1897 27,753 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improved Manufacture of Projectiles 
1897 27,754 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improved Manufacture of Projectiles 
1897 27,755 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improved Manufacture of Projectiles 
1898 3,543 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Projectiles 
1898 16,901 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in Projectiles 
1898 20,983 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in Projectiles 
1898 21,805 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in Projectiles 
1899 13,670 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Steel Castings, such as Projectiles 
1901 6,089 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture or 
Production of Hardened Steel 
Projectiles and other Hardened Steel 
Articles 
1901 6,091 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Projectiles 
1902 2,150 Frederick Charles Fairholme and 
Joseph Ernst Fletcher (Cammell) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Projectiles and in Apparatus therefor 
1902 28,376 James Rossiter Hoyle and 
Alexander Anderson (Firth) 
Improvements in Armour Piercing 
Projectiles 
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1903 1,850 Frederick Charles Fairholme and 
Joseph Ernst Fletcher (Cammell) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Armour Plates and Projectiles 
1903 8,299 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Steel Armour Plates, or other Plates of 
Steel, with a Hardened Face 
1903   12,279  Cammell Laird & Company 
Limited, Frederick Charles 
Fairholme and Joseph Ernst 
Fletcher (Cammell) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Hollow Projectiles 
1903 12,281 Cammell Laird & Company 
Limited, Frederick Charles 
Fairholme and Joseph Ernst 
Fletcher (Cammell) 
Improvements in Projectiles 
1903 18,414 James Rossiter Hoyle and 
Alexander Anderson (Firth) 
Improvements in Armour Piercing 
Projectiles 
1903 19,686 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and 
Alexander George McKenna 
(Firth-Sterling) 
Improvements in Caps for Projectiles 
1904 7,882 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Projectiles, and of 
Caps for use therewith 
1904 8,037 James Rossiter Hoyle and 
Alexander Anderson (Firth) 
Improvements in Armour Piercing 
Projectiles 
1904 15,219 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Projectiles 
1906 19,133 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Gun Houses and other Protective 
Structures for use in War Ships, Forts 
and the like 
1907 15,976 Cammell Laird & Company 
Limited, William Archbold Hartley 
and Bedford Henry Deby 
(Cammell) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Armour Plates and other Articles 
1907 19,104 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Caps 
for Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1908 2,817 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Capped 
Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1908 6,942 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in Armour Piercing 
Projectiles 
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1908 8,105 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles and Caps therefor 
1908 14,706 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Clad Vessels and Armour Plates 
therefor 
1908 17,453 Tolmie John Tresidder, James 
Rossiter Hoyle and Harry Bland 
Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1908 19,062 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Armour Plating 
1909 9,215  Edward Kay and Cammell Laird 
& Company Limited (Cammell) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Projectiles 
1909 10,937 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1909 12,055 Vickers, Sons & Maxim Limited, 
Thomas Edward Vickers and 
John Lawrence Benthall 
(Vickers) 
Improvements relating to the 
Manufacture of Armour Plates and 
other Steel Articles 
1909 23,288 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Percussion Fuzes for Projectiles 
1910 14,899 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Percussion Fuzes for Projectiles 
1911 6,923 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Fuzes 
for Projectiles 
1911 22,899 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Fuzes 
for Projectiles 
1911 28,032 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1912 3,901 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Fuzes 
for Projectiles 
1912 15,595 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in Caps for Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1912 21,903 Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack and Major Augustus Basil 
Holt Clerke (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Caps 
for Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1912 29,145 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Fuzes 
for Projectiles 
1913 10,607 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Capped 
Armour Piercing Projectiles and Caps 
therefor 
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1913 10,990 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1913 10,991 James Rossiter Hoyle, William 
Arthur Burton and Harry Bland 
Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1913 17,600 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour-
piercing Projectiles 
1914 1,619 Cammell Laird & Company 
Limited and James McNeal Allan 
(Cammell) 
Improvements in or relating to Caps 
for Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1914 8,875 Thos. Firth & Sons Limited and 
Harry Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour-
piercing Projectiles 
1914 8,876 Thos. Firth & Sons Limited and 
Harry Bland Strange (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour-
piercing Projectiles 
1915 3,423 John Brown & Company Limited 
and Tolmie John Tresidder 
(Brown) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Armour Plates 
1915 4,228 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Metal Ingots 
1915 6,993 Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack and Issac Bernard Milne 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Projectiles 
1916 105,348 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Major Augustus Basil Holt Clerke 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Helmets 
1916 124,826 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strang (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Fuzes 
for Projectiles 
1916 126,048 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strang (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Time 
Fuzes and those having Delay Action 
1916 126,049 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Steel 
1916 127,601 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Caps 
for Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1916 127,602 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture or Treatment of Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1916 128,961 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Shell 
1917 120,774 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Bullets 
for use in Revolvers and like Firearms 
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1917 125,671 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strang (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1917 127,660 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Devices for 
Decapping Armour-piercing Shells  
1917 127,851 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Sidney Arthur Main (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Bullets 
1917 129,367 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Devices for 
Protecting Turret Roofs, and 
analogous Structures, against Shells 
and Projectiles 
1917 133,131 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Manganese Steel 
Sheets and Helmets made therefrom 
1918 125,737 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strang (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Projectiles 
1918 125,738 James Rossiter Hoyle and Harry 
Bland Strang (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Projectiles 
1918 130,692  Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Caps 
for Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1918 142,143 Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack and Issac Bernard Milne 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1918 142,145 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1918 142,146 Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack and Augustus Basil Holt 
Clerke (Hadfields) 
Improvements in and relating to the 
Manufacture of Gun Tubes, suitable 
for use in the Construction of Howitzer 
and like Guns and for the Linings of 
Wire-wound and other Guns 
1918 142,148 Robert Abbott Hadfield and 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Armour Piercing 
Projectiles, Shells and other Hollow 
Bodies 
1918 142,149 Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack, Issac Bernard Milne, 
James Rossiter Hoyle, Harry 
Bland Strang and Esmond Morse 
(Hadfields and Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Manufacture of Caps for Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
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1919 164,056 Robert Abbott Hadfield, 
Alexander George McKenzie 
Jack and Augustus Basil Holt 
Clerke (Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Capped 
Armour Piercing Projectiles 
1921 184,920 Cammell Laird & Company  
Limited, James McNeal Allan, 
Alexander Parker Hague and 
Thomas Middleton (Cammell) 
Improvements in or relating to the 
Cementation of Iron, Steel and 
Ferrous Alloys 
1922 202,681 Robert Abbott Hadfield  and 
Augustus Basil Holt Clerke 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1922 208,803 William Herbert Hatfield and 
Harry Green (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Alloy 
Steels 
1923 220,006 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Alloys 
1923 232,656 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Alloys 
1925 251,837 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Micrometer Screw 
Gauges of the Beam Type 
1926 250,148 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Instruments for 
Measuring Angles 
1926 265,503 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Micrometer Calliper 
Gauges 
1927 276,249 Cammell Laird & Company  
Limited, James McNeal Allan, 
and Alexander Parker Hague 
(Cammell) 
Improvements in or relating to Alloy 
Steels 
1927 302,812 William Herbert Hatfield and 
Harry Green (Firth) 
Improvements in the Manufacture of 
Metal Articles and Alloys therefor 
1928 313,471 Robert Abbott Hadfield 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Alloys 
1928 316,394 William Herbert Hatfield and 
Harry Green (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Metal 
Articles for use in Chemical and like 
Processes and Alloys therefor 
1929 325,963 Tolmie John Tresidder (Brown) Improvements in Setting Rods for use 
with Micrometer Gauges 
1929 329,966 Harry Bland Strang and Harry 
Green (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
1929 329,967 Harry Bland Strang and Harry 
Green (Firth) 
Improvements in or relating to 
Projectiles 
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1929 333,237  William Herbert Hatfield and 
Harry Green (Firth) 
A Method of, or Process for, 
Rendering Austenitic Nickel-chromium 
Steels Non-corrodible 
1930 352,548 Robert Abbott Hadfield  
(Hadfields) 
New or Improved Manufacture of 
Material suitable for Resisting Rifle 
Bullets and other Projectiles and for 
other purposes 
1930 353,425 Robert Abbott Hadfield  and 
Augustus Basil Holt Clerke 
(Hadfields) 
Improvements in or relating to Armour 
Piercing Projectiles 
  
 
Section 2: US Patents (10 Total) 
 
Year 
Patent 
Number 
Inventor(s) and Company Title Of Patent 
1903 721,487 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile 
1903 725,385 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile 
1904 748,827 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Cap for Projectile 
1906 815,992 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile and its Band 
1907 841,753 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile 
1907 875,023 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile 
1908 893,963 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile 
1910 950,586 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Capped Armor-Piercing 
Projectile 
1910 963,489 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Projectile 
1910 968,012 Charles Van Cise Wheeler and Alexander 
George McKenna (Firth-Sterling) 
Cap for Armor-Piercing 
Projectile 
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Appendix B: Hadfields’ and Firth’s British Government Projectile Orders 
1900-1914 
 
Section 1: Hadfields’ Orders 
Order Date Customer Quantity Description Value 
10 February 1900 British Army 10,000 15 pound shrapnel shell, Hadfields cast 
steel 
£10,387 
24 February 1900 British Navy 30,000 4.7 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £26,400 
24 February 1900 British Navy 40,000 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £19,050 
01 March 1900 British Army 10,000 12 pound shrapnel cast steel shell £8,985 
21 March 1900 British Navy 200 12 inch heavy armour piercing shot £10,508 
14 May 1900 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £32,984 
14 May 1900 British Navy 800 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £15,664 
14 May 1900 British Navy 600 8 inch armour piercing shell £6,652 
14 May 1900 British Navy 10,400 6 inch armour piercing shell £46,540 
07 June 1900 British Army 7,360 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £3,569 
07 June 1900 British Navy 4,000 12 inch heavy common, pointed, cast steel 
shell 
£49,200 
07 June 1900 British Navy 300 9.2 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £2,231 
07 June 1900 British Navy 900 8 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £4,050 
07 June 1900 British Navy 40,000 6 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £62,299 
07 June 1900 British Navy 10,000 4 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £6,800 
07 June 1900 British Navy 36,000 4.7 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £22,620 
07 June 1900 British Navy 30,000 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £14,250 
26 June 1900 British Army 5,000 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £86,853 
03 July 1900 British Army 2,000 4.7 inch shrapnel shell £3,870 
13 July 1900 British Navy 400 13.5 inch armour piercing shell £20,645 
25 July 1900 British Army 10,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £38,975 
16 August 1900 British Army 200 6 inch high explosive shell, Hadfields cast 
steel 
£630 
16 November 1900 British Navy 500 13.5 inch armour piercing shell £26,875 
16 November 1900 British Navy 400 12 inch light armour piercing shell £15,084 
16 November 1900 British Navy 1,000 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £35,500 
16 November 1900 British Navy 500 10 inch armour piercing shell £11,414 
16 November 1900 British Navy 400 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £6,900 
16 November 1900 British Navy 15,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £58,349 
03 December 1900 British Navy 1,200 4 inch common, pointed shell £813 
03 December 1900 British Navy 10,000 12 pound, common, pointed shell £4,675 
     
15 February 1901 British Army 6 Fit six 6 inch AP shells with caps  £12 
06 May 1901 British Navy 1,600 12 inch heavy common, pointed, cast steel 
shell 
£19,514 
06 May 1901 British Navy 1,200 9.2 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £8,040 
06 May 1901 British Navy 8,000 4 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £5,279 
06 May 1901 British Navy 10,000 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £4,575 
13 May 1901 British Navy 200 12 inch heavy armour piercing shot £9,950 
13 May 1901 British Navy 600 6 inch armour piercing shot £3,574 
15 May 1901 British Navy 5,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £18,500 
22 May 1901 British Army 10 6 pound unharded shell for trial £17 
31 May 1901 British Army 7,000 4.7 inch shrapnel shell £11,201 
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15 June 1901 British Army 1 6 inch uncapped armour piercing shell £3 
04 July 1901 British Navy 1,000 6 inch common, pointed practice shell £806 
30 May 1901 British Army 12 7.5 inch armour piercing shell £93 
08 August 1901 British Army 1 6 inch AP shot to be fired at KNC plate at 
20 deg.  
£0 
10 September 1901 British Army 10,000 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £4,533 
11 September 1901 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £26,368 
03 October 1901 British Army 450 6 inch cast steel practice shell £480 
18 December 1901 British Army 10,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £32,500 
     
20 January 1902 British Army 250 12 pound common shell £50 
20 January 1902 British Army 260 6 inch armour piercing shell £205 
20 January 1902 British Army 8 9.2 inch common steel shell £20 
20 January 1902 British Army 12 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £35 
20 January 1902 British Army 4 10 inch common shell £19 
07 April 1902 British Navy 9 12 inch light armour piercing shell £42 
07 April 1902 British Navy 5 12 inch heavy common shell £27 
07 April 1902 British Navy 70 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £390 
07 April 1902 British Navy 18 13.5 inch armour piercing shell £127 
01 May 1902 British Navy 2,000 6 inch cast steel shrapnel shell £5,002 
01 May 1902 British Navy 1,600 6 inch armour piercing shell in Hadfields 
cast steel 
£7,702 
23 May 1902 British Navy 50,000 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £20,674 
26 May 1902 British Army 13,500 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £5,568 
17 March 1902 British Army 3 6 inch improved cast steel AP shot capped £16 
09 June 1902 British Navy 300 13.5 inch armour piercing shell, cast steel £13,635 
09 June 1902 British Navy 43,000 6 inch solid shot, cast iron £33,150 
09 June 1902 British Navy 400 13.5 inch solid shot, cast iron, for practice £2,887 
09 June 1902 British Navy 600 12 inch heavy solid shot, cast iron, for 
practice 
£3,404 
09 June 1902 British Navy 300 12 inch light solid shot, cast iron, for 
practice 
£1,516 
14 June 1902 British Army 833 12 inch light armour piercing shell £24,996 
14 June 1902 British Army 365 10 inch armour piercing shell, Hadfields 
cast steel 
£7,490 
14 June 1902 British Army 1,632 9.2 inch armour piercing shell, Hadfields 
cast steel 
£27,578 
14 June 1902 British Army 7,600 6 inch armour piercing shell in Hadfields 
cast steel 
£25,843 
07 July 1902 British Navy 10,000 6 inch armour piercing shell in Hadfields 
cast steel 
£32,526 
17 July 1902 British Army 62 4.7 inch common shell £25 
17 July 1902 British Army 287 6 inch common shell £210 
17 July 1902 British Army 269 6 inch armour piercing shell £196 
17 July 1902 British Army 46 6 inch armour piercing shot £33 
17 July 1902 British Army 4 9.2 inch common shell £14 
17 July 1902 British Army 22 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £65 
18 October 1902 British Army 5,000 12 pound common, pointed, cast steel shell £2,049 
     
25 March 1903 British Navy 17,000 4.7 inch solid shot, cast iron £5,847 
15 May 1903 British Navy 500 12 inch heavy, common, pointed, cast steel 
shell 
£5,004 
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15 May 1903 British Navy 8,000 12 pound, common, pointed, cast steel 
shell 
£3,111 
26 May 1903 British Army 200 9.2 inch common lyddite shell £2,104 
24 June 1903 British Navy 5,000 6 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £7,132 
24 June 1903 British Navy 9,000 4 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £4,930 
30 June 1903 British Navy 1,200 9.2 inch armour piercing shell, cast steel £13,305 
30 June 1903 British Navy 20,000 6 inch armour piercing shell, cast steel £53,238 
08 July 1903 British Navy 1,600 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £37,741 
21 July 1903 British Army 200 6 inch shot, forged £209 
21 July 1903 British Army 200 4.7 inch shot, forged £104 
08 October 1903 British Army 400 6 inch armour piercing shell £1,050 
10 October 1903 British Army 3 6 inch Heclon projectiles £15 
     
06 January 1904 British Navy 40 6 inch common shell £24 
06 January 1904 British Navy 190 6 inch armour piercing shell £116 
06 January 1904 British Navy 126 6 inch armour piercing shot £77 
06 January 1904 British Navy 27 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £58 
06 January 1904 British Navy 19 12 inch light armour piercing shell £87 
06 January 1904 British Navy 34 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £170 
29 January 1904 British Army 200 6 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £255 
30 January 1904 British Army 4 6 inch Heclon projectiles £20 
25 February 1904 British Navy 1,200 7.5 inch common, pointed shell £4,275 
10 March 1904 British Navy 800 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap £11,235 
28 March 1904 British Navy 7,000 4 inch solid shot, cast iron £1,431 
26 April 1904 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell £8,986 
26 April 1904 British Navy 800 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £8,503 
26 April 1904 British Navy 1,600 7.5 inch armour piercing shell £22,325 
02 May 1904 British Navy 600 12 inch heavy cast iron shot £2,934 
11 May 1904 British Army 84 6 inch pointed common shell £152 
20 May 1904 British Army 9,000 5 inch solid shot £2,475 
31 May 1904 British Navy 2,200 7.5 inch common, pointed, cast steel shell £8,226 
21 June 1904 British Navy 2,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £5,079 
21 June 1904 British Navy 4,000 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£25,980 
02 August 1904 British Navy 300 10 inch solid shot £837 
12 August 1904 British Navy 8,000 4.7 inch solid shot £2,229 
01 September 1904 British Army 889 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£5,772 
19 September 1904 British Navy 3,000 6 inch solid shot £1,913 
30 September 1904 British Navy 800 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £8,617 
11 October 1904 British Army 10 6 inch cast steel common shell £23 
01 December 1904 British Navy 600 10 inch common, pointed shell £4,800 
01 December 1904 British Navy 1,000 7.5 inch common, pointed shell £3,800 
22 December 1904 British Navy 10,000 12 pound common, pointed shell £3,710 
     
02 January 1905 British Navy 1,600 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£8,270 
02 January 1905 British Navy 800 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£7,908 
02 January 1905 British Navy 800 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£7,840 
02 January 1905 British Army 15 6 inch shell £35 
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09 January 1905 British Navy 300 10 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£7,057 
09 January 1905 British Navy 800 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£14,728 
11 January 1905 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy solid shot £1,876 
11 January 1905 British Army 52,000 18 pound shrapnel shell £46,468 
25 January 1905 British Army 700 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£6,825 
25 January 1905 British Army 400 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£2,048 
10 February 1905 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap (Heclon) 
£26,766 
24 March 1905 British Army 45,000 18 pound shrapnel shell £32,981 
25 May 1905 British Navy 200 10 inch solid shot £542 
25 May 1905 British Navy 6,000 6 inch solid shot £3,642 
10 June 1905 British Navy 5,000 12 pound common pointed shell £1,862 
31 July 1905 British Army 810 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£4,235 
05 September 1905 British Navy 2,800 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap (Heclon) 
£81,914 
05 September 1905 British Navy 2,400 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£39,920 
05 September 1905 British Navy 1,200 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£11,285 
03 November 1905 British Army 400 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£6,400 
06 December 1905 British Navy 10,000 12 pound common pointed shell £3,981 
07 December 1905 British Army 3,000 5 inch solid shot £940 
08 September 1905 British Army 4 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£43 
     
20 January 1906 British Army 25 Cast steel bodies for 60 pound shrapnel 
shell 
£18 
17 February 1906 British Army 5 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£30 
18 May 1906 British Army 4 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£40 
28 May 1906 British Navy 1,200 12 inch heavy solid shot £5,398 
28 May 1906 British Navy 1,000 7.5 inch solid shot £1,258 
28 May 1906 British Navy 1,000 7.5 inch solid shot £1,240 
28 May 1906 British Navy 2,500 6 inch solid shot £1,650 
16 June 1906 British Navy 20,000 12 pound common, pointed shell £6,968 
19 December 1906 British Navy 10,000 12 pound common lyddite shell £4,661 
06 July 1906 British Navy 3,000 7.5 inch common, pointed shell £10,174 
11 July 1906 British Army 2 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with caps £22 
08 August 1906 British Navy 1,100 12 inch heavy, common, pointed, cast steel 
shell 
£11,833 
15 August 1906 British Army 2 12 inch AP shell  £65 
15 August 1906 British Army 2 7.5 inch AP shell £20 
29 October 1906 British Navy 6 12 inch armour piercing capped shell 
(Eron) 
£195 
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15 January 1907 British Army 2 12 inch Eron AP Shell with caps £37 
15 January 1907 British Army 2 12 inch AP shell without caps £33 
11 January 1907 British Army 2 7.5 inch common, pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£25 
17 January 1907 British Navy 3,000 12 pound common lyddite shell £1,170 
27 February 1907 British Army 6 12 inch Eron capped shell £111 
08 February 1907 British Army 20,000 18 pound shrapnel shell £15,340 
13 April 1907 British Navy 800 12 armour piercing shell with cap  £24,812 
19 April 1907 British Army 6 7.5 inch capped common pointed shell £60 
15 May 1907 British Army 1 7.5 inch capped common pointed shell £10 
22 June 1907 British Navy 7 7.5 inch AP shell £8 
22 June 1907 British Navy 1 12 inch AP shell  £4 
29 June 1907 British Army 17,500 18 pound shrapnel shell £13,575 
04 October 1907 British Army 1 7.5 inch Eron shell fitted with our patent 
cap 
£10 
10 October 1907 British Navy 4,800 12 inch heavy, common, pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£119,925 
18 November 1907 British Army 2 12 inch common, pointed shell with cap £9 
18 November 1907 British Army 5 7.5 inch Heclon AP Shell £6 
27 November 1907 British Army 4 9.2 inch Eron capped common pointed 
shell 
£69 
04 February 1908 British Navy 5,000 4 inch heavy common, pointed shell £3,450 
27 May 1908 British Army 4 12 inch AP shell with cap to our design £140 
05 June 1908 British Navy 100 12 inch common shell with cap (Eron) £1,750 
05 June 1908 British Navy 100 12 inch common shell with cap (Eron) £1,750 
17 May 1908 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy common, pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£20,774 
25 August 1908 British Navy 20 12 inch lyddite shell £530 
02 September 1908 British Navy 2,000 4 inch heavy common, pointed shell £1,425 
05 September 1908 British Navy 800 7.5 inch common, pointed with cap (Eron) £7,144 
17 September 1908 British Navy 20 6 inch common pointed shell with cap £80 
17 September 1908 British Navy 20 6 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Different) 
£80 
17 September 1908 British Navy 35 6 inch lyddite shell  £147 
17 September 1908 British Navy 35 6 inch lyddite shell (Different) £147 
28 October 1908 British Army 2 12 inch Heclon AP shell with cap £132 
28 October 1908 British Army 2 12 inch Eron common shell with cap £132 
16 December 1908 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£9,938 
29 December 1908 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£10,113 
     
26 January 1909 British Army 2 7.5 inch Eron common pointed shell with 
cap 
£17 
29 January 1909 British Army 2 12 inch Heclon capped shell with 8 calibre 
head 
£66 
04 February 1909 British Army 5 9.2 inch high explosive armour piercing 
shell 
£87 
12 February 1909 British Navy 20 9.2 inch common cast iron shell £100 
12 February 1909 British Navy 10 7.5 inch common cast iron shell £27 
12 February 1909 British Navy 10 6 inch common cast iron shell £13 
16 March 1909 British Army 20 9.2 inch lyddite shell £265 
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06 April 1909 British Navy 300 12 inch heavy common lyddite shell £5,070 
07 April 1909 British Army 20 12 inch heavy common shell with cap £361 
05 May 1909 British Navy 3 9.2 inch common shell with cap £53 
15 June 1909 British Army 20 12 inch heavy cast steel practice shell with 
cap 
£275 
10 June 1909 British Navy 6,000 4 inch heavy common, pointed shell £1,556 
05 July 1909 British Army 50 6 inch common lyddite shell £195 
23 October 1909 British Navy 10,000 4 inch heavy common lyddite shell £8,135 
01 October 1909 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy common, pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£10,050 
01 October 1909 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy common lyddite shell £6,300 
05 October 1909 British Navy 3 6 inch common capped shell (Eron) £15 
21 August 1909 British Navy 40 12 inch Eron common capped shell £903 
21 August 1909 British Navy 10 12 inch Heclon AP shell £221 
21 August 1909 British Navy 10 12 inch lyddite shell £221 
21 August 1909 British Navy 40 12 inch Eron common capped shell £903 
21 August 1909 British Navy 10 12 inch Heclon AP shell £221 
21 August 1909 British Navy 10 12 inch lyddite shell £221 
06 October 1909 British Navy 40 12 inch Eron common capped shell £898 
06 October 1909 British Navy 10 12 inch Heclon AP shell £220 
06 October 1909 British Navy 10 12 inch lyddite shell £220 
21 August 1909 British Navy 6 12 inch lyddite shell £120 
06 October 1909 British Navy 5 12 inch lyddite shell £119 
06 October 1909 British Navy 4 12 inch Eron common capped shell £168 
06 October 1909 British Navy 4 12 inch Heclon AP shell £168 
06 October 1909 British Navy 4 12 inch Eron common capped shell £168 
06 October 1909 British Navy 4 12 inch Heclon AP shell £168 
15 October 1909 British Navy 4 12 inch Eron common capped shell £168 
15 October 1909 British Navy 4 12 inch Heclon AP shell £168 
22 November 1909 British Army 3 7.5 inch common pointed shell with cap £26 
22 November 1909 British Army 3 7.5 inch common pointed shell £25 
     
22 February 1910 British Army 8 12 inch lyddite shell £238 
22 February 1910 British Army 10 12 inch lyddite shell £240 
24 February 1910 British Navy 400 6 inch Eron common, pointed, cast steel 
shell with cap 
£2,160 
21 March 1910 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£20,158 
02 June 1910 British Navy 50 13.5 inch common, pointed projectile with 
cap 
£1,200 
03 June 1910 British Navy 500 7.5 inch practice shot £638 
27 June 1910 British Navy 50 13.5 inch common, pointed projectile with 
cap 
£1,175 
31 October 1910 British Navy 800 6 inch common, pointed with cap £3,873 
02 September 1910 British Navy 8,000 12 and 14 pound practice shot £732 
02 September 1910 British Navy 1,000 7.5 inch practice shot £1,277 
05 September 1910 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£10,053 
12 September 1910 British Navy 1,200 13.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£55,154 
12 September 1910 British Navy 800 13.5 inch common, pointed projectile with 
cap (Eron) 
£37,520 
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06 October 1910 British Army 117 9.2 inch heavy common lyddite shell £758 
     
19 January 1911 British Navy 2 13.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap £92 
02 February 1911 British Navy 26 13.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£851 
02 February 1911 British Navy 3 13.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£145 
02 February 1911 British Navy 26 13.5 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£858 
02 February 1911 British Navy 3 13.5 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£148 
02 February 1911 British Navy 16 13.5 inch common lyddite shell £456 
02 February 1911 British Navy 26 13.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£851 
02 February 1911 British Navy 3 13.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£145 
02 February 1911 British Navy 26 13.5 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£858 
02 February 1911 British Navy 3 13.5 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£148 
02 February 1911 British Navy 16 13.5 inch common lyddite shell £456 
27 April 1911 British Navy 21 13.5 inch representative common capped 
shell 
£672 
13 June 1911 British Navy 2,800 6 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£13,533 
13 July 1911 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy common pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£19,776 
13 July 1911 British Navy 2,000 6 inch common lyddite shell £4,533 
13 July 1911 British Navy 31,600 4 inch heavy common lyddite shell £28,875 
04 August 1911 British Navy 7,500 4 inch heavy common lyddite shell £6,765 
17 August 1911 British Navy 2,000 13.5 inch heavy common pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£90,735 
17 August 1911 British Navy 2,000 13.5 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap (Heclon) 
£86,000 
22 August 1911 British Army 2,775 4.5 inch common lyddite howitzer shell £2,771 
04 October 1911 British Navy 5 Projectiles representative of 13.5 inch AP 
with cap 
£135 
04 October 1911 British Navy 5 Projectiles representative of 13.5 inch 
common capped 
£136 
12 October 1911 British Navy 400 13.5 inch heavy common lyddite shell £11,508 
26 October 2011 British Navy 10 Projectiles representative of 12 inch heavy 
AP with cap 
£135 
     
09 January 1912 British Army 7 9.2 inch representative AP shell with cap £94 
15 February 1912 British Navy 1,600 13.5 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£70,087 
15 February 1912 British Navy 800 13.5 inch heavy common pointed shell with 
cap 
£36,840 
02 April 1912 British Navy 10 6 inch capped common shell (Eron) £48 
26 March 1912 British Army 4 9.2 inch representative AP shell with cap £53 
09 August 1912 British Navy 37,000 4 inch heavy common lyddite shell £41,836 
18 September 1912 British Navy 3,000 6 inch common lyddite shell £8,119 
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06 November 1912 British Navy 2,800 6 inch common, pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£16,827 
28 November 1912 British Navy 400 13.5 inch heavy common pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£20,016 
13 December 1912 British Navy 2 14 inch Heclon armour piercing capped £136 
13 December 1912 British Navy 2 14 inch Eron common pointed with cap £141 
     
15 January 1913 British Navy 10 6 inch armour piercing with cap, filled with 
salt 
£62 
03 February 1913 British Navy 800 13.5 inch light common pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£35,931 
17 April 1913 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy common pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£10,213 
28 May 1913 British Navy 1,600 15 inch armour piercing shell with cap 
(Heclon) 
£102,215 
31 May 1913 British Navy 4,000 6 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£25,324 
11 June 1913 British Navy 2 Representative 15 inch Eron common 
pointed capped 
£124 
07 August 1913 British Navy 6,000 4 inch heavy practice shot £1,696 
09 August 1913 British Army 625 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap £10,426 
26 July 1913 British Navy 1,200 15 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£79,158 
24 November 1913 British Navy 205 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£469 
08 December 1913 British Navy 12,000 4 inch heavy common lyddite shell £16,936 
10 December 1913 British Army 9 6 inch armour piercing Heclon shell £54 
     
21 January 1914 British Navy 400 13.5 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£18,482 
21 January 1914 British Navy 1,200 13.5 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£53,122 
21 January 1914 British Navy 800 15 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£49,326 
21 January 1914 British Navy 400 15 inch armour piercing shell with cap £23,760 
22 January 1914 British Navy 10 6 inch armour piercing Heclon shell £62 
17 March 1914 British Navy 1,600 6 inch common pointed shell with cap £9,523 
20 April 1914 British Army 500 9.2 inch heavy practice shot £1,074 
03 July 1914 British Navy 1,600 15 inch armour piercing shell with cap £96,201 
03 July 1914 British Navy 2,800 15 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£172,889 
03 July 1914 British Navy 400 12 inch heavy common pointed shell with 
cap (Eron) 
£9,868 
03 July 1914 British Navy 4,000 6 inch common pointed shell with cap 
(Eron) 
£23,969 
15 July 1914 British Navy 7,500 4 inch heavy common lyddite shell £10,593 
08 August 1914 British Army 800 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap  £14,266 
 
Source: Sheffield Archives, Hadfields Projectile Order Books Volume 1 to 3. 
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Section 2: Firth’s Orders 
 
Order Date Customer Quantity Description Value 
27 January 1900 British Army 1,000 5 inch common lyddite shell £2,100 
02 March 1900 British Army 6,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £34,500 
14 May 1900 British Navy 2,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £11,840 
14 May 1900 British Navy 400 12 inch armour piercing heavy shell £19,800 
14 May 1900 British Navy 800 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £19,600 
13 July 1900 British Navy 400 13.5 inch Armour Piercing Shell £25,600 
16 November 1900 British Navy 8,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £39,600 
16 December 1900 British Navy 500 13.5 inch Armour Piercing Shell £31,000 
     
14 June 1902 British Army 833 12 inch armour piercing light projectile £24,115 
14 June 1902 British Army 365 10 inch armour piercing shell £7,099 
14 June 1902 British Army 3,680 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £55,016 
14 June 1902 British Army 100 8 inch armour piercing shell £945 
14 June 1902 British Army 12,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £37,500 
     
16 April 1903 British Navy 200 6 inch armour piercing shot £1,300 
30 June 1903 British Navy 6,000 6 inch armour piercing shell £14,250 
06 August 1903 British Army 400 9.2 inch armour piercing shell £3,750 
     
12 January 1904 British Army 400 9.2 inch cast steel shrapnel shell £2,700 
10 March 1904 British Navy 1,600 7.5 inch armour piercing shell £22,400 
28 March 1904 British Navy 1,000 12 inch light solid shot  £3,320 
26 April 1904 British Navy 800 7.5 inch armour piercing shell £11,200 
26 April 1904 British Navy 800 7.5 inch armour piercing shell £11,200 
21 June 1904 British Navy 2,000 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap £13,250 
01 September 1904 India Office 888 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap £5,772 
     
09 January 1905 British Navy 300 10 inch armour piercing shell with cap £7,800 
11 January 1905 British Navy 300 12 inch heavy solid shot £1,275 
01 April 1905 British Navy 400 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap £7,400 
31 July 1905 British Army 810 6 inch armour piercing shell with cap £3,827 
05 September 1905 British Navy 800 12 inch heavy armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£25,600 
05 September 1905 British Navy 3,200 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap £51,200 
05 September 1905 British Navy 400 7.5 inch armour piercing shell with cap £3,750 
03 November 1905 British Army 400 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap £6,400 
     
September1908 British Navy 715  Common Shell £10,000 
     
January 1909  British Navy 800 12 inch Projectiles £17,000 
October 1909  British Navy 400 12 inch AP projectiles  
October 1909  British Navy 500 12 inch Lyddite shell £17,000 
     
June 1910  British Navy  4 inch lyddite shell £10,000 
September 1910  British Navy 800 13.5 inch armour piercing shell As below 
September 1910 British Navy 800 13.5 inch common pointed shell £87,000 
     
13 June 1911 British Navy 400 6 inch common shell £2,000 
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August 1911 British Navy 2,400 13.5 inch projectiles £100,000 
     
27 February 1912 British Navy 400 13.5 inch AP  As Below 
27 February 1912 British Navy 400 13.5 inch Common  £39,400 
15 October 2012 British Navy 400 6 inch common pointed with cap £2,450 
21 October 1912 British Army 200 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap £3,300 
28 September 1912 British Navy 3,200 6 inch common pointed with cap £19,600 
     
03 February 1913 British Navy 400 13.5 inch light armour piercing shell with 
cap 
£16,800 
28 May 1913 British Navy 800 15 inch armour piercing shell with cap £53,200 
31 May 1913 British Navy 1,600 6 inch common pointed shell with cap £9,920 
14 July 1913 British Navy 400 15 inch common pointed shell with cap £27,548 
18 July 1913 British Army 200 9.2 inch armour piercing shell with cap £3,325 
     
21 January 1914 British Navy 20 15 inch armour piercing shell with cap £1,260 
21 January 1914 British Navy 380 15 inch armour piercing shell with cap £23,940 
21 January 1914 British Navy 420 15 inch common pointed shell with cap £27,668 
21 January 1914 British Navy 380 15 inch common pointed shell with cap £25,032 
21 January 1914 British Navy 1,200 13.5 inch common pointed shell with cap £52,200 
June 1914 British Navy Unknown Details unknown £100,000 
 
Source: Sheffield Archives, Firth Records; The National Archives, Director of 
Naval Contracts Annual Reports 1900-1914. 
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Appendix C: Hadfields’ and Firth’s British Government Projectile Orders 
1920-1930 
 
Section 1: Hadfields’ Orders 
Order Date Customer Quantity Description Value 
12 March 1920 British Navy 800 15 inch Armour Piercing with Cap £118,773 
19 June 1920 British Navy 21 15 inch Armour Piercing with Cap £2,835 
17 July 1920 British Navy 200 15 inch Shell APC (Improved type for trials) £30,775 
27 September 1920 British Army 800 13.5 inch Shell APC Heavy £92,960 
01 December 1920 British Army 2 15 inch APC Shell Light £270 
09 December 1920 British Navy 1 15 inch APC Shell Light £135 
     
25 January 1921 British Navy 3 16 inch Shell APC 50 calibre £1,200 
26 February 1921 British Navy 600 15 inch Shell APC, New Type £82,347 
11 June 1921 British Navy 18 15 inch Shell APC Special Experimental £2,555 
23 July 1921 British Navy 15 6 inch APC and AP Shells 4% capacity £373 
23 September 1921 British Navy 4 15 inch APC double capped £800 
08 December 1921 British Navy 12 6 inch APC and AP Shells 4% capacity £268 
10 December 1921 British Navy 1,800 15 inch Armour Piercing Capped £260,678 
12 January 1922 British Navy 8 6 inch AP uncapped £179 
30 January 1922 British Navy 12 15 inch SAP Shell £1,668 
02 March 1922 British Navy 10 6 inch AP with Ballistic Caps £223 
08 May 1922 British Navy 20 6 inch AP representative £206 
29 June 1922 British Navy 100 0.308 inch Armour Piercing Bullets Capped 
Type 
£17 
30 June 1922 British Navy 2 16 inch APC shell £320 
18 July 1922 British Navy 4 15 inch SAP Shell £530 
03 August 1922 British Navy 800 15 inch APC £101,296 
21 August 1922 British Navy 250 16 inch APC representative £14,812 
25 August 1922 British Navy 12 4.7 inch Semi AP Shell  £142 
01 September 1922 British Navy 9 6 inch AP Shell £165 
20 September 1922 British Navy 12 6 inch APC Shell £257 
20 September 1922 British Navy 2 6 inch empty APC £82 
25 September 1922 British Navy 12 16 inch APC shell £1,589 
09 October 1922 British Navy 4 16 inch APC shell £550 
16 October 1922 British Navy 12 7.5 inch APC Shell £426 
28 September 1922 British Navy 40 0.303 Special Armour Piercing Bullets £10 
20 November 1922 British Navy 6 6 inch AP with Ballistic Caps £125 
19 December 1922 British Navy 30 6 inch AP representative £358 
19 December 1922 British Navy 6 6 inch AP Shell £112 
28 December 1922 British Navy 10 15 inch APC Shell New Type £307 
     
05 February 1923 British Navy 4 15 inch (Speical) APC Shell £472 
06 April 1923 British Navy 4 6 inch APC Shell £90 
18 April 1923 British Navy 6 6 inch APC Shell £135 
24 April 1923 British Navy 1,600 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic 
Cap 
£19,164 
30 April 1923 British Navy 720 5.2 inch Semi AP Shell £4,618 
11 May 1923 British Navy 60 5.2 inch SAP Representative shell £257 
01 June 1923 British Navy 4,800 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic £53,820 
 266 
Cap 
16 June 1923 British Navy 380 6 inch AP representative shell £4,506 
14 July 1923 British Navy 600 15 inch APC Shell £76,012 
07 August 1923 British Navy 10 4.7 inch SAP shell £165 
01 November 1923 British Navy 2,400 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic 
Cap 
£32,145 
01 November 1923 British Navy 5,600 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic 
Cap 
£60,425 
22 December 1923 British Navy 16 16 inch APC shell improved design £2,200 
     
03 January 1924 British Navy 10 5.2 inch SAP representative shell £47 
21 January 1924 British Navy 100 15 inch APC representative shell £4,550 
24 January 1924 British Navy 12 15 inch SAPC shell £1,554 
15 March 1924 British Navy 180 5.2 inch SAP shell £1,278 
05 April 1924 British Navy 1,600 4.7 inch SAP shell £9,131 
30 April 1924 British Navy 16 8 inch APC shell £373 
16 June 1924 British Navy 30 15 inch SAPC representative shell £1,425 
17 June 1924 British Navy 42 6 inch APC representative shell £504 
18 July 1924 British Army 5,000 3 pound AP shell £2,875 
10 July 1924 British Army 8 9.2 inch AP Capped shell £384 
19 August 1924 British Navy 1,200 16 inch APC shell £177,231 
08 September 1924 British Navy 38 6 inch, 50 calibre shell £453 
10 September 1924 British Navy 600 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic 
cap 
£7,134 
20 October 1924 British Navy 164 8 inch APC representative shell £2,369 
21 November 1924 British Army 20,000 3 pound AP shell £11,289 
03 December 1924 British Army 2,000 4.7 inch SAP shell £9,514 
16 December 1924 British Navy 12 4.7 inch heavy SAP shell £61 
27 December 1924 British Navy 10 4.7 inch heavy SAP shell £59 
     
22 January 1925 British Navy 10 6 inch APC shell £180 
03 February 1925 British Navy 1,000 16 inch APC shell £151,536 
12 February 1925 British Navy 3,200 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic 
cap 
£37,078 
17 February 1925 British Navy 26 7.5 inch SAPC shell with Ballistic cap £808 
19 February 1925 British Navy 20 4 inch SAP representative shell £109 
20 March 1925 British Navy 23 6 inch APC representative shell £13 
21 March 1925 British Army 10 9.2 inch common pointed ballistic cap shell £435 
18 May 1925 British Navy 13 16 inch APC representative shell £68 
27 May 1925 British Army 1,000 60 pounder high explosive shell £2,605 
16 June 1925 British Navy 10 4.7 inch SAP representative shell £41 
24 June 1925 British Navy 12 4.7 inch SAP heavy shell £72 
29 June 1925 British Army 12 8 inch SAP shell £405 
29 June 1925 British Army 12 8 inch SAPC shell £501 
11 August 1925 British Army 500 3.7 inch Howitzer shell £775 
11 August 1925 British Army 500 4.5 inch Howitzer shell £1,077 
28 August 1925 British Navy 3,000 6 inch common pointed shell with Ballistic 
cap 
£36,015 
09 September 1925 British Navy 6 16 inch APC representative shell £390 
11 September 1925 British Navy 30 7.5 inch representative SAPC shell £622 
06 October 1925 British Navy 12 16 inch representative shell £780 
12 October 1925 British Navy 406 6 inch CPBC representative shell £539 
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24 October 1925 British Army 6,432 4.7 inch Howz HE Shell £10,047 
28 October 1925 British Navy 100 16 inch APC representative shell £5,929 
09 November 1925 British Navy 20 4 inch SAP representative shell £81 
20 November 1925 British Navy 10 4.7 inch SAP shell for trials £80 
21 December 1925 British Navy 20 8 inch SAP shell of various designs £771 
28 December 1925 British Navy 14 7.5 inch SAPC and 7.5 inch SAP shell £426 
     
06 January 1926 British Navy 20 8 inch representative SAPC shell £312 
06 January 1926 British Navy 20 8 inch representative SAP shell £334 
01 January 1926 British Navy 2,800 4.7 inch heavy SAP shell £18,717 
03 March 1926 British Army 6 9.2 inch AP Capped shell £288 
12 January 1926 British Navy 40 8 inch representative SAP shell £613 
20 January 1926 British Navy 100 16 inch APC representative shell £5,965 
12 February 1926 British Navy 12 8 inch SAPC shell £511 
13 February 1926 British Navy 10 5.2 inch representative SAP shell £63 
10 March 1926 British Navy 1,060 4.7 inch SAP shell £6,006 
15 March 1926 British Navy 10 16 inch cast steel practice shot £462 
21 April 1926 British Navy 5 8 inch SAPC shell  
21 April 1926 British Navy 5 8 inch SAPC representative shell £258 
29 April 1926 British Navy 130 8 inch SAPC representative shell £2,225 
19 May 1926 British Navy 24 6 inch CPBC shell £320 
07 June 1926 British Army 5,000 3 pound AP shell £2,628 
10 June 1926 British Navy 3,000 4.7 inch heavy HE shell £7,177 
05 July 1926 British Navy 6,000 8 inch SAPC shell £214,849 
15 July 1926 British Navy 10 4 inch SAP shell weighted salt £79 
30 July 1926 British Navy 40 7.5 inch SAPC representative shell £968 
16 August 1926 British Navy 10 6 inch CPBC shell representative £50 
16 August 1926 British Navy 20 16 inch practice projectiles £1,470 
02 December 1926 British Army 50 9.2 inch representative APC shell  
02 December 1926 British Army 50 9.2 inch representative CPBC shell £2,552 
15 December 1926 British Navy 20 16 inch practice projectiles £904 
21 December 1926 British Navy 14 15 inch SAPC shell £1,653 
31 December 1926 British Navy 2,000 7.5 inch SAPC shell £57,914 
     
17 January 1927 British Navy 5,000 4 inch high explosive heavy shell £7,500 
21 January 1927 British Navy 40 6 inch CPC to various specifications £610 
10 February 1927 British Navy 2,400 8 inch SAPC shell £85,456 
29 March 1927 British Navy 180 16 inch APC representative shell £10,597 
29 March 1927 British Navy 10 4 inch SAP heavy shell £66 
13 April 1927 British Navy 12 7.5 inch SAPC shell £405 
28 May 1927 British Navy 2,000 4.7 inch heavy high explosive shell £4,701 
28 May 1927 British Navy 5,000 4 inch high explosive heavy shell £7,415 
23 August 1927 British Navy 2,000 6 inch CPBC shell £23,180 
26 July 1927 British Navy 40 16 inch APC representative shell £2,250 
11 August 1927 British Navy 100 16 inch APC representative shell £5,625 
20 September 1927 British Navy 40 15 inch target ship practice projectiles £1,200 
23 September 1927 British Navy 2,400 4.7 inch SAP heavy shell £11,623 
24 September 1927 British Navy 40 16 inch target ship practice projectiles £1,340 
07 October 1927 British Navy 4,800 8 inch SAPC shell £165,963 
15 November 1927 British Navy 5 16 inch practice projectiles £335 
26 November 1927 British Navy 100 16 inch APC representative shell £5,625 
07 December 1927 British Navy 1,600 7.5 inch SAPC shell £46,033 
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03 January 1928 British Navy 4,400 4 inch SAP heavy shell £19,091 
10 February 1928 British Navy 120 16 inch APC representative shell £6,750 
18 April 1928 British Navy 12 16 inch practice projectiles £739 
17 May 1928 British Navy 250 16 inch APC representative shell £14,062 
17 May 1928 British Navy 400 4.7 inch SAP shell MK1 £1,960 
17 May 1928 British Navy 2,000 4.7 inch SAP shell MK2 £10,098 
19 May 1928 British Navy 4,600 4.7 inch HE shell £10,876 
19 May 1928 British Navy 11,000 4 inch HE shell £16,320 
02 June 1928 British Navy 400 4.7 inch heavy SAP shell £1,971 
13 June 1928 British Navy 3,200 8 inch SAPC shell £109,388 
25 June 1928 British Army 6 9.2 inch AP shell £299 
10 August 1928 British Navy 12 15 inch APC shell £1,483 
13 August 1928 British Army 24 9.2 inch APC representative shell £480 
13 August 1928 British Army 24 9.2 inch CPBC respresentative shell £552 
27 August 1928 British Army 40 9.2 inch heavy practice shot £360 
05 October 1928 British Navy 7,200 4.7 inch SAP heavy shell £35,514 
12 October 1928 British Navy 200 16 inch APC representative shell £11,874 
24 November 1928 British Navy 1,000 8 inch SAPC shell £36,433 
06 December 1928 British Navy 200 15 inch practice target ship projectiles £6,650 
     
03 January 1929 British Navy 100 7.5 inch target ship practice shell £1,782 
19 January 1929 British Navy 15 16 inch APC representative shell £904 
16 February 1929 British Navy 300 16 inch practice projectiles £13,144 
01 March 1929 British Navy 40 15 inch practice projectile target ship £2,009 
08 June 1929 British Navy 5,000 4 inch heavy HE shell £7,540 
24 July 1929 British Navy 12 8 inch SAPC shell £253 
02 August 1929 British Army 2 9.2 inch APC shell £96 
11 September 1929 British Navy 8,800 4.7 inch heavy SAP shell £43,252 
02 October 1929 British Army 3,009 4.5 inch HE Howitzer shell £4,938 
02 October 1929 British Army 503 4.5 inch smoke Howitzer shell £1,062 
23 October 1929 British Navy 100 15 inch APC shell £13,247 
04 November 1929 British Navy 1 15 inch SAPC shell £125 
16 November 1929 British Navy 11 6 inch CPBC shell (New Design) £239 
12 December 1929 British Navy 56,000 2 pounder high explosive shell £12,624 
12 December 1929 British Navy 9,000 2 pounder projectiles £2,591 
     
08 February 1930 British Army 5 9.2 inch APC shell £243 
17 April 1930 British Navy 80,000 2 pounder common nose fuze shell £17,007 
30 April 1930 British Navy 160 6 inch CPBC representative shell £1,074 
12 May 1930 British Navy 20,000 2 pounder HE shell £4,507 
24 May 1930 British Navy 900 4.7 inch Heavy HE shell £2,125 
27 May 1930 British Navy 200 16 inch practice projectiles £8,600 
29 May 1930 British Navy 50,000 2 pounder practice projectiles £9,398 
06 June 1930 British Navy 500 4.7 inch heavy practice projectiles £1,496 
04 July 1930 British Navy 5,000 2 pound tracer projectiles £1,465 
04 July 1930 British Navy 3,500 8 inch practice projectiles £32,625 
31 July 1930 British Navy 4,000 4.7 inch heavy SAP shell £19,954 
19 August 1930 British Army 3 9.2 inch APC projectiles for costal defence £57 
09 September 1930 British Navy 4,000 4 inch practice projectiles £8,157 
11 October 1930 British Navy 70 16 inch high explosive shell £6,587 
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Source: Sheffield Archives, Hadfields Projectile Order Books Volume 3 to 5. 
 
 
Section 2: Firth’s Orders 
Note: Firth‟s orders are recorded only by year and as British Government 
orders. No further details are available.  
 
Order Date Customer Quantity Description Value 
1920 British Government 2,400 7.5inch CPC £43,200 
1920 British Government 400 13.5inch APC £36,000 
1920 British Government 800 13.5inch APC £72,000 
1920 British Government 2 15inch APC Experimental £250 
     
1921 British Government 400 15inch APC £50,000 
1921 British Government 4 16inch APC Experimental £600 
1921 British Government 15 6inch AP Experimental £225 
1921 British Government 400 13.5inch APC £36,000 
1921 British Government 1,000 15inch APC £125,000 
     
1922 British Government 18 6inch AP Experimental £270 
1922 British Government 10 6inch AP Representative £90 
1922 British Government 400 15inch APC £50,000 
1922 British Government 12 4.7inch SAP £84 
1922 British Government 2 6inch APC £30 
1922 British Government 12 16inch APC Experimental £1,800 
1922 British Government 12 7.5inch APC Experimental £360 
1922 British Government 26 6inch AP Experimental £390 
     
1923 British Government 800 6inch CPBC £9,600 
1923 British Government 3,200 6inch CPBC £36,000 
1923 British Government 400 15inch APC £50,000 
1923 British Government 4,400 6inch CPBC £47,300 
     
1924 British Government 12 16inch APC Experimental £1,800 
1924 British Government 2,000 4.7inch SAP £11,350 
1924 British Government 16 8inch APC Experimental £688 
1924 British Government 40 7.5inch APC Experimental £1,375 
1924 British Government 2 6inch CP Experimental £24 
1924 British Government 800 16inch APC £120,533 
1924 British Government 4 7.5inch APC Experimental £120 
1924 British Government 400 6inch CPBC £4,300 
     
1925 British Government 600 16inch APC £89,885 
1925 British Government 1,600 6inch CPBC £20,667 
1925 British Government 32 7.5inch SAPC Experimental £888 
1925 British Government 12 4.7inch SAP Experimental £84 
1925 British Government 28 8inch SAPC Experimental £1,077 
1925 British Government 2,200 6inch CPBC £26,336 
1925 British Government 40 7.5inch APC Experimental £1,370 
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1925 British Government 10 4.7inch SAP £67 
1925 British Government 48 8inch SAPC Experimental £1,905 
     
1926 British Government 1,800 4.7inch SAP £10,057 
1926 British Government 12 8inch SAPC Experimental £512 
1926 British Government 20 8inch SAPC Representative £320 
1926 British Government 3 50lbs Bombs £117 
1926 British Government 3 120lbs Bombs £125 
1926 British Government 3 250lbs Bombs £153 
1926 British Government 3 500lbs Bombs £188 
1926 British Government 24 6inch CPBC Experimental £324 
1926 British Government 3,200 8inch SAPC £114,400 
1926 British Government 400 8inch SAPC £14,150 
1926 British Government 10 4inch SAP Experimental £80 
1926 British Government 14 15inch SAPC £1,806 
1926 British Government 1,200 7.5inch SAPC £34,650 
     
1927 British Government 4 1500lbs Bombs £394 
1927 British Government 1,600 8inch SAPC £56,600 
1927 British Government 25 7.5inch APC £856 
1927 British Government 12 7.5inch SAPC £412 
1927 British Government 1,200 6inch CPBC £13,400 
1927 British Government 2,800 8inch SAPC £95,620 
1927 British Government 1,200 7.5inch SAPC £34,200 
     
1928 British Government 2,400 4inch SAP £10,440 
1928 British Government 6 450lbs Bombs £382 
1928 British Government 2,000 8inch SAPC £68,125 
1928 British Government 12 15inch APC £1,449 
1928 British Government 4,000 4.7inch SAP £19,900 
1928 British Government 600 8inch SAPC £20,438 
     
1929 British Government 12 8inch SAPC £347 
1929 British Government 5,200 4.7inch SAP £25,740 
1929 British Government 100 15inch APC £12,700 
1929 British Government 1 15inch SAPC £129 
1929 British Government 55 6inch CPBC £456 
     
1930 British Government 4 2000lbs Bombs £454 
1930 British Government 150 16inch Practice £6,390 
1930 British Government 2,000 8inch Practice £18,400 
1930 British Government 2,400 4.7inch SAP £11,940 
 
Source: Sheffield Archives, Firth-Brown Records 
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Appendix D: Brown’s Monthly Armour Orders 1904-1924 
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m
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D
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m
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1904 £579 £90 £298,485 £0 £4,198 £0 £197,860 £24 £0 £43 £435 £86 
1905 £571 £5,555 £3,400 £2,012 £0 £0 £2,725 £936 £184 £934 £5,737 £215 
1906 £33,750 £117,892 £238,236 £235 £0 £7,606 £0 £0 £0 £99 £109 £368,618 
1907 £230 £61 £75 £0 £3,779 £0 £1,800 £288 £1,972 £0 £32 £0 
1908 £288,776 £0 £0 £545 £5,102 £400 £21,124 £720 £608 £0 £0 £3,180 
1909 £146,603 £0 £1,601 £864 £1,700 £0 £169,900 £0 £1,535 £27,055 £792 £613 
1910 £152,875 £800 £192,448 £132,504 £31,506 £274,350 £698 £7,659 £2,062 £746 £784 £10,500 
1911 £80,394 £249,605 £32 £0 £0 £53,784 £47,886 £15,733 £88,990 £0 £0 £0 
1912 £245,298 £0 £65,137 £0 £0 £150,435 £52,792 £74,296 £1,660 £504 £0 £71,016 
1913 £43,424 £3,767 £102,241 £0 £517 £611,002 £0 £86,009 £6,309 £2,800 £204 £0 
1914 £0 £0 £11,746 £0 £0 £287,576 £28,088 £2,563 £0 £3,094 £0 £64,986 
1915 £0 £217,511 £13,971 £109,300 £0 £3,093 £1,296 £0 £0 £1,000 £51 £6,665 
1916 £315 £4,212 £0 £880 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
1917 £4,455 £108,480 £0 £0 £0 £0 £49,187 £0 £5,764 £10,104 £10,104 £564 
1918 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £10,935 £0 £0 £7,950 £61,944 £0 
1919 £0 £0 £14,825 £0 £5,350 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £5,000 
1920 £10,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £86,273 £0 £0 £0 £0 £23,923 £0 
1921 £0 £2,500 £0 £0 £0 £5,862 £0 £26,980 £0 £16,510 £0 £0 
1922 £0 £0 £0 £0 £300 £0 £0 £3,534 £1,494 £0 £0 £565,135 
1923 £0 £0 £47,626 £5,760 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
1924 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £67 £0 £0 £0 £0 
Source: Sheffield Archives, X308/1/2/1/3/1 to 21, Brown‟s Managing Directors Reports 1905-1924 
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